Kelsen Research Articles

Sovereignty across generations: The problem of divisive pluralism dismissed

The Rawlsian conception of constituent power in Alessandro Ferrara’s Sovereignty Across Generations is burdened by a deep contradiction that renders the central argument in the book highly questionable. On the one hand, Rawls is (correctly in my view) presented as the thinker that confronted contemporary political theory with the problem of divisive pluralism. On the other hand, Rawls is also presented (incorrectly in my view) as the thinker who then suddenly found a solution for this divisive pluralism in the ‘common values’ that all the members of these divisively pluralist societies share ‘unproblematically’. The combination of these two moves leaves one with the sense that Rawls rather frivolously put up the problem of divisive pluralism like a strawman that he could shoot down again without much ado. This article proposes a different reading of Rawls that considers him a serious thinker who did not amuse himself and his readers with strawman-problems. For this reading of Rawls, guidance is drawn from Hans Kelsen, the very thinker whom Sovereignty Across Generations casually dismisses for failing to grasp or appreciate the ‘common values’ that pluralist societies share so ‘unproblematically’.

A Critique of State and Law in Hans Kelsen’s Thought from Herman Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy

Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyze the theoretical commitments and the legal-political problems of Hans Kelsen’s thought from the perspective of Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. It seeks to answer the following question: Why was the relationship between state and law in Kelsen’s thought unable to protect civil society and individuals from the power of the state? The argument, based on Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, is that Kelsen was trapped in an insurmountable theoretical dialectic or tension between nature and freedom. In pursuit of methodological purity, Kelsen reduced the state and law to the logical aspect and morality to the historical aspect. Analyzing Kelsen’s thought from the point of view of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique, this paper demonstrates that Kelsen’s commitments with respect to reality led him to a reductionist theory that rendered society defenseless against the power of the state.

Essay About The Western History of Human Rights

Objective: The objective of this article was to investigate the historicity of Human Rights and Human Dignity, with an emphasis on the development of religious natural law in the Roman Catholic and Apostolic periods. Theoretical Framework: Works by renowned authors in Law, Social Sciences and Humanities were consulted, namely Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hans Kelsen and Rafael Diehl. Method: The methodology used in this research was based on a holistic and multidisciplinary analysis, that is, empirical and documentary research was essential for the hermeneutic and conceptual analysis of Human Rights and Human Dignity. Results and Discussion: It is clear that the conceptual notion of human being was, is and seems to be influenced by religious and rationalist natural law perspectives. Implications of the Research: The research seeks to awaken readers to the historicity of Human Rights and Human Dignity, notably regarding apparently extra-legal precepts of natural law. Originality/Value: This study contributes to the Academy, in the sense of, dialectically, providing a dialogue between classical and contemporary theories on Human Rights and Human Dignity.

Grundnorm and Grounding A modern Metaphysics for Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory?

Abstract This article explores the possibility of reconstructing Hans Kelsen’s neo-Kantian theory of the basic norm (Grundnorm) with the help of the theory of (metaphysical) grounding. First, we outline Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm as an integral part of his neo-Kantian transcendental idealism and give a sketch of grounding theory; we then try to fit these theories together. As it turns out, grounding theory has some internal flaws. More importantly, several of the features of a metaphysical ground are not compatible with the roles which Kelsen ascribes to the basic norm – its roles as a keystone of the legal hierarchy and as a transcendental-logical condition of legal cognition. Finally, an alternative conception is examined, according to which the legal system is grounded not by the basic norm but by social facts, with the basic norm serving as a bridging principle. However, this alternative is flawed as well; its main problem seems to be that it violates the dualism of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’. The argument is relevant for the concept of personhood, because Kelsen treats the term ‘person’ in law as a mere expression for the unity of a specific set of legal norms, so that the identity of persons is ultimately dependent on the identity and function of the basic norm of the legal system.

The Influence of Theorie Von Stufenbau Der Rechtsordnung in the Indonesian Legal System

The aim of this research is to analyze the influence of Hans Kelsen's Theorie Von Stufenufbau Der Rechtsordnung on the Indonesian legal system. The research method employed is legal research with a statutory and conceptual approach. Primary and secondary legal materials are analyzed using normative analysis. The findings reveal that Theorie Von Stufenufbau Der Rechtsordnung significantly impacts the Indonesian legal system. There are at least two main influences identified. First, the system of laws and regulations in Indonesia has been structured hierarchically since the enactment of the Temporary People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. XX/1966 up to the present day. However, this hierarchy is not absolute, especially concerning the positions of Perppu and People's Consultative Assembly Decrees. Second, there is a recognized mechanism for reviewing legal norms to ensure their validity, whether through judicial review, political review, or executive review. The hierarchical structure of Indonesia's legal system reflects Kelsen's theory, which posits that law consists of interrelated levels of norms. Each level derives its authority from the norm above it, with the basic norm at the apex, serving as the source of legitimacy for the entire legal system. In the Indonesian context, this basic norm can be identified as the UUD NRI 1945, which underpins all subordinate legislation. The review mechanism for legal norms also illustrates the influence of Kelsen's theory. Judicial review, conducted by the Constitutional Court, assesses whether a law aligns with the Constitution. Political review is undertaken by legislative bodies such as the DPR, which can evaluate and amend legislation. Executive review is carried out by executive bodies, such as the President or ministers, who have the authority to adjust or repeal regulations deemed inappropriate.

How to explain the phenomenon of law – part II

The following article is divided into two parts. Its purpose is to briefly review the competing ways of understanding the law. The first presents the concepts of natural law with its variant- the law of nature with variable content and legal positivism (classical, the theory of "pure law" by Hans Kelsen, refined positivism), Gustaw Radbruch's formulas and the relations between them.The second part discusses the realistic concept of law (American realism, legal psychologism of Leon Petrażycki and Scandinavian ones), the concepts of the so-called the third way (hermeneutics, communication theory of law, the rhetorical concept of Chaim Perelman's law) and a multifaceted approach to law.

The Power of Purity: Preliminary Notes for an Archaeology of Modern Jurisprudence

AbstractIn this paper I will try to subsume what Carl Schmitt referred to as the three types of juristic thought – positivism, decisionism and institutionalism – under the same 'signature of power’. With this expression I refer here to a general enunciative function that informs (legal) thought, forcing it to perform an (ex-ceptional) articulation of (form of) law and (force of) life. My suggestion is thus that it is possible to interpret the different approach to the law question of two fatherly figures of modern jurisprudence – Hans Kelsen (positivism) and Carl Schmitt (decisionist-institutionalism) – in a way which, while mantaining that there is indeed a difference between their theories, points also towards a more fundamental partnership which concerns the very form (i.e. ex-ceptionality) of their questioning. The purpose of this paper is thus to show that the fundamental differences between these two approaches become indistinguishable if re-considered in the context of a broader problematisation of power which, following Giorgio Agamben’s reinterpretation of Foucault’s work on biopolitics, can here be defined as an ideology of govern-mentality according to which, simply put, sociality can be reduced to one, two-sided, operation: government/self-government through a decision on the form of law, to be perfomed at different levels, including thought. Legal theory as practiced by Kelsen and Schmitt is, in this respect, governmental or biopolitical, because it institutes a fictional threshold of indifferentiation between law (form) and life (force), whose preservation, by means of further (ex-ceptional) articulations (i.e. inclusive-exclusions), becomes the jurist’s fundamental task. Moreover, given the central role of both Kelsen’s positivism and Schmitt’s decisionist institutionalism for modern legal theory in general, a critical reflection on the act of (legal) theorising as such as an act of power is made possible. The modern tradition of legal theory can thus be interpreted – in spite of its increasing complexity and fragmentation (which was already reflected, at the beginning of the last century, in the fragmentation of legal theory into positivist, institutionalist and decisionist stances) – as preserving thought’s power to relate law and life. One possible alternative to a theory of (i.e. that belongs to) power is, I think, a practice of critical observation (a study) of the power of theory.

Pentingnya Pemisahan Kekuasaan Dalam Mempertahankan Pemerintahan Yang Seimbang

The division of power into three branches put forward by two experts called trias politica which is generally divided into legislative, executive, and judicial powers, the fourth branch put forward by Hans Kelsen in the statement of ensuring regime stability requires a fourth branch referred to as the Constitutional Court which is believed to be the guardian of the stability of the other three branches by maintaining the constitution in the party government and with this function can determine many other characteristics. By using a normative method that aims to understand and interpret the rules of law contained in the constitution of state administration in Indonesia, ensuring the suitability of each rule of law with the norms that apply in the context of writing articles on constitutional law. The data used in this paper is secondary data. This existence of a balanced government in the state administration ensures that there is a fair contribution of power in each power-sharing system with the aim of monitoring and balancing each other to prevent abuse of power and ensure the fulfillment of citizens’ rights.

Analysis of Dispute over Authority to Conduct Journalist Competency Tests Following Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 38/PUU/XIX/2021

This study discusses a dispute between the Press Council (DP) and the National Board for Profession Certification (BNSP) over the authority to conduct journalist competency tests (UKW) using Hans Kelsen’s and Hans Kaviasky’s Theory of Hierarchy of Law. This research was conducted through a qualitative approach using a normative judicial method in analyzing the Constitutional Court’s Decision No.38/PPU-XIX/2021 concerning the authority to conduct journalist competency tests. Secondary data of this research was obtained through literature and document studies. This research found that there has been no final clarification on the settlement of the legal dispute between DP and BNSP over the authority to conduct journalist competency tests following the Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 38/PPU-XIX/2021 rejecting in full the applicants’ plea. The legal implication of the decision is that both DP and BNSP can continue to conduct journalist competency tests respectively.

Tinjauan Yuridis Putusan Pengadilan Agama Stabat No.1062/Pdt. G/2015/PA.Stab Tentang Pembatalan Hibah Perspektif Teori Keadilan

This study aims to analyze the decision of the Religious Court Stabat No.1062/Pdt. G/2015/PA.Stab regarding grant cancellation. This study uses a statutory and conceptual approach. The data sources used are primary data sources consisting of decisions from the Religious Courts, compilations of Islamic law, books of civil law laws, compilations of sharia economic laws. Meanwhile, secondary sources of law consist of books of Islamic jurisprudence, law books, and scientific journal articles. The results of this study indicate that the panel of judges examining cases of disputes over the cancellation of grants uses article 35 paragraph 1, article 36 paragraph 1 of law number 1 of 1974 concerning joint property and article 1338 of the Civil Code regarding agreements/agreement, thus ignoring the article regarding the permissibility of withdrawing a grant object even though the grant is without the approval of other heirs. The panel of judges should ideally be guided by the concept of Maqasid Syari'ah, namely maintenance of property and offspring. Thus, it can avoid negative impacts that will occur in family ties, such as the relationship between parents and their heirs. However, according to Hans Kelsen's theory of justice, the legal considerations made by judges in deciding cases of cancellation of grants are inconsistent in terms of the application of the legal system in force in Indonesia because according to him a sense of justice has not been fulfilled for justice seekers.

Is Vladimir Putin a Realist with Special Attention to the Concept of a Force Monopoly and Hans Kelsen’s Principle of Effectiveness of Laws and Joe Biden’s (President of the United States of America) Speech at the United Nations General Assembly Meeting of 20th September, 2023 That There Will Be Reprisal against Russia for Starting the War with Ukraine Coincide with

Is Vladimir Putin a Realist with Special Attention to the Concept of a Force Monopoly and Hans Kelsen’s Principle of Effectiveness of Laws and Joe Biden’s (President of the United States of America) Speech at the United Nations General Assembly Meeting of 20th September, 2023 That There Will Be Reprisal against Russia for Starting the War with Ukraine Coincide with

PERTANGGUNGJAWABAN NOTARIS TERKAIT PENOLAKAN PEMBUATAN AKTA SYARIAH DAN AKIBAT HUKUMNYA MENURUT SISTEM HUKUM DI INDONESIA.

The refusal of notaries to make Sharia deeds without a valid reason raises important issues regarding their legal liability and its legal consequences in the Indonesian legal system. Although the law provides for the obligation of notaries to act fairly and non-discriminatively, the existing legal literature is lacking in exploring the administrative, civil, and criminal legal implications of such refusal. This study raises two problems, namely how the legal consequences for notaries related to the rejection of making Sharia deeds according to the legal system in Indonesia and how the responsibility of Notaries related to the rejection of making Sharia deeds according to the legal system in Indonesia, using the theory of legal consequences and liability theory of Hans Kelsen. The method used in this study is the normative juridical method, namely legal research conducted by researching library materials or secondary data only. The research approach used is the approach of legislation, case approach, analytical approach and conceptual approach. The technique of collecting legal materials is carried out by identifying and inventorying positive legal rules, researching library materials (books, scientific journals, research reports) and other sources of legal materials that are relevant to the legal issues under study. For technical analysis of legal material is done by systematic and grammatical interpretation. The results of this study that the reason noltaris mellnollak mellrellsmikan kolnvellnsiolnal deed is karellna ulrulsan religious law. The choice undertaken Noltaris only mellrellsmikan deed that bellrsifat Sharia karellna call ulntulk tulndulk heart and patulh tellrhadap kellimanan principle that he lived. It tellrsellbult, based ollellh pellrintah in Al-Qulran and Al-Hadith, “Rasullulllah sallallahul ' alaihi wa sallam mellaknat pellmakan riba (rellntellnir), pellnyelltolr riba (customers who mellminjam), pellnullis riba transactions (sellkrelltaris) and Dula witness mellnyaksikan riba transactions, sellmulanya same dalamSS dolsa.” (HR. Mulslim Zero. 1598Noltaris the mellnollak mellrellsmikan kolnvellnsiolnal deed in pellservice pulblik mellrulpakan sulatul rights owned by noltaris sellbagai nellgara citizens, where nellgara is obliged to ulntulk mellngakolmoldasi the rights of bellrnellgara from seaeach country citizen

SENGKETA PEMBATALAN HIBAH DI PENGADILAN AGAMA STABAT DITINJAU DARI MASLAHAH

This study aims to examine the considerations of religious court judges in examining and deciding grant cancellation disputes. This study will analyze the decision of the Religious Court regarding the cancellation of grants in terms of maslahah. This study uses qualitative normative legal research. While the approach used is statutory and conceptual approach. The data sources used are primary data sources consisting of decisions from the Religious Courts, compilations of Islamic law, books of civil law laws, compilations of sharia economic laws. Meanwhile, secondary sources of law consist of books of Islamic jurisprudence, law books, and scientific journal articles. The results of this study indicate that the panel of judges examining cases of disputes over the cancellation of dominant gifts applies article 35 paragraph 1, article 36 paragraph I law number 1 of 1974 concerning joint assets and article 1338 of the civil law code concerning agreements/agreement, thus ignoring Article regarding the permissibility of withdrawing the grant object even though the grant is without the approval of other heirs. Meanwhile, according to the theory of maslahah initiated by al-Ghazali that the decisions of the Religious Courts made by the panel of judges are ideally to realize the concept of maqasid sharia, namely maintenance of property and offspring. Thus, it can avoid negative impacts that will occur in family relationships, such as the relationship between parents and their heirs. However, according to Hans Kelsen's theory of justice, the considerations made by judges in deciding cases of cancellation of grants tended to be inconsistent in the application of the applicable legal system, so that according to him, the intended sense of justice had not been fully fulfilled.

Taking Dworkin’s Legal Monism Seriously

Abstract In this review essay, I analyse two philosophical positions presented by Cormac Mac Amhlaigh in New Constitutional Horizons – namely, a pluralistic analytic legal theory, which offers a criterion of ‘individuation’ of legal systems in the context of transnational laws (to explain the relationship between domestic and international law), and a pluralistic account of constitutionalism, which understands the concept of ‘constitution’ and related political concepts in the context of transnational legal relationships (treating them as ‘interpretive concepts’ in the sense of Ronald Dworkin). My main target is not Mac Amhlaigh’s account of constitutionalism, with which I agree, but, rather, his analytic legal theory. After a brief summary of the former, to make explicit the interpretive methodology of the book, I respond to the latter in two ways: first, I present Dworkin’s argument to defend Hans Kelsen’s international legal monism against H.L.A. Hart’s objections, and, second, I argue that the analytic ambition to provide a test to distinguish sharply between municipal law and international law, treating them as separate while simultaneously valid systems, is unachievable. I end with a claim that Dworkin’s thesis of the unity of value entails a distinctive version of legal monism, which is more plausible than Kelsen’s traditional legal monism because it is not committed to a ‘linear’ or ‘hierarchical’ theory of law.

Legal Certainty In Financial Disputes Case Resolution Progressive Legal Perspective

Pure Legal Theory (The Pure Theory of Law) is a positive legal theory. However, it does not discuss positive Law that applies in a particular legal system; it only discusses general legal theory. Hans Kelsen's presentation of Pure Legal Theory aims to explain the nature of Law and methods of making Law rather than explaining what the Law should be or the best way for Law to be created. This writing uses descriptive legal research, in which the author uses a normative juridical research type using the Library Research data collection method. This research aims to determine how the legal certainty and protection of the parties in mediating the resolution of Sharia financial disputes, a comparison of progressive legal analysis of Hans Kelsen and Satjipto Raharjo's legal theory in resolving Sharia financial disputes. Based on the research and discussion results, a picture is obtained that legal certainty (rechtssicherheit) Legal certainty is the certainty of laws or regulations; all kinds of methods, methods, and so on must be based on laws or regulations. Within legal certainty, there are positive laws and written laws. Normative legal certainty is when a regulation that regulates it clearly and logically is created and promulgated. Progressive Law wants to return the Law to the right track (on the right track). For this reason, Satjipto Rahardjo thinks that legal breakthroughs are needed (legal breakthroughs, not legal breaking) in law formation and enforcement.

Legal Counterrevolution: Property and Judicial Power in the Weimar Republic

This article offers a new account of the rise of judicial power in modern Germany. Strong judicial control of the government is often associated with the constitutional ethos that emerged in postwar West Germany as a reaction to Nazi rule. This article locates the origins of German judicialization in the political struggles of the Weimar era. It shows how the assumption of a power to judicial review by Germany's highest court, the Reichsgericht, was the product of the successful cooperation of the judiciary with conservative political parties on the issue of property rights in the young republic. These were at the centre of two controversies examined in the article: the expropriation of princes of former ruling houses and the consequences of the hyperinflation of 1923. In both cases the Reichsgericht used an understanding of property as an inalienable right to radically reinterpret Germany's first democratic constitution, which had in fact granted the legislature extensive power to modify property relations. This suited the judiciary's own objective of assuming stronger controls over legislative action and bolstered the political position of conservative forces in Weimar politics. What emerged was a supra-positive constitutionalism that sought to supersede the written constitution. These political realities were an essential context for theoretical debates on the extent and limits of judicial power between theorists such as Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, Hermann Heller, Franz Neumann, and Ernst Fraenkel. An examination of the complex interaction of parliamentary, judicial, and popular politics concerning the issue of property reveals that German judicial empowerment amounted to an attempt to rewrite the Weimar Constitution and limit the scope of Germany's democratic revolution.

The role of the judiciary: Interpreting vs creating law – or how Hans Kelsen justified “judicial activism”

Hans Kelsen was not only a legal theorist but also worked as a constitutional judge in the First Austrian Republic between 1919 and 1930. Faced with increasing political criticism due to its “activism”, Kelsen radicalized his theory of law-application. He emphasized that judicial work generates law (i.e., it is genuinely political) and that a judge can also create new law outside the framework of possible norm meanings. In this way, he was able to refute political calls for the “depoliticization” of constitutional jurisdiction. In the paper, I present why the Austrian Constitutional Court was accused of “activism” and how Kelsen responded to it. The sociological question of how the judiciary exercises political power and how this power is perceived by politics is addressed in the paper with a focus on legal history, specifically regarding the Austrian Constitutional Court during the interwar period. Hans Kelsen no fue sólo un teórico del derecho, sino que también trabajó como juez constitucional en la Primera República Austriaca entre 1919 y 1930. Ante las crecientes críticas políticas por su “activismo”, Kelsen radicalizó su teoría de la aplicación del Derecho. Subrayó que la labor judicial genera derecho (es decir, es genuinamente política) y que un juez también puede crear nuevo derecho fuera del marco de los posibles significados de las normas. De este modo, pudo refutar los llamamientos políticos a la “despolitización” de la jurisdicción constitucional. En el artículo, expongo por qué se acusó al Tribunal Constitucional austriaco de “activismo” y cómo respondió Kelsen a ello. La cuestión sociológica de cómo el poder judicial ejerce el poder político y cómo este poder es percibido por la política se aborda en el trabajo con atención a la historia jurídica, concretamente en relación con el Tribunal Constitucional austriaco durante el período de entreguerras.

True ‘contradictions’ and conflicts in the Talmud

Abstract In this article, we consider the presence of what appear to be true contradictions in the Talmud. We consider and reject a glut-theoretic response. We argue these apparently contradictory Talmudic passages should be understood not as ordinary propositions, but as being given under an operator. This allows us to understand these rulings as genuinely conflicting, but not genuinely contradictory. We illustrate the broad shape of such a view through consideration of Hans Kelsen's late-period philosophy of law. We also consider and reject responses to this issue given by Rashi, R. Kook, and R. Feinstein. We close by considering why a system of Jewish law which allows for jointly affirmed conflicting propositions is desirable. We claim that if, as Maimonides suggests, the fundamental project of Jewish law is the eradication of idolatry, then the law itself should remind us that God's ways are higher than our ways. One way of doing so is to resist capture by a transparent set of principles, by allowing for conflicting rulings to be affirmed. This article does not presuppose familiarity with the Talmudic corpus or Jewish tradition.

Un especialista en realismo político clásico y en la obra de Hans Kelsen: entrevista a Robert Schuett

Robert Schuett, a former career civil servant (2011-2022), is currently a non-resident professor in international relations at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, a visiting fellow at the Department of Political Science at the University of Salzburg, as well as an honorary member of the School of Governance and International Affairs at the University of Durham, England. Robert Schuett was awarded a master’s degree by research in 2005 and a PhD in 2009, both in Political Science from the School of Governance and International Affairs at Durham University; the supervisor of his doctoral thesis was John C. Williams (Durham University), and his external evaluators were Chris J. Brown (London School of Economics) and Richard Little (University of Bristol). In 2007, he completed a doctoral research stay at LUISS University in Rome and, in 2010, he was a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Psychology at the University of California, San Diego, USA. He currently lives and works in Vienna. Robert Schuett’s main areas of interest are political philosophy, international relations, and political methodology. He is particularly interested in the classical approach to political and legal theory, economics and society, ethics, and justice. Professor Robert Schuett has authored and edited numerous works, including Hans Kelsen’s Political Realism (2021), The Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism (2018), The Concept of the State in International Relations: Philosophy, Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism (2015), and Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations: The Resurrection of the Realism Man (2010).

The Crisis of Democracy and the Legitimate Rule of Law: Kelsen, Populism, and the Politics of Recognition

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: This essay examines how deliberation and recognition contribute to our understanding of democracy as a form of government combining two sources of legitimacy, one based on a legal procedure and the other based on ideological faith commitment.
 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: Although joint deliberation about policy aims and recognition of person’s political identities are often assumed to be complementary (Habermas, 1996; Honneth, 2014; Taylor, 1994), I argue that this need not be the case. Political identities oriented by faith commitments pose a challenge to deliberation oriented by rational compromise. A one-sided emphasis on deliberation or recognition as exclusive sources of democratic legitimation threatens to debase the res publica to an arena of identity politics whose populist proclivities are antithetical to liberal democracy. Exacerbating this trend is the phenomenon of political polarization caused in large part by the economic stratification and socio-cultural fragmentation of a global, digital form of capitalism. My method for examining and resolving the problem relies on notable philosophers who have written about the legal and political implications of deliberation and the politics of recognition: Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, and Hans Kelsen.
 THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The paper begins by summarizing the importance of recognition for political life and its ambivalent humanistic and nationalistic (and sub-nationalistic) senses (Part 1). I then turn to Kelsen’s critique of recognition as incompatible with the rule of law, followed by his qualified endorsement of recognition, understood as a necessary political ethos underwriting a liberal, deliberative form of democracy (Parts 2 and 3). Turning to our contemporary democratic crisis, I show how structural transformations within and between political parties and the public sphere have given rise to authoritarian forms of populism (Part 4). I conclude by noting how imperatives within digital capitalism produce ambivalent effects regarding the restoration...