In 1809 Adam Seybert made an odd request. Speaking on floor of House of Representatives, Republican congressman from Pennsylvania asked that Alexander Hamilton's famed Report on Manufactures be reprinted for Congress. Hamilton's report, which had been tabled by House eighteen years earlier, was, according Seybert, document which contained much important matter, and did honor its author. Seybert added that it could serve as the basis on which an important superstructure might be raised.1 Historians long have described Hamilton's three reports-on credit, national bank, and manufactures-as bedrock of Federalist and catalysts in split between first American parties, Federalists and Democratic-Republicans. Yet, here Seybert, a Republican, was suggesting that Federalist Report on Manufactures might serve as blueprint for a American economy. By embracing ideas of his party's old archenemy, Seybert illustrated an important shift in discourse within first party system during events leading up War of 1812. During this period, a time of very heated rhetoric, parties appeared almost switch positions on issue of manufacturing and role of federal government in economy. Two aspects of Hamilton's report, according common wisdom, should have troubled Seybert and his fellow Republicans. The first was treasury secretary's support for manufacturing. In report's introduction, Hamilton acknowledged that, although manufacturing had gained support in nation, there were still some skeptics who were critical of it, particularly those who viewed agriculture as the most beneficial and productive object of human industry. Much of first section of report aimed prove that these skeptics were wrong and show that manufacturing could, in fact, be just as productive as agriculture. Historians generally have placed Republicans in camp of skeptical agrarians. Although simplistic Beardian dualism of Republican rural agrarianism versus Federalist urban capitalism has been replaced with a more nuanced vision of Republicans who, often reluctantly, supported limited forms of manufacturing, most historians still do not describe Republicans as enthusiastic promoters of manufacturing.2 The second potentially troubling aspect of report for Republicans was Hamilton's insistence that power of federal government be used encourage manufacturing. His critics, Hamilton predicted, would argue that to endeavor, by extraordinary patronage of government, accelerate growth of manufactures, is, in fact, endeavor by force and art, transfer natural current of industry from a more a less beneficial channel. Referring recent formulation of French physiocrats and Adam Smith, Hamilton explained that such critics would conclude that to leave industry itself, therefore, is, in almost every case, soundest as well as simplest policy. Hamilton's analysis of his opponents' logic has often been accepted by modern historians, most of whom agree that Republicans were indeed antimercantilist, although not always, as Joyce Appleby has argued, proponents of economic freedom and Adam Smith's invisible hand.3 Hamilton's 1791 report and Jeffersonian opposition it have long been at center of historical understanding of early American reaction industrialization. There was more discussion, however. For one thing, neither Hamilton's nor Jefferson's positions were necessarily broadly representative. Focusing too closely on their thought can blur positions of those below them. Also, last years of first party system, years of embargo and war between 1808 and 1815, were arguably more significant in shaping American attitudes toward manufacturing than were 1790s. This was period when promoters of a new economy based on industry truly came into their own. …
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Jan 1, 2022
Vagel C Keller 
Open Access
