H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Research Articles

Pathogenicity in Chickens and Turkeys of a 2021 United States H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Clade 2.3.4.4b Wild Bird Virus Compared to Two Previous H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4 Viruses.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of subtype H5 of the Gs/GD/96 lineage remain a major threat to poultry due to endemicity in wild birds. H5N1 HPAIVs from this lineage were detected in 2021 in the United States (U.S.) and since then have infected many wild and domestic birds. We evaluated the pathobiology of an early U.S. H5N1 HPAIV (clade 2.3.4.4b, 2021) and two H5N8 HPAIVs from previous outbreaks in the U.S. (clade 2.3.4.4c, 2014) and Europe (clade 2.3.4.4b, 2016) in chickens and turkeys. Differences in clinical signs, mean death times (MDTs), and virus transmissibility were found between chickens and turkeys. The mean bird infective dose (BID50) of the 2021 H5N1 virus was approximately 2.6 log10 50% embryo infective dose (EID50) in chickens and 2.2 log10 EID50 in turkeys, and the virus transmitted to contact-exposed turkeys but not chickens. The BID50 for the 2016 H5N8 virus was also slightly different in chickens and turkeys (4.2 and 4.7 log10 EID50, respectively); however, the BID50 for the 2014 H5N8 virus was higher for chickens than turkeys (3.9 and ~0.9 log10 EID50, respectively). With all viruses, turkeys took longer to die (MDTs of 2.6-8.2 days for turkeys and 1-4 days for chickens), which increased the virus shedding period and facilitated transmission to contacts.

Mortality in Wild Turkey (Meleagris gallopavo) Associated with Natural Infection with H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (HPAIV) Subclade 2.3.4.4.

A Eurasian strain of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) was first detected in North America in December 2021 and has since been confirmed in numerous wild and domestic avian species. In April 2022, 41 Wild Turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo) were found dead in Johnson County, Wyoming, USA adjacent to a property with confirmed HPAIV in a backyard poultry flock. Oropharyngeal swabs were collected from 11 of the 41 turkeys and necropsy was performed on seven. Avian influenza virus RNA was detected in all 11 turkeys by real-time reverse-transcription PCR. Acute, multiorgan necrosis was observed grossly and identified in all seven turkeys evaluated by histopathology, most consistently in the lung, spleen, liver, gastrointestinal tract, and gonads. Lesions indicate high virulence of subclade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in Wild Turkeys, with infections presenting as clusters of acute mortality. Although documented cases of HPAIV in Wild Turkeys are rare, these findings signify a risk of spillback from domestic poultry, which may be heightened by the recent rise in backyard poultry ownership and the use of peridomestic habitat by wild birds. Additional research is needed to better understand the risk of disease transmission at the interface of Wild Turkeys and backyard poultry and the potential conservation and management implications of HPAIV in wild gallinaceous birds.

Dissection of key factors correlating with H5N1 avian influenza virus driven inflammatory lung injury of chicken identified by single-cell analysis.

Chicken lung is an important target organ of avian influenza virus (AIV) infection, and different pathogenic virus strains lead to opposite prognosis. Using a single-cell RNA sequencing (scRNA-seq) assay, we systematically and sequentially analyzed the transcriptome of 16 cell types (19 clusters) in the lung tissue of chickens infected with H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) and H9N2 low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV), respectively. Notably, we developed a valuable catalog of marker genes for these cell types. Compared to H9N2 AIV infection, H5N1 AIV infection induced extensive virus replication and the immune reaction across most cell types simultaneously. More importantly, we propose that infiltrating inflammatory macrophages (clusters 0, 1, and 14) with massive viral replication, pro-inflammatory cytokines (IFN-β, IL1β, IL6 and IL8), and emerging interaction of various cell populations through CCL4, CCL19 and CXCL13, potentially contributed to the H5N1 AIV driven inflammatory lung injury. Our data revealed complex but distinct immune response landscapes in the lung tissue of chickens after H5N1 and H9N2 AIV infection, and deciphered the potential mechanisms underlying AIV-driven inflammatory reactions in chicken. Furthermore, this article provides a rich database for the molecular basis of different cell-type responses to AIV infection.

What awaits US in the next bird migration in South America: Prospects for the detection and incidence of HPAIV H5N1 in commercial poultry and wild birds. Proceeding of The First International Avian Influenza Summit, University of Arkansas- October 16-17, 2023".

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 poses a significant threat to both commercial poultry operations and wild bird populations worldwide. South America, with its rich avian biodiversity and extensive poultry industry, is susceptible to the introduction and spread of this devastating virus. This study explores the imminent challenges and potential outcomes associated with the upcoming bird migration season in South America, focusing on the detection and incidence of HPAIV H5N1. Employing a multidisciplinary approach is necessary to integrate spatial modeling, genomic surveillance, and epidemiological analyses to forecast the dynamics of HPAIV H5N1 in the region. By examining historical migration patterns, host susceptibility, and environmental factors, it will be possible to elucidate potential pathways for virus dissemination among wild bird populations and spillover into commercial poultry farms. Furthermore, this study evaluates the efficacy of current surveillance and monitoring strategies in detecting HPAIV H5N1, identifying potential gaps, and offering recommendations for enhanced surveillance protocols. Leveraging advanced molecular techniques is necessary to analyze viral genomes to track potential mutations associated with increased virulence or altered host range, thereby providing crucial insights for targeted intervention measures. The outcomes of this research will advance our understanding of the ecological and epidemiological factors influencing the spread of HPAIV H5N1 in South America and inform proactive strategies for early detection, containment, and mitigation of future outbreaks. This comprehensive assessment is a pivotal step towards safeguarding poultry industries and avian biodiversity in the face of emerging infectious diseases.

HPAI H5N1 outbreak in Chile, 2022-2023. Proceeding of The First International Avian Influenza Summit, University of Arkansas- October 16-17, 2023"

In Chile, from December 5, 2022, to date (August 30), 892 HPAI H5N1 HPAI-positive samples have been detected in wild birds, affecting 50 species, with 94 zones under control. To date, more than 35,000 wild birds are dead. In addition, 175 positive backyard bird premises have been detected, with more the 14,000 birds culling distributed in the 16 regions of the country in 97 zones under sanitary control. This is the event 4,775 registered in the WAHIS system. In addition, since March 13, 2023, the HPAI H5N1 virus was identified in a broiler genetics unit. Since that date, 12 outbreaks have been detected nationwide, which were distributed in 12 flocks (1.47\% of the total number of industrial flocks). Of these, 5 were in laying hens (1.4\% of the national total), 3 in broiler turkeys, 2 in turkey breeders, 1 in broilers, and 1 in broiler breeders. As a result of these outbreaks, the total number of susceptible birds was eliminated, corresponding to 1,479,433 birds. The procedure for each poultry outbreak is determined in the current AI Contingency Plan, which defines in general terms the establishment of a Zone under Sanitary Control (ZBCS), where a protection zone (3 km radius) and a surveillance zone of 7 km radius are defined, forming a total restriction zone of 10 km radius around each outbreak. For outbreaks in poultry, 7 ZBCS were created, concentrating all commercial outbreaks. commercial outbreaks. In some cases (as in ZBCS\_102 and 114), more than one outbreak was detected in each one. The actions carried out within each ZBCS in wildlife and in poultry and non-poultry are surveillance in the protection and surveillance zones, including clinical, molecular, and serological surveillance. Chile declared itself free of highly pathogenic avian influenza on August 22, 2023. On the other hand, on February 16, 2023, the first case of HPAI H5N1 in aquatic mammals was recorded, being a sea lion, the affected individual. To date, more than 20,000 sea lions have been stranded and died from the disease, and cases have been reported in other aquatic mammal species. In this outbreak, one human case has been reported in the north of the country and one terrestrial mammal (Geoffroy’s cat) in Patagonia. The Chilean A/H5 HA genes were genetically closest related to samples detected in Peru around the same period, and both Peruvian and Chilean strains derive from A/H5N1 viruses, causing widespread outbreaks in poultry and wild birds across North America. This outbreak corresponds to the first incursion of a HPAI H5 virus of Euro-North American lineage to South America, having serious consequences for wildlife, affecting backyard poultry and commercial flocks, which forces us to improve our capacities for risk assessment, surveillance, biosecurity, diagnosis, training and risk communication to poultry farmers, professionals and publishers in Chile as well as in Latin America.

Detection of H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses in Four Raptors and Two Geese in Japan in the Fall of 2022.

In the fall of 2022, high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) were detected from raptors and geese in Japan, a month earlier than in past years, indicating a shift in detection patterns. In this study, we conducted a phylogenetic analysis on H5N1 HPAIVs detected from six wild birds during the 2022/2023 season to determine their genetic origins. Our findings revealed that these HPAIVs belong to the G2 group within clade 2.3.4.4b, with all isolates classified into three subgroups: G2b, G2d, and G2c. The genetic background of the G2b virus (a peregrine falcon-derived strain) and G2d viruses (two raptors and two geese-derived strains) were the same as those detected in Japan in the 2021/2022 season. Since no HPAI cases were reported in Japan during the summer of 2022, it is probable that migratory birds reintroduced the G2b and G2d viruses. Conversely, the G2c virus (a raptor-derived strain) was first recognized in Japan in the fall of 2022. This strain might share a common ancestor with HPAIVs from Asia and West Siberia observed in the 2021/2022 season. The early migration of waterfowl to Japan in the fall of 2022 could have facilitated the early invasion of HPAIVs.

Recurring Trans-Atlantic Incursion of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 Viruses by Long Distance Migratory Birds from Northern Europe to Canada in 2022/2023.

In December 2022 and January 2023, we isolated clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses from six American crows (Corvus brachyrhynchos) from Prince Edward Island and a red fox (Vulpes vulpes) from Newfoundland, Canada. Using full-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis, these viruses were found to fall into two distinct phylogenetic clusters: one group containing H5N1 viruses that had been circulating in North and South America since late 2021, and the other one containing European H5N1 viruses reported in late 2022. The transatlantic re-introduction for the second time by pelagic/Icelandic bird migration via the same route used during the 2021 incursion of Eurasian origin H5N1 viruses into North America demonstrates that migratory birds continue to be the driving force for transcontinental dissemination of the virus. This new detection further demonstrates the continual long-term threat of H5N1 viruses for poultry and mammals and the subsequent impact on various wild bird populations wherever these viruses emerge. The continual emergence of clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx viruses requires vigilant surveillance in wild birds, particularly in areas of the Americas, which lie within the migratory corridors for long-distance migratory birds originating from Europe and Asia. Although H5Nx viruses have been detected at higher rates in North America since 2021, a bidirectional flow of H5Nx genes of American origin viruses to Europe has never been reported. In the future, coordinated and systematic surveillance programs for HPAI viruses need to be launched between European and North American agencies.

Emergence of a new genotype of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses in Bangladesh

ABSTRACT Influenza virological surveillance was conducted in Bangladesh from January to December 2021 in live poultry markets (LPMs) and in Tanguar Haor, a wetland region where domestic ducks have frequent contact with migratory birds. The predominant viruses circulating in LPMs were low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 and clade 2.3.2.1a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses. Additional LPAIs were found in both LPM (H4N6) and Tanguar Haor wetlands (H7N7). Genetic analyses of these LPAIs strongly suggested long-distance movement of viruses along the Central Asian migratory bird flyway. We also detected a novel clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus from ducks in free-range farms in Tanguar Haor that was similar to viruses first detected in October 2020 in The Netherlands but with a different PB2. Identification of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N1 viruses in Tanguar Haor provides continued support of the role of migratory birds in transboundary movement of influenza A viruses (IAV), including HPAI viruses. Domestic ducks in free range farm in wetland areas, like Tangua Haor, serve as a conduit for the introduction of LPAI and HPAI viruses into Bangladesh. Clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have dominated in many regions of the world since mid-2021, and it remains to be seen if these viruses will replace the endemic clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses in Bangladesh.

Emergence and potential transmission route of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in domestic cats in Poland, June 2023.

In June 2023, a fatal disease outbreak in cats occurred in Poland. Most cases tested in Poland (29 of 47) were positive for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A (H5N1) virus. Genetic analyses revealed clade 2.3.4.4b with point mutations indicative of initial mammalian hosts adaptations. Cat viral sequences were highly similar (n = 21), suggesting a potential common infection source. To investigate possible infection routes, our group tested food samples from affected households. HPAI H5N1 virus was detected in one poultry meat sample.

Outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus in cats, Poland, June to July 2023.

BackgroundOver a 3-week period in late June/early July 2023, Poland experienced an outbreak caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus in cats.AimThis study aimed to characterise the identified virus and investigate possible sources of infection.MethodsWe performed next generation sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of detected viruses in cats.ResultsWe sampled 46 cats, and 25 tested positive for avian influenza virus. The identified viruses belong to clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype CH (H5N1 A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/3/2022-like). In Poland, this genotype was responsible for several poultry outbreaks between December 2022 and January 2023 and has been identified only sporadically since February 2023. Viruses from cats were very similar to each other, indicating one common source of infection. In addition, the most closely related virus was detected in a dead white stork in early June. Influenza A(H5N1) viruses from cats possessed two amino acid substitutions in the PB2 protein (526R and 627K) which are two molecular markers of virus adaptation in mammals. The virus detected in the white stork presented one of those mutations (627K), which suggests that the virus that had spilled over to cats was already partially adapted to mammalian species.ConclusionThe scale of HPAI H5N1 virus infection in cats in Poland is worrying. One of the possible sources seems to be poultry meat, but to date no such meat has been identified with certainty. Surveillance should be stepped up on poultry, but also on certain species of farmed mammals kept close to infected poultry farms.

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b in wild and domestic birds: Introductions into the United States and reassortments, December 2021–April 2022

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage H5 clade 2.3.4.4b continue to have a devastating effect on domestic and wild birds. Full genome sequence analyses using 1369 H5N1 HPAIVs detected in the United States (U.S.) in wild birds, commercial poultry, and backyard flocks from December 2021 to April 2022, showed three phylogenetically distinct H5N1 virus introductions in the U.S. by wild birds. Unreassorted Eurasian genotypes A1 and A2 entered the Northeast Atlantic states, whereas a genetically distinct A3 genotype was detected in Alaska. The A1 genotype spread westward via wild bird migration and reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses. Reassortments of up to five internal genes generated a total of 21 distinct clusters; of these, six genotypes represented 92% of the HPAIVs examined. By phylodynamic analyses, most detections in domestic birds were shown to be point-source transmissions from wild birds, with limited farm-to-farm spread.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infections in wild carnivores connected to mass mortalities of pheasants in Finland.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has caused widespread mortality in both wild and domestic birds in Europe during 2020-2022. Virus types H5N8 and H5N1 have dominated the epidemic. Isolated spill-over infections in mammals started to emerge as the epidemic continued. In autumn 2021, HPAI H5N1 caused a series of mass mortality events in farmed and released pheasants (Phasianus colchicus) in a restricted area in southern Finland. Later, in the same area, an otter (Lutra lutra), two red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) and a lynx (Lynx lynx) were found moribund or dead and infected with H5N1 HPAI virus. Phylogenetically, H5N1 strains from pheasants and mammals clustered together. Molecular analyses of the four mammalian virus strains revealed mutations in the PB2 gene segment (PB2-E627K and PB2-D701N) that are known to facilitate viral replication in mammals. This study revealed that avian influenza cases in mammals were spatially and temporally connected with avian mass mortalities suggesting increased infection pressure from birds to mammals.

MicroRNA expression profiling in the lungs of genetically different Ri chicken lines against the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus.

The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus triggers infectious diseases, resulting in pulmonary damage and high mortality in domestic poultry worldwide. This study aimed to analyze miRNA expression profiles after infection with the HPAI H5N1 virus in resistant and susceptible lines of Ri chickens.For this purpose, resistant and susceptible lines of Vietnamese Ri chicken were used based on the A/G allele of Mx and BF2 genes. These genes are responsible for innate antiviral activity and were selected to determine differentially expressed (DE) miRNAs in HPAI-infected chicken lines using small RNA sequencing. A total of 44 miRNAs were DE after 3 days of infection with the H5N1 virus. Computational program analysis indicated the candidate target genes for DE miRNAs to possess significant functions related to cytokines, chemokines, MAPK signaling pathway, ErBb signaling pathway, and Wnt signaling pathway. Several DE miRNA-mRNA matches were suggested to play crucial roles in mediating immune functions against viral evasion. These results revealed the potential regulatory roles of miRNAs in the immune response of the two Ri chicken lines against HPAI H5N1 virus infection in the lungs.

Investigating the Genetic Diversity of H5 Avian Influenza Viruses in the United Kingdom from 2020-2022.

Since 2020, the United Kingdom and Europe have experienced annual epizootics of high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV). The first epizootic, during the autumn/winter of 2020-2021, involved six H5Nx subtypes, although H5N8 HPAIV dominated in the United Kingdom. While genetic assessments of the H5N8 HPAIVs within the United Kingdom demonstrated relative homogeneity, there was a background of other genotypes circulating at a lower degree with different neuraminidase and internal genes. Following a small number of detections of H5N1 in wild birds over the summer of 2021, the autumn/winter of 2021-2022 saw another European H5 HPAIV epizootic that dwarfed the prior epizootic. This second epizootic was dominated almost exclusively by H5N1 HPAIV, although six distinct genotypes were defined. We have used genetic analysis to evaluate the emergence of different genotypes and proposed reassortment events that have been observed. The existing data suggest that the H5N1 viruses circulating in Europe during late 2020 continued to circulate in wild birds throughout 2021, with minimal adaptation, but then went on to reassort with AIVs in the wild bird population. We have undertaken an in-depth genetic assessment of H5 HPAIVs detected in the United Kingdom over two winter seasons and demonstrate the utility of in-depth genetic analyses in defining the diversity of H5 HPAIVs circulating in avian species, the potential for zoonotic risk, and whether incidents of lateral spread can be defined over independent incursions of infections from wild birds. This provides key supporting data for mitigation activities. IMPORTANCE High-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) outbreaks devastate avian species across all sectors, having both economic and ecological impacts through mortalities in poultry and wild birds, respectively. These viruses can also represent a significant zoonotic risk. Since 2020, the United Kingdom has experienced two successive outbreaks of H5 HPAIV. While H5N8 HPAIV was predominant during the 2020-2021 outbreak, other H5 subtypes were also detected. The following year, there was a shift in the subtype dominance to H5N1 HPAIV, but multiple H5N1 genotypes were detected. Through the thorough utilization of whole-genome sequencing, it was possible to track and characterize the genetic evolution of these H5 HPAIVs in United Kingdom poultry and wild birds. This enabled us to assess the risk posed by these viruses at the poultry-wild bird and the avian-human interfaces and to investigate the potential lateral spread between infected premises, a key factor in understanding the threat to the commercial sector.

Genetic Characterization and Pathogenesis of H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Isolated in South Korea during 2021-2022.

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx have been circulating in poultry and wild birds worldwide since 2014. In South Korea, after the first clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from wild birds in October 2021, additional HPAIV outbreaks occurred in poultry farms until April 2022. In this study, we genetically characterized clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV isolates in 2021-2022 and examined the pathogenicity and transmissibility of A/mandarin duck/Korea/WA585/2021 (H5N1) (WA585/21) in chickens and ducks. Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses caused 47 outbreaks in poultry farms and were also detected in multiple wild birds. Phylogenetic analysis of HA and NA genes indicated that Korean H5N1 HPAI isolates were closely related to Eurasian viruses isolated in 2021-2022. Four distinct genotypes of H5N1 HPAI viruses were identified in poultry, and the majority were also found in wild birds. WA585/21 inoculated chickens showed virulent pathogenicity with high mortality and transmission. Meanwhile, ducks infected with the virus showed no mortality but exhibited high rates of transmission and longer viral shedding than chickens, suggesting that they may play an important role as silent carriers. In conclusion, consideration of both genetic and pathogenic traits of H5N1 HPAI viruses is required for effective viral control.

Efficient and Informative Laboratory Testing for Rapid Confirmation of H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4) High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Outbreaks in the United Kingdom.

During the early stages of the UK 2021-2022 H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) epizootic in commercial poultry, 12 infected premises (IPs) were confirmed by four real-time reverse-transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RRT)-PCRs, which identified the viral subtype and pathotype. An assessment was undertaken to evaluate whether a large sample throughput would challenge laboratory capacity during an exceptionally large epizootic; hence, assay performance across our test portfolio was investigated. Statistical analysis of RRT-PCR swab testing supported it to be focused on a three-test approach, featuring the matrix (M)-gene, H5 HPAIV-specific (H5-HP) and N1 RRT-PCRs, which was successfully assessed at 29 subsequent commercial IPs. The absence of nucleotide mismatches in the primer/probe binding regions for the M-gene and limited mismatches for the H5-HP RRT-PCR underlined their high sensitivity. Although less sensitive, the N1 RRT-PCR remained effective at flock level. The analyses also guided successful surveillance testing of apparently healthy commercial ducks from at-risk premises, with pools of five oropharyngeal swabs tested by the H5-HP RRT-PCR to exclude evidence of infection. Serological testing at anseriform H5N1 HPAIV outbreaks, together with quantitative comparisons of oropharyngeal and cloacal shedding, provided epidemiological information concerning the chronology of initial H5N1 HPAIV incursion and onward spread within an IP.

Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) from the 2021/22 epizootic is highly duck adapted and poorly adapted to chickens.

The 2021/2022 epizootic of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAIV) remains one of the largest ever in the UK, being caused by a clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV. This epizootic affected more than 145 poultry premises, most likely through independent incursion from infected wild birds, supported by more than 1700 individual detections of H5N1 from wild bird mortalities. Here an H5N1 HPAIV, representative of this epizootic (H5N1-21), was used to investigate its virulence, pathogenesis and transmission in layer chickens and Pekin ducks, two species of epidemiological importance. We inoculated both avian species with decreasing H5N1-21 doses. The virus was highly infectious in ducks, with high infection levels and accompanying shedding of viral RNA, even in ducks inoculated with the lowest dose, reflecting the strong waterfowl adaptation of the clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIVs. Duck-to-duck transmission was very efficient, coupled with high environmental contamination. H5N1-21 was frequently detected in water sources, serving as likely sources of infection for ducks, but inhalable dust and aerosols represented low transmission risks. In contrast, chickens inoculated with the highest dose exhibited lower rates of infection compared to ducks. There was no evidence for experimental H5N1-21 transmission to any naive chickens, in two stocking density scenarios, coupled with minimal and infrequent contamination being detected in the chicken environment. Systemic viral dissemination to multiple organs reflected the pathogenesis and high mortalities in both species. In summary, the H5N1-21 virus is highly infectious and transmissible in anseriformes, yet comparatively poorly adapted to galliformes, supporting strong host preferences for wild waterfowl. Key environmental matrices were also identified as being important in the epidemiological spread of this virus during the continuing epizootic.

The efficacy of an inactivated avian influenza H5N1 vaccine against an African strain of HPAI H5N8 (clade 2.3.4.4 B)

ABSTRACT Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses from the Goose/Guangdong/96-lineage emerged in Southeast Asia and subsequently spread to the Middle East, Africa and Europe, infecting a range of birds and mammals (including humans). This lineage of H5 viruses can efficiently establish itself in wild birds after circulating among gallinaceous poultry, facilitating reassortment with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus strains, enhancing dispersal over long distances and contributing to endemicity. The detection of HPAI H5N8 virus (clade 2.3.4.4B) in 2017 in the Mpumalanga Province of South Africa marked the beginning of an epidemic that devastated the South African poultry industry. Vaccines were tested to assess protection against the circulating field strain. This article describes the performance of a reverse genetics inactivated H5N1 vaccine from Zoetis (RG-H5N1), with 96.1% identity to the circulating HPAI H5N8 virus. Two locally formulated benchmarks, one containing an H5N8 antigen homologous to the field strain (Benchmark-H5N8), the other containing a heterologous (87.6% identity to field virus) LPAI H5N1 antigen (Benchmark-H5N1), were included for comparison. Efficacy was assessed in specific pathogen-free (SPF) chickens using a prime-boost approach (injections at days 21 and 45), followed by a challenge with a South African HPAI H5N8 isolate (70 days of age). The Zoetis RG-H5N1 vaccine and Benchmark-H5N8 outperformed the Benchmark-H5N1 in terms of humoral response against the H5N8 antigen and reduction of shedding. The Zoetis RG-H5N1 vaccine protected 100% of the chickens against clinical disease and death. This study confirmed that antigenically matched inactivated vaccines could induce robust protection and markedly reduce viral shedding. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS Conditionally licensed vaccine protected against HPAI H5N8 (clade 2.3.4.4B). Complete protection against clinical disease and mortality. Drastic reduction of viral shedding after challenge.

The Role of Airborne Particles in the Epidemiology of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus in Commercial Poultry Production Units.

Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 284 poultry infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1-positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have presented as geographical clusters, raising questions about the lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been observed for some AIV strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs were confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious viruses were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside but in close proximity to infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected at greater distances (≤10 m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious viruses, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 80 m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harboring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10 m) through the air, while macroscopic particles containing vRNA might travel further (≤80 m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds and the efficiency of biosecurity, represent greater importance in disease incursion.

Introduction of Multiple Novel High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (H5N1) Virus of Clade 2.3.4.4b into South Korea in 2022

Since October 2020, H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have spread to many countries. Although these viruses evolved from Eurasian ancestors, reassortant with other LPAI viruses has generated various genotypes. Here, we identified three H5N1 HPAI viruses belonging to clade 2.3.4.4b; these viruses were isolated from mandarin duck, common teal, and domestic breeder ducks in October 2022 during an avian influenza (AI) active surveillance program. Two of the H5N1 viruses (MD/WA496 and BD/H493) have been found sporadically in China, Russia, and Korea. It is presumed that two viruses with a similar gene constellation isolated in Russia, China, and Korea were introduced into the breeding area during the spring migration, and were introduced newly to Korea during the autumn migration. Due to international bird migration, the other virus (CT/WA537) is most similar (99.3–99.8%) to a virus detected in North Dakota, USA in April 2022. These results suggest that H5N1 viruses with at least two genotypes were introduced at the same time into Korea during the autumn of 2022, and that they originated from Eurasian breeding grounds and North America. Thus, multiple 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses were introduced into Korea during the autumn season of 2022.