This paper analyzes the materials of the symposium held by the RAND Corporation from 16 to 20 April 1962. Its purpose was to generalize the experience of past combat conflicts, which could contribute to an effective fight against insurgents in future conflicts. Twelve military officers of the armies of the United States, Britain, France and Australia participated in this symposium. All of them took part in counter-guerrilla operations around the world Algeria, China, Greece, Kenya, Laos, Malaya, Oman, South Vietnam and the Philippines. Their rich experience formed the basis of this symposium. The goals and objectives of the symposium, the features of the materials and the biographies of the participants are consecrated in details in the paper. The questions discussed at the meeting are discussed in details. They are characteristics and examples of guerrilla warfare; primary objectives of counterinsurgency and some effective organizational and operational approaches; tactics and techniques of counter-guerrilla warfare; principles and techniques of political action; psychological warfare and civil actions; intelligence and counterintelligence: problems and techniques of intelligence-gathering, and the importance of communications; British campaign in Kenya; selection of personnel for counterinsurgency; special role of the advisor; winning the Counterguerrilla War. The conclusion of the paper shows a special significance of the materials of this symposium for the study of military thought during the Cold War, and especially the influence of the colonial experience of European empires on US foreign policy.
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