The that won the battles of the Gulf War in 1991 was one of the most professional ever fielded by America. As General Schwarzkopf commented, We could have traded equipment with the Iraquis and still won. [1] And when that returned home, it was welcomed by a supportive, even adoring, public. Now, almost one decade later, the situation has changed dramatically. During the past nine years, the US has undergone radical changes--major force and budget reductions, revised modernization programs, and successive base realignments and closures. All were intended by design to adapt the institution to the post-Cold War geopolitical situation. But there are many indications that the result is an quite unlike the victor of the Gulf War battles. It is instead an of decreasing effectiveness, one which suffers from a weakening relationship with the American public and, of more concern, with its own members. The last decade has been one of massive change to which the profession has yet to adapt fully. Simply stated, the end of the Cold War, which roughly coincided with the culmination of other shifts in the organization of Western, postindustrial societies, has drastically altered the expectations of where and how the profession of arms will apply its expertise. Today, in this new interwar period, [2] the is expected to operate effectively across the entire spectrum of violence, from major theater wars to domestic disaster relief. Further, it must be prepared to conduct these varied operations worldwide in any physical and political environment, and to do so in very rapid order. With these shifts in society's expectations came the need for a huge expansion in the profession's knowledge base and in the application of that expert knowledge to new situations. Such growth in expertise should have generated changes throughout the Army's leadership and management systems--from organizational structure to app lied technology,, from measures of readiness to measures of effectiveness, and from military training systems to professional military education. The is faltering, however, in its attempts to adapt to these stark changes; this inability to adapt is itself a significant manifestation of a decline in effectiveness. Unfortunately, this potentially dangerous situation remains, at the systemic level, largely unrecognized by the institution. Even worse, it is not clear that there is currently within the officer corps of the a consensus on just what Army Professionalism is, nor a common language with which to analyze and discuss it. Absent such analysis and dialogue, the is looking elsewhere for solutions to the decline in effectiveness by studying individually the recurring symptoms as they reach crisis proportions, such as recruiting shortfalls, an exodus of captains, unfunded adaptations in structure and technology, and leadership failures. There are two ways to look at the Army. The first is as a large, bureaucratic organization. The second is as a profession. The has, over past decades, increasingly moved toward using organizational concepts for decisionmaking to lead, design, and structure the institution's systems, and away from using professional concepts to do so. Such is the case today: operations research, efficiency goals, outsourcing, reengineering, and bonuses dominate the institution's analyses and solutions. As such, efficiency is a dominant goal, surpassing military effectiveness. Due to an excessively organizational perspective, the has borrowed aspects of human resource systems from corporations, and then wonders why the members of the profession are acting like employees. The is missing (and thereby losing) competitions with other professions and organizations at the boundaries of its expertise. And, it is resisting change because that threatens present force structure, rather than viewing the needed change in th e context of how it affects the Army's expertise and jurisdiction, and thus its professionalism. …