INSIDE NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA Scott D. Sagan, editor Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 28ipp, US $27.95 Paper ISBN 978-0-8047-6239-7Before India and Pakistan reached nuclear threshold in 1998, two countries were widely considered to be locked in long-term but lowintensity confrontation. But their acquisition of nuclear weapons left international community's nonproliferation initiatives - especially nonproliferation and comprehensive test ban treaties - in tatters. In 12 years since, scholars have given much attention to Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrine, command and control, and governmental stability.The central claim of Inside Nuclear South Asia is that nuclear pessimists are right. In contributors' view, it is fallacious to claim that more nuclear weapons are better, that increases stability, or that nuclear powers will never go to war with each other. Though several accounts on nuclear south Asia have appeared recently, Sagan writes that this book is unique because it both new insights into domestic politics and organizational interests behind specific nuclear policy choices in South Asia and sustained critique of excessively narrow realist views of nuclear proliferation (3). It lives up to this claim by providing counterarguments to optimist school - whose leading proponent is Kenneth Waltz - and by offering focused analysis ofthe domestic political reasons why two countries sought nuclear weapons in first place. Moreover, it offers convincing answer to most salient question in Indo- Pakistani relations: [w]hy did nuclear not lead to nuclear peace in South Asia? (4).The book's six chapters are divided into two parts, first on causes and second on consequences of of nuclear weapons in subcontinent. Kanti Bajpai provides brilliant explanation of how domestic politics influenced India's nuclear tests. In criticizing BJP government's nuclear policy, he argues that [tjhose who thought that tests on both sides of border would produce regional stability were mistaken (47). He concludes that policy of next BJP government will lead to still more proliferation, in large part for domestic reasons. By championing nuclear weapons, for example, party can burnish its Hindu nationalist credentials and substantially expand its electoral support.Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way provide useful interpretation of south Asia's nuclear growth by testing theories against three possible determinants: technological, external, and domestic factors. Their statistical analysis of Indo- Pakistani rivalry offers three critical insights. First, liberalization theory, which claims that trade openness discourages states' nuclear ambitions, is incorrect. Instead of limiting proliferation, India's and Pakistan's economic liberalization and elevated growth rates made it worse. Second, they argue that if a nuclear armed great power had offered security guarantee to two countries, might have been curtailed (85). Third, contrary to Bajpai's argument, impact of domestic politics on is negative because the degree of democracy, democratic transition, and political instability are all inconsequential in influencing (94). The United States should therefore work to resolve conflict over Kashmir, they conclude, because dispute over region is primary cause of Indo- Pakistani rivalry. …
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Mar 1, 2012
Julia Gillard 
Open Access
