Groupthink Phenomenon Research Articles

MANAGING GROUP DECISION MAKING PROCESSES: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND GROUPTHINK

This study explores the effects of different structures of accountability on the development of groupthink. Specifically, the differences between individual and collective accountability are examined and contrasted to a condition with no accountability. The groupthink phenomenon can be differentiated into collective avoidance, arising from a pessimistic perception of a decisional issue, and collective overoptimism. It is argued that structures of accountability can either promote or reduce groupthink, depending upon the way group members perceive the decisional issue. We tested the hypothesis that accountability can prevent the collective‐avoidance type of groupthink, and that individual accountability will be more effective in doing so than collective accountability, by preventing the possibility to “hide in the crowd.” The results confirm that under conditions conducive to collective avoidance, individual accountability is more effective in reducing groupthink‐like tendencies than collective accountability. However, group members expecting to be collectively responsible still display less symptoms of groupthink than control groups. In particular, accountability makes groups display more difficulty to reach consensus, stimulates group members to try to influence the decision making, results in a more equal dispersion of influence within the group, and in less risky decisions. Some methodological concerns regarding research on groupthink and accountability, and the implications of the findings for future research in this area are discussed.

An Empirical Investigation of the Groupthink Phenomenon

This paper reports results of an empirical investigation of the groupthink theoreticalframework presented in Janis'second edition of Groupthink. Factor analysis was used to develop scales to measure the aspects of groupthink proposed by Janis (1982). Results supported some, but not all, of the symptoms and defects postulated by Janis. Next, a path analytic procedure was utilized to test the implied causal ordering of the Groupthink model (Janis, 1982, p. 244). This study provides limited support for the causal sequence specified in the model. However, the relationship between groupthink-induced decision defects and outcomes were not as strong as Janis suggests. These results prompt the authors to agree with Courtright (1978) that many intervening and/or moderating factors not included in the Janis framework influence decision outcomes.

Some Alternatives to Traditional Social Psychology of Groups

Previous critiques of social psychological theory and research on group processes have not had much discernible impact. Several alternative theoretical traditions from outside social psychology are offered for the enrichment of the social psychological study of groups. Problems with laboratory groups and contrasting approaches to Janis's groupthink phenomena are discussed from each of four alternative traditions as examples of the value of broadening our theoretical approaches to group life.

A laboratory investigation of groupthink

A recent addition to the collection of theory on group communication is the concept of “groupthink,” formulated by Irving Janis. The purpose of this study was to examine the groupthink phenomenon under controlled, laboratory conditions. Because the original formulation was based on historical case studies of foreign‐policy decisions, a laboratory analogue which recreated the important elements of the theory was constructed. The results of this study indicated that (1) the groupthink phenomenon is amenable to study in the laboratory, and (2) the theory as postulated by Janis is essentially correct. It was also suggested that even though Janis argues that several variables indicate the occurrence of groupthink, the results of this study indicated that the presence or absence of disagreement (conflict, hostility) among group members may be the best discriminator between groupthink and non‐groupthink groups.

The Nixon Group1

A sociometric analysis and an examination in terms of group process offer some clues toward the understanding of the actions and decisions by former President Nixon's advisory group, the young team. Review of the transcripts of the White House tapes and the hearings of the Senate Select Committee and the House Judiciary Committee suggests that, in contrast to the Kennedy group, the Nixon group was not a closely knit team with high esprit de corps and mutual respect. Rather, there were two strongly competing factions: Haldeman/Ehrlichman/Colson and Mitchell/Dean. The group was held together by a common dependence upon the president who set the basic tone and ideal for the group—to succeed one had to be driving, hard‐hitting against all “enemies,” willing to be pragmatic in accomplishing team goals. The existence of competing factions contributed to acceleration of riskiness and extreme measures and to a reduction of moral restraints. In that sense, the groupthink phenomenon described by Janis was evident in the Nixon group.