Family firms (FFs) have unique governance characteristics regarding their Boards of Directors (BoDs) and have been found to behave differently than other organizations due to the involvement of the controlling families. While cultural and institutional contexts have been suggested to influence the way companies are governed, most research on governance and BoDs in FFs (that results in theory development and prescription of practices) has been conducted in the institutional context of developed economies. Consequently, there is a lack of knowledge regarding the governance and BoDs of FFs in developing regions such as Latin America.In order to close this gap, this study reviews the literature regarding business governance and BoDs of FFs in Latin America and compares it with the knowledge coming from developed economies. It also detects the most salient topics that attracts the undivided attention of researchers in Latin America: rights expropriation, business groups and interlocking of directors. Furthermore, this paper proposes a model that explains the salience of these topics based on the institutional domains and cultural context shaping corporate governance and characterizes each of its key elements (capital, management/labor, and State) in the context of Latin America. Finally, fruitful directions for further research are suggested.