Group-level Adaptation Research Articles

Altruism And Organism: Disentangling The Themes Of Multilevel Selection Theory

The evolution of groups into adaptive units, similar to single organisms in the coordination of their parts, is one major theme of multilevel selection theory. Another major theme is the evolution of altruistic behaviors that benefit others at the expense of self. These themes are often assumed to be strongly linked, such that altruism is required for group-level adaptation. Multilevel selection theory reveals a more complex relationship between the themes of altruism and organism. Adaptation at every level of the biological hierarchy requires a corresponding process of natural selection, which includes the fundamental ingredients of phenotypic variation, heritability, and fitness consequences. These ingredients can exist for many kinds of groups and do not require the extreme genetic variation among groups that is usually associated with the evolution of altruism. Thus, it is reasonable to expect higher-level units to evolve into adaptive units with respect to specific traits, even when their members are not genealogically related and do not behave in ways that are obviously altruistic. As one example, the concept of a group mind, which has been well documented in the social insects, may be applicable to other species.

Group Selection and Assortative Interactions

Natural selection at all levels requires heritable phenotypic variation among units. At the group level, variation is often increased by reproduction coupled with limited dispersal, which forms the basis of kin selection and traditional group selection models. Assortative interactions are another possible mechanism for creating variation among groups that has received less attention. We present a series of models in which altruism is a continuously varying trait and individuals are free to choose their associates, based on information that is acquired through experience, observation, or cultural transmission. Assortative interactions can generate highly nonrandom variation among groups, favoring the evolution of altruism and other group-level adaptations among genealogically unrelated individuals. Altruism can evolve even when the initial phenotypic variation in altruism is not heritable, a form of genetic assimilation. The importance of assortative interactions depends in part on cognitive abilities that...

Authoritarianism as a group-level adaptation in humans

AbstractWilson & Sober's discussion of group selection is marred by the absence of plausible examples of human group-level behavioral adaptation. The trait of authoritarianism is one possible example of such an adaptation. It reduces within-group variance in reproductive success, manifests itself more strongly in response to group-level threat, and is found in a variety of cultures.

Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences

AbstractIn both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s and 1970s but a positive literature began to grow during the 1970s and is rapidly expanding today. We review this recent literature and its implications for human evolutionary biology. We show that the rejection of group selection was based on a misplaced emphasis on genes as “replicators” which is in fact irrelevant to the question of whether groups can be like individuals in their functional organization. The fundamental question is whether social groups and other higher-level entities can be “vehicles” of selection. When this elementary fact is recognized, group selection emerges as an important force in nature and what seem to be competing theories, such as kin selection and reciprocity, reappear as special cases of group selection. The result is a unified theory of natural selection that operates on a nested hierarchy of units.The vehicle-based theory makes it clear that group selection is an important force to consider in human evolution. Humans can facultatively span the full range from self-interested individuals to “organs” of group-level “organisms.” Human behavior not only reflects the balance between levels of selection but it can also alter the balance through the construction of social structures that have the effect of reducing fitness differences within groups, concentrating natural selection (and functional organization) at the group level. These social structures and the cognitive abilities that produce them allow group selection to be important even among large groups of unrelated individuals.

Groups as vehicles and replicators: The problem of group-level adaptation

Groups as vehicles and replicators: The problem of group-level adaptation

Hard-Core Darwinism Since 1859The Ant and the Peacock: Altruism and Sexual Selection from Darwin to Today.Helena Cronin

Previous articleNext article No AccessNew Biological BooksHard-Core Darwinism Since 1859 The Ant and the Peacock: Altruism and Sexual Selection from Darwin to Today. Helena Cronin George C. WilliamsGeorge C. Williams Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Quarterly Review of Biology Volume 68, Number 3Sep., 1993 Published in association with Stony Brook University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/418173 Views: 2Total views on this site Citations: 36Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1993 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Francis L. W. Ratnieks, Kevin R. Foster, Tom Wenseleers Darwin's special difficulty: the evolution of “neuter insects” and current theory, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 65, no.33 (Dec 2010): 481–492.https://doi.org/10.1007/s00265-010-1124-8David Sloan Wilson, Elliott Sober Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 585–608.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036104John Alroy, Alexander Levine Driving both ways: Wilson & Sober's conflicting criteria for the identification of groups as vehicles of selection, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 608–610.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036116C. Daniel Batson Seeing the light: What does biology tell us about human social behavior?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 610–611.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036128C. Loring Brace The consequences of group selection in a domain without genetic input: Culture, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 611–612.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0003613XMichael Bradie Metaphors and mechanisms in vehicle-based selection theory, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 612–612.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036141Gordon M. Burghardt Group selection and the group mind in science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 613–613.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036153Donald T. Campbell, John B. Gatewood Ambivalently held group-optimizing predispositions, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 614–614.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036165F. T. Cloak Unnecessary competition requirement makes group selection harder to demonstrate, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 614–615.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036177Lee Cronk Group selection's new clothes, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 615–616.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036189James F. Crow In praise of replicators, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 616–616.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036190Richard Dawkins Burying the vehicle, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 616–617.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036207Daniel C. Dennett E pluribus unum?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 617–618.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036219Lee Alan Dugatkin Subtle ways of shifting the balance in favor of between-group selection, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 618–619.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036220John Dupré Some philosophical implications of the rehabilitation of group selection, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 619–620.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036232Robert H. Frank Group selection and “genuine” altruism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 620–621.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036244Margaret Gilbert Me, you, and us: Distinguishing “egoism,” “altruism,” and “groupism”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 621–622.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036256Charles J. Goodnight Contextual analysis and group selection, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 622–622.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036268Todd A. Grantham Putting the cart back behind the horse: Group selection does not require that groups be “organisms”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 622–623.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0003627XP. E. Griffiths, R. D. Gray Replicators and vehicles? Or developmental systems?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 623–624.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036281Adolf Heschl Reconstructing the real unit of selection, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 624–625.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036293Harmon R. Holcomb Empirically equivalent theories, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 625–626.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0003630XKent E. Holsinger Groups as vehicles and replicators: The problem of group-level adaptation, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 626–627.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036311David L. Hull Taking vechicles seriously, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 627–628.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036323Michael E. Hyland Different vehicles for group selection in humans, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 628–628.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036335Elisabeth A. Lloyd Rx: Distinguish group selection from group adaptation, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 628–629.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036347Kevin MacDonald Group evolutionary strategies: Dimensions and mechanisms, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 629–630.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036359Geoffrey F. Miller Beyond shared fate: Group-selected mechanisms for cooperation and competition in fuzzy, fluid vehicles, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 630–631.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036360Jim Moore Hominids, coalitions, and weapons: Not vehicles, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 632–632.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036372Randolph M. Nesse Why is group selection such a problem?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 633–634.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036384Anatol Rapoport Nongenetic and non-Darwinian evolution, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 634–634.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036396Jeffry A. Simpson Adaptation and natural selection: A new look at some old ideas, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 634–636.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036402Eric Alden Smith Semantics, theory, and methodological individualism in the group-selection controversy, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 636–637.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036414Nicholas S. Thompson Vehicles all the way down?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 638–638.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036426Christopher Wills The maintenance of behavioral diversity in human societies, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 638–639.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00036438David Sloan Wilson, Elliott Sober Group selection: The theory replaces the bogey man, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no.44 (Feb 2010): 639–654.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0003644X

Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation

Agreements and kindred phenomena are ubiquitous in human life.' They are a central source of obligation. Obligation is a forceful species of reason for action. It is therefore important to be clear about the nature of agreements and the obligations of agreement. These matters have not as yet been well understood. Or so a number of common pronouncements suggest. Among these are some prevalent claims about the impact of coercion on agreements. Philosophers standardly claim that coerced agreements do not impose obligations to fulfill the agreement: they are not binding.2 Many assert that

Conflict in single-queen hymenopteran societies: the structure of conflict and processes that reduce conflict in advanced eusocial species

Social insect workers can increase their inclusive fitness by increasing colony production of reproductives, by manipulating the identity of colony reproductives in favor of individuals with greater kin-value (e.g. relatedness) to themselves, or both. The manipulative option results from the non-clonal genetic structure of insect societies and necessarily introduces conflict into insect societies. This paper examines conflict over male production, queen-rearing, and sex allocation for monogynous hymenopteran societies. The structure of conflict is shown to vary according to the particular conflict, queen mating frequency, and other factors. Importantly, there are conditions under which the actual conflict (i.e. the actual manipulation of reproduction) is predicted to be markedly less than the potential conflict (i.e. all the manipulations potentially beneficial to individual workers given the kin-value asymmetries within the colony). For example, when manipulation is costly (i.e. reduces colony productivity), or relatively ineffective (i.e. because of limitations to kin recognition ability, or counter manipulations such as worker policing) it may be selectively disfavored. Furthermore, low actual conflict may be characteristic of certain sub-sets of workers (e.g. foragers) or certain phases of colony growth (e.g. the ergonomic phase). As a result, a pluralistic rather than a typological perspective on conflict in insect societies is suggested. Low actual conflict may facilitate the evolution of colony- or group-level adaptations (i.e. attributes of individuals which have evolved to enable them to function synergistically as a colony or group, such as social foraging in honey bees and army ants), despite the non-clonal genetic structure of most insect societies. However, low levels of actual conflict between individuals need not result in group-level adaptations. The term community of interest is suggested to describe groups within which there is little or no actual conflict, whether or not group-level adaptations occur. The recently revived term superorganism is problematic, because it is often used in a categorical way, to describe whole societies. This difficulty is partly overcome by the pluralistic outlook, which would favor statements such as “foraging in the honey bee shows superorganismic properties” (i.e. group-level adaptations), rather than typological thinking such as “the honey bee colony is a superorganism”.