ALTHOUGH THE DOCTRINE of the four cardinal virtues cannot be documented in a formal sense earlier than Plato's Republic in the first quarter of the fourth century B.C., it is commonly assumed to have been supported by a tradition which went back perhaps two centuries into the archaic period.' The priority of dikaiosune in the Platonic canon needs no demonstration. Its proposed definition constitutes the formal hypothesis of the treatise and though the first book in the manner of the other early dialogues on virtue ends aporetically, the treatise as a whole devotes itself to completing the definition with meticulous exactitude.2 The effect of the eloquent argument offered in Plato's written masterpiece has been to rivet on the minds of scholars and laymen alike the presumption that the English terms justice and righteousness represent what had always been a general idea available to the Greeks throughout their earlier cultural history, a concept lying at the back of their minds and taken for granted. If one asks, Is this presumption based on fact?, the answer will depend on how fact is defined. Is it a datum supplied by the intuitions of moral philosophy, which has always been prone to assume for its own purposes that the notion of the moral law as idea or ideal informs our common humanity and must exist as a realized concept in the minds of all men who share such a culture as the Greeks possessed? Or is it
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