IN HIS judicious and scholarly essay Professor Sabine has clearly indicated what lawyers and social scientists can do in the determination of justice; but I am not sure how he thinks philosophers make their contribution to the subject. If you are in doubt about the justice of action, Mr. Sabine does not direct you to the avowedly universal moral maxims of Plato, Kant, or Bentham. Rather, following his formula, you are to make a factual investigation to determine an equivalence of burdens and advantages in a relationship that is defined by rules. In this formula there is unknown, x, a blank that has to be filled in by empirical inquiry at the scene of judgment. That blank is for the specific rules defining the specific relationships of the persons whose action and treatment are to be judged just or unjust. If you suspect that the rules and relationships are in the process of changing, you will make further factual studies, as Mr. Sabine did in tracing the changing conceptions of justice in compensating workmen for accidents. The application of the formula of justice clearly calls for the fact-finding methods and the predictions of legal and social science. What I should like to have clarified is whether Professor Sabine believes that not only the application, but also the formulation, of the concept of justice is a fact-finding problem for legal and social science. Is his statement of the nature of justice empirical generalization that can be verified by examining common usage (to which he frequently refers)? The maxims of Plato, Bentham, and other philosophers are notoriously inaccurate as generalizations of common usage. If we try, as Plato did, to define justice as every man doing that for which he is best fitted, or, with Bentham, say that it is equal consideration in determining the greatest happiness of the greatest number, we are always bumping into situations where application of the maxim runs counter to common usage. The application seems unjust to us and to other persons whose judgment we respect. The maxims of the grand philosophers do not describe the actual judgments of good and competent men. As Stuart Hampshire has said: