Great Power Security Research Articles

Why 1914 but Not Before? A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors

Why did the July 1914 crisis—but not crises in 1905, 1908–9, 1911, and 1912–13—escalate to great-power war despite occurring under similar international and domestic conditions? Explanations based on underlying and slowly changing structural, social, or cultural variables cannot answer this question. Examining three Balkan crises of 1912–13 and the July Crisis, we refine realist explanations based on power, alliances, and reputational interests by incorporating the impact of changing power distributions and alliances in the Balkans on the great-power security system. A more complete answer to the why-1914-but-not-before question, however, requires the incorporation of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, which went beyond a pretext for war. It eliminated the most powerful and effective proponent for peace in Vienna and fundamentally changed the nature of the decision-making process in Austria-Hungary. Counterfactually, we argue that a hypothetical crisis with Franz Ferdinand present would probably have ended differently.

ASEAN: still the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality?

ABSTRACT The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) pursuit for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) first began during the Cold War, at a time of intense superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia. ASEAN reaffirmed the importance of this principle in 2020, amid growing concerns of instability in the Asia-Pacific region as a result of increasing tensions between the United States (US) and China. Through an examination of the ZOPFAN principle, this paper seeks to develop a greater understanding of ASEAN’s ability to respond to periods of geopolitical crisis and Great Power rivalry. It asks whether a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia has ever been successfully realised, and what is the likelihood of one being achieved in the future. As analysis of recent security challenges will show, ZOPFAN falls short as both a framework for regional security and as an expression of regional autonomy. This raises serious questions about ASEAN’s coherence in the post-Cold War era, and its ability to uphold regional order in light of renewed Great Power security competition.

Offshore wind energy – South Africa’s untapped resource

In the context of the Anthropocene, the decoupling of carbon emissions from electricity generation is critical. South Africa has an ageing coal power fleet, which will gradually be decommissioned over the next 30 years. This creates substantial opportunity for a just transition towards a future energy mix with a high renewable energy penetration. Offshore wind technology is a clean electricity generation alternative that presents great power security and decarbonisation opportunity for South Africa. This study estimated the offshore wind energy resource available within South Africa’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), using a geographic information system methodology. The available resource was estimated under four developmental scenarios. This study revealed that South Africa has an annual offshore wind energy production potential of 44.52 TWh at ocean depths of less than 50 m (Scenario 1) and 2 387.08 TWh at depths less than 1 000 m (Scenario 2). Furthermore, a GIS-based multi-criteria evaluation was conducted to determine the most suitable locations for offshore wind farm development within the South African EEZ. The following suitable offshore wind development regions were identified: Richards Bay, KwaDukuza, Durban, and Struis Bay. Based on South Africa’s annual electricity consumption of 297.8 TWh in 2018, OWE could theoretically supply approximately 15% and 800% of South Africa’s annual electricity demand with offshore wind development Scenario 1 and 2 respectively.

With Friends Like These: Brinkmanship and Chain-Ganging in Russia's Near Abroad

ABSTRACTUnrecognized statelets may be forming in the Eastern Donbas region of Ukraine under the aegis of Russian protection—a “frozen conflict.” Georgia's past provides a useful cautionary tale in reference to Ukraine's probable future. The very same conceptual debates that are currently underway in the West with respect to Ukraine—“credibility of great-power security guarantees versus chain-ganging”—have, over the past twenty years, generated policies that facilitated the rise of political coalitions within Georgia that prefer war with Russia to any other outcome.

Great Power Security Cooperation: Arms Control and the Challenge of Technological Change

Great Power Security Cooperation: Arms Control and the Challenge of Technological Change

Geographical blessing versus geopolitical curse: great power security agendas for the Black Sea region and a Turkish alternative

The Black Sea has been a site of contention and confrontation for centuries, though changes since the end of the Cold War allowed for the emergence of a cooperative environment. Due to its strategic location in the middle of Eurasia, controlling the region represents a unique geopolitical interest. This uniqueness at times turns into threats for regional and international peace and stability; thus its fortuitous location can become a curse. This paper argues that increased big power (US, EU and Russian Federation) attention does not guarantee prosperity, and can create occasional clashes. It looks at how the security interests of the big powers came to focus on the Black Sea, and explores one of the regional alternatives for its future political, economic and security structures.

Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Middle Power Bridging

By theoretically and empirically examining regional middle power influence, this article explores how particular middle powers emerge pivotally to affect great powers. Clearly, middle powers like Poland and South Korea cannot act effectively alone. But they are at the centre of greater power disputes and must insulate themselves from great power alignments to preserve independence and prosperity. Even with their frequent predicaments, such as limited resources and modest power capabilities, middle powers can influence great power security dilemmas, and even can reduce those dilemmas through regional and cooperative bridging alignments. This analysis of the Republic of Poland and the Republic of South Korea demonstrates why their other-help foreign policy alignment pivotally affects great-power self-help security dilemmas. Examining other-help security alignments for specialized, regional, and bridge building by these pivotal middle powers at the twentieth century's end reveals important insights into their 21st-century impact. This article also extends the insights of self-help in international relations, showing how Poland and South Korea tried to reduce regional great power security dilemmas differently in the 1990s. Thus, analysis of theoretical and foreign policy alignments that Poland and South Korea promoted towards their neighbours in the early 1990s and late 1990s, respectively focuses on extending international relations theory for other-help middle power bridging. This analysis shows how democratized and globally integrative middle powers like Poland and South Korea do, in fact, influence some of the 21st century's most important security challenges, particularly lessening great power security dilemmas.

Reflections on Producing Security

This symposium has provided a priceless opportunity to advance debate on how global commerce influences international security. Of particular importance is that these articles help clarify exactly how the globalization of production affects great power security relations. My article comprises four parts, the first of which outlines the current state of the debate on how the globalization of production influences security and discusses why further research on this topic is needed. Section two examines Jonathan Kirshner's article, which helpfully shows why my conclusion that the globalization of production is stabilizing ultimately pertains to the severity of great power war, not its initiation. Section three discusses Jonathan Caverely's article and demonstrates how almost all the critical issues raised by Caverley are consistent with Producing Security. Section four turns to Eugene Gholz's contribution, which explores the boundary conditions of some of my arguments and usefully underscores that the globalization of production does not influence the benefits of conquest in advanced countries nearly as strongly in the short-term as it does in the long-term.

Nuclear proliferation and great power security

(2002). Nuclear proliferation and great power security. Defence Studies: Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 77-102.

TMD in the Asia‐pacific: A view from China

This paper gives an insight into China's concerns and reactions to the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system in the Asia‐Pacific. The projected capabilities of the TMD system are embroiled in controversy and the People's Republic of China (PRC) believes that it can seriously undermine China's nuclear deterrent, making it vulnerable to attack. The historical enmity between Japan and China might resurface as Japan participates in the development of the TMD with the United States. The US is determined to deploy the TMD to meet “non‐deterrable threats” and as a counter‐proliferation measure. It is unlikely that China will be deterred from staking its claim on Taiwan to achieve complete reunification of the motherland. Confronted with a security dilemma, China is enhancing its missile capabilities and voicing its concern in international forums. Voicing its fears about space militarisation, violation of arms control agreements and missile proliferation, China has sought to build up global resistance to the development and deployment of the TMD. At the same time, PRC's military is gearing itself to fight a “limited war” on its frontiers and enhancing military cooperation with France, Russia and Israel. Is the TMD necessary? Can the world afford to neglect an emerging great power's security concerns? These two fundamental questions prompt the arguments produced in this paper.

Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)

In the Third World, regional military-security cooperation has evolved through three frameworks. The advent of the Cold War saw the emergence of two competing frameworks, one of which may be termed `autonomous' and the other, `hegemonic'. A review of these frameworks and their practical manifestations points to some important lessons concerning the limitations of regional military-security cooperation in the Third World. By using these lessons as a conceptual framework, the paper analyses the role of ASEAN, which the paper finds as a third framework in the evolutionary adaptation of regional military-security cooperation in the Third World. Within this framework, the four main criteria of evaluation applied to ASEAN are: (1) ASEAN's role in intra-member conflict resolution, (2) the structure of military-security cooperation within ASEAN, (3) the types of military-security cooperation undertaken by the ASEAN members, and (4) the conflict between ASEAN's professed aspirations for regional autonomy versus the need felt by its members for great power security guarantees. On the basis of such an evaluation, the paper establishes the major features and limitations of ASEAN and examines whether these are similar to some other contemporary subregional groupings in the Third World groupings.

Historical Trends in Great Power War, 1495-1975

The hypothesis that war between the Great Powers is diminishing in frequency but increasing in seriousness is tested for the last five centuries of the modern Great Power system. We define this system, establish its origins in 1495, identify its membership, operationalize and identify its wars, measure these wars along several key dimensions, and analyze the historical trends along each dimension. It is found that the frequency of Great Power war has been diminishing rapidly from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century, with a slight upturn in the twentieth century. The Great Power wars that do occur, however, have become more serious along every dimension except duration, which has remained unchanged. They have been increasing in extent (number of belligerent Powers), severity (battle-deaths), intensity (battle-deaths per capita), concentration (battle-deaths per nation-year of war), and, to a certain degree, magnitude (nation-years). These trends are explained in terms of technological innovation, increasing interdependence of the modern Great Power security system, increasing rationalization and centralization of military power under the state, popularization of war through the nation in arms, emergence of a peacetime military establishment directed by professionals, and total mobilization of society for the enhancement of the military power of the state.