Grand Alliance Research Articles

Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942

(2002). Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 51-85.

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II

<sc>Mark A. Stoler</sc>. <italic>Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and U.S. Strategy in World War II</italic>. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2000. Pp. xxii, 380. $37.50

<sc>Mark A. Stoler</sc>. <italic>Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and U.S. Strategy in World War II</italic>. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2000. Pp. xxii, 380. $37.50

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and U.S. Strategy in World War II

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and U.S. Strategy in World War II

Culture, Power, and Mission to Moscow: Film and Soviet-American Relations during World War II

Following a sumptuous feast (and copious amounts of vodka), the guests, gathered around a banquet table deep within the Kremlin's walls in May 1943, toasted SovietAmerican friendship. Premier Joseph V. Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov praised the Grand Alliance. Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Soviet commissar for foreign trade, Lavrenty P. Beria, the head of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del, NKVD), and Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, offered toasts, and the Anglo-Americans present-including the British ambassador to Moscow, Adm. William H. Standley, the reigning United States representative, and Joseph E. Davies, Washington's former ambassador-reciprocated. The American emissary from 1936 to 1938, Davies was there because President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sent him to arrange an introductory summit with Stalin, a meeting at which Roosevelt was sure all outstanding Soviet-American differences could be ironed out. Although Davies' presence was unusual, thus far the evening had been little different from similar receptions held by Soviet leaders for their Allied comrades during World War II. On this occasion, however, the former ambassador had brought with him a movie that both he and Roosevelt hoped would convince the Soviet dictator to eschew separate peace negotiations with Adolf Hitler and to remain within the tenuous Big Three

Defoe's "South-Sea" and "North-Sea" Schemes: A Footnote to A New Voyage Round the World

Defoe's "South-Sea" and "North-Sea" Schemes: A Footnote to A New Voyage Round the World P.N. Furbank and W.R. Owens In May 1711, shortly after Robert Harley had put forward in Parliament a plan for a South Sea Company, he asked Daniel Defoe to let him have his thoughts about it. It would form part of the charter of the Company that, under the Grand Alliance treaty of 1701, England had the right to take possession of some part of the Spanish dominions; and Defoe responded by proposing the seizure of an area in Patagonia (largely unpopulated and not under Spanish rule) as a step towards establishing a colony on the other side of the Andes, at Valdivia,1 in Chile. The land around Valdivia was, he said, very fertile; the climate was ideally suited to the English; and the region abounded in gold. Defoe's purpose was to give some definite and practical substance to the new Company's plans, though without encouraging the (to him) absurd notion that Spain could be made to allow an open trade throughout her dominions. Whatever trading relations were to spring up between the new colony and its Spanish and Indian neighbours would, as he pictured it, be unofficial; and meanwhile a valuable exchange of products might be set in train with England's colonies in New England and the Caribbean. 1 There was disagreement about the spelling of this name, which sometimes appears as "Baldivia" or "Baldavia " According to Defoe, in his letter to Harley, the place was founded by the Spanish general Pedro Valdivia ([1500]-1553). See The tetters ofDaniel Defoe, ed. George Harris Healey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 345^9. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION, Volume 13, Number 4, July 2001 502 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION Defoe told Harley he hoped his scheme would be no less acceptable for having been formerly proposed to King William, "Since I can Assure your Ldpp No Eye Ever Saw the Drafft Except his Late Majtie and The Earle of Portland, and The Originalls were allways in My Own hand; Till my Lord Nottinghams fury forced me to Burn Them with Other papers to keep Them Out of his hands."2 A discreetly veiled version of this Valdivian proposal appeared in the Review for 19 July and 7 August 1711, and a further one in An Essay on the South-Sea Trade (September 1711), where Defoe again claims to have presented "these Schemes" to the King at the beginning of the war and says that they were "so approved of both by himself, and several of those whom his Majesty was pleased to communicate them to, that nothing but the unhappy Death of that Glorious Prince prevented that this Attempt, (instead of that which has proved so fatal at Barcelona,) had taken up the last Seven Years, with the Blood and Treasure of this Nation."3 From now on, this project became a favourite theme with Defoe. He gives an extended version of it in chapter 22 of A General History of Discoveries and Improvements (1725-26; the emphasis here being primarily on Patagonia), and a briefer one in A Plan of the English Commerce (1728);4 and meanwhile in A New Voyage Round the World, by a Course never sailed before (1725 [for 1724]) he had devised the fictional narrative of a voyage to the South Seas,5 designed to show that his Valdivian and Patagonian projects were a practical possibility. The imaginary voyage, a circumnavigation of the globe, begins late in 1713, that is to say not long after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Part of its aim is to see if inroads might be made on the French trading hegemony in the South Seas, and for this purpose it is planned to sail under a variety of colours: French, English, or Imperialist as best suits the particular circumstances. The English captain, who narrates, wants to attempt an eastward circumnavigation, and after many vicissitudes, including an abortive mutiny, the ship's company adopt his scheme. They 2 Defoe, Letten, p. 345. 3 An Essay on the South-Sea Trade (1711), in Political and Economic Writings of...

Allies and adversaries: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. strategy in World War II

Allies and adversaries: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. strategy in World War II

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II

Formed soon after Pearl Harbor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. Their functions grew to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns during World War II, however, when the military voice assumed an unprecedented importance. Analysing the wartime rise of military influence in US foreign policy, Mark Stoler focuses on the evolution of and debates over US and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies - Great Britain and the Soviet Union - and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and post-war national security policy.

The Potsdam Conference and the Spanish Problem

This article examines and analyses the discussion over ‘the Spanish Problem’ taking place between the leaders of the three great Allied powers during the Postdam Conference of July–August 1945. It argues that the approved condemnation of the Franco regime was a bald rhetorical declaration which contained no effective sanctions, be they diplomatic, economic or military. The reference to Spain was the result of a minimal agreement reached with great difficulty after arduous negotiations which resulted in the imposition of a toothless international ostracism. Consequently, aided by the disintegration of the Grand Alliance and its replacement by the Cold War, the Francoist dictatorship cautiously inched its way to post-war survival.

The CPLD implementation of Viterbi algorithm in grand alliance ATSC systems

Digital television has become one of the most promising industries. The advanced television system is scheduled to totally replace the current television broadcasting system in the US. In this paper, we present the implementation and discussion of the trellis en/decoder in the grand alliance digital television system proposed by the Advanced Television System Committee (ATSC). In the paper, we use a relatively efficient way to realize the en/decoding circuit. The correctness of our design has also been demonstrated.

1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II

At a crucial point in the twentieth century, as Nazi Germany prepared for war, negotiations between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union became the last chance to halt Hitler's aggression. Incredibly, the French and British governments dallied, talks failed, and in August 1939 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. Michael Carley's gripping account of these negotiations is not a pretty story. It is about the failures of appeasement and collective security in Europe. It is about moral depravity and blindness, about villains and cowards, and about heroes who stood against the intellectual and popular tides of their time. Some died for their beliefs, others labored in obscurity and have been nearly forgotten. In 1939 they sought to make the Grand Alliance that never was between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. This story of their efforts is background to the wartime alliance created in 1941 without France but with the United States in order to defeat a demonic enemy. 1939 is based upon Mr. Carley's longtime research on the period, including work in French, British, and newly opened Soviet archives. He challenges prevailing interpretations of the origins of World War II by situating 1939 at the end of the early cold war between the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, and by showing how anti-communism was the major cause of the failure to form an alliance against Hitler. 1939 was published on September 1, the sixtieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland and the start of the war.

The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

Abbreviations and Acronyms The Evolution of the KGB, 1917-1991 The Transliteration of Russian Names Foreward The Mitrokhin Archive From Lenin's Cheka to Stalin's OGPU The Great Illegals The Magnificent Terror War The Grand Alliance Victory From War to Cold War The Part 1: North American Illegals in the 1950's The Adversary. Part 2: Walk-ins, Legal Residencies and the Early Cold War The Main Adversary Part 3: Illegals after Abel The Main Adversary Part 4: Walk-ins, Legal Residencies and the Later Cold War Political Warfare: Active Measure and the Main Adversary PROGRES Operations. Part 1: Crushing the Prague Spring PROGRESS Operations. Part 2: Spying on the Soviet Bloc The KGB and Western Communist Parties Eurocommunism Ideological Subversion Part 1: The War Against the Dissidents Ideological Subversion Part 2: The Victory of the Dissidents SIGINT in the Cold War Special Tasks Part 1: From Marshal Tito to Rudolf Nureyev Special Tasks Part 2: The Andropov Era and Beyond Cold War Operations Against Britain Part 1: After the Magnificient Five Cold War Operations Against Britain Part 2: After Operation FOOT The Federal Republic of Germany France and Italy during the Cold War: Agent Penetration and Active Measures The Penetration and Persecution of the Soviet Churches The Polish Pope and the Rise of Solidarity The Polish Crisis and the Crumbling of the Soviet Bloc Conclusion: From the One-Party State to the Yeltsin Presidency Appendices A. KGB Chairmen, 1917-26 B. Heads of Foreign Intelligence, 1920-1999 C. The Organization of the KGB D. The Organization of the KGB First Chief Directorate E. The Organization of a KGB Residency Notes Bibliography Index.

The "Polish Problem" - American War-Time Perspectives

As one of the initial, and arguably most devastated, casualties of the Second World War, Poland’s restoration as a free and independent state was seen as a test case for the viable continuation of the victorious Grand Alliance. Yet seemingly irreconcilable differences between the Western powers and the Soviet Union over intricate territorial and political issues (with the Polish state and people caught firmly in the middle) would signal the end of the working alliance. The US collectively struggled to come to terms with this “Polish problem”– its government failing to deliver to the Poles on those democratic principles enshrined within the Atlantic Charter, and its people finding the very ideals for which they had gone to war compromised. While reflecting the unique complexities of this particular dilemma, American officialsrsquo; perceptions of the conundrum over Poland bear a ringing familiarity to future East European developments and certainly set the tone for the ensuing West-Soviet impasse there. Indeed, this author would not be alone in suggesting that the superpower struggle over Poland at the close of World War II was itself the very genesis of the Cold War conflict.

The Canadian Middle Power Myth

THE RHETORIC OF 'MIDDLEPOWERHOOD' has dominated Canada's external political identity since the Second World War. Middle-power status has been used to justify a voice in international organizations, leadership in international initiatives, and consultation with Canadian officials on matters of concern to the international community. Canada has used the middle power concept to further its foreign policy aims and to promote nationalism through an internationally recognized identity.For all its importance, 'middle power' is rarely defined, and limited explanations are never specific. This vagueness is deliberate and conceals a striking reality: Canada's status as a middle power is a myth. The history of middlepowerhood uncovers a tradition of Canadian rhetoric crafted to justify the attainment of disproportionate influence in international affairs.(f.1) This subtle process of nationalist self- promotion had its genesis in 1942 when diplomat Hume Wrong introduced the functional principle, and it continues to be manifest in the Canadian human security agenda today.In 1933, David Mitrany legitimized the concept of functionalism in international relations, evaluating the potential for a successful world government by dividing the world into two types of states: great and small. Recognizing that some of the smaller states were increasing in strength, and seeking to ensure successful and co-operative international governance, he proposed to acknowledge the differing capacities of the smaller powers through 'a functional structure of political authority.'(f.2)Mitrany's ideas undoubtedly influenced Hume Wrong when he wrote to Norman Robertson, the undersecretary of state for external affairs, about Canada's role and status in the direction of war and the shaping of peace during inter-allied World War II negotiations: 'the principle, I think, is that each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of war proportionate to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of the various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned.'(f.3) Wrong's 'functional principle' was narrower than Mitrany's 'functionalism.' It stipulated that individual small-state involvement in international affairs should be based upon certain conditions: the relevance of the state's interests, the direct contribution of the state to the situation in question, and the capacity of the state to participate.(f.4) Wrong did not intend to contest the role of the great powers - their inherent right to influence over all aspects of global governance was conceded. The principle was to apply to all remaining states. There were indeed two tiers of powers in the international system. However, some of the smaller powers deserved greater relative status predetermined by three criteria: relevance, contribution, and capacity. Functional powers were small powers. The functional principle was a 'functional' means of differentiating between smaller states, based on their relative capacities at a specific time.The tenets of the functional principle helped elevate Canada's status within the international community during World War II. Canada became a leading non-great power. It had a functional voice in the shaping of international relations. Over time, however, that was not enough. With the war coming to a close, Brooke Claxton, the minister of defence, proposed to extend the principle beyond its original meaning: 'the nations of the world must come to think of representation in terms of function rather than status.'(f.5) Claxton hoped to change the power structure.Great powers had formal status that would soon be recognized in the charter of the United Nations. Regardless of the state of the French economy, the British military, or Soviet political stability, the three remained great powers. Great-power status was differentiated objectively. It hardly fluctuated, and it allowed certain states to maintain a disproportionate influence in international affairs. …

Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941–1945. By Bradley F. Smith. Modern War Studies. Edited by, Theodore A. Wilson. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. Pp. xix+307. $35.00.Forging Stalin's Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation. By Sally W. Stoecker. Foreword by, David Glantz. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998. Pp. xiv+207. $59.00.War and Diplomacy: The

Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941–1945. By Bradley F. Smith. Modern War Studies. Edited by, Theodore A. Wilson. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. Pp. xix+307. $35.00.Forging Stalin's Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation. By Sally W. Stoecker. Foreword by, David Glantz. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998. Pp. xiv+207. $59.00.War and Diplomacy: The

China and the Issue of Postwar Indochina in the Second World War

China's foreign relations during the Second World War underwent a radical metamorphosis. The Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) earned new international respect by mounting a tenacious resistance against the Japanese enemy. By allying itself with powerful countries in the West for the first time in modern history, China emerged from its involuntary diplomatic isolation. The new Grand Alliance facilitated China's diplomatic initiatives seeking to eradicate the legal stigma of its semi-colonial status through the abrogation of the unequal treaties. In the process China also leaped to the rank of the ‘Big Four’. At a time when the Western colonialism was receding, the Japanese Empire was collapsing and national independence movements were on the rise in many Asian countries, China seemed positioned to achieve a new prominent leadership role in Asian and world affairs.

SDTV and Multiple Service in a DTV Environment

With the adoption of the Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC) Digital Television (DTV) standard and the 5th and 6th Report and Order by the FCC, a rapid implementation of digital television broadcasting is now under way in the U.S. The DTV standard allows broadcasters to offer multiple standard-definition television (SDTV) services as well as high-definition television (HDTV) service. Furthermore, the FCC gives broadcasters maximum flexibility in their use of a digital channel by not requiring them to deliver any HDTV programs. Regulatory flexibility in DTV implementation and system capability in the DTV standard will certainly open the door to a new age of multimedia services including multiple SDTV service. The concept of multiple SDTV service is based on the use of the same technologies and system architecture developed for HDTV by the Grand Alliance (GA). Multiple SDTV service could be provided to the public in addition or as a supplement to HDTV service. This includes such things as transmission of multiple 4 x 3 aspect ratio or widescreen programs with resolution equivalent to or better than the current analog NTSC system. This paper reviews the definition of SDTV and its provision in the ATSC DTV standard and then examines the key elements of the MPEG-2 transport system that provides the means for multiple service. To facilitate the implementation of multiple SDTV service, a discussion is given on how to configure multiple SDTV service as well as select user definable MPEG-2 parameters. Finally, issues and challenges regarding multiple SDTV service are addressed.

The HDTV Broadcast Standard: Subjective Evaluation of Proponent Systems

Six high-definition television (HDTV) systems were tested to establish a proposed HDTV terrestrial transmission standard. The tests occurred in two rounds and were conducted at the Advanced Television Test Center (ATTC); and at Cable Labs in Alexandria, VA; and at the Advanced Television Evaluation Laboratory (ATEL) in Ottawa, Ont., Canada. The testing process played an important role in accelerating the development of HDTV technology in North America, culminating in the development of the digital Grand Alliance HDTV System, the adopted standard. This paper summarizes the results of subjective image quality tests (Basic Received Quality, Impairment/Interference, and Receiver Scan Conversion) of the proponent HDTV systems from both rounds of testing, thereby permitting the reader to compare the relative performance of competing systems and gain some insight into the testing process conducted at ATEL.

John Charmley. <italic>Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–57</italic>. (A Harvest Book.) Paperback edition. San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace. 1996. Pp. xv, 427. $18.00

John Charmley. Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–57. (A Harvest Book.) Paperback edition. San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace. 1996. Pp. xv, 427. $18.00 Get access Charmley John. Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–57. (A Harvest Book.) Paperback edition. San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace. 1996. Pp. xv, 427. $18.00. R. J. Q. Adams R. J. Q. Adams Texas A&M University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 103, Issue 3, June 1998, Pages 893–894, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/103.3.893 Published: 01 June 1998

Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57

Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57