Since the 19905, pundits, parliamentarians, and professors alike have criticized the Liberal government for its seeming neglect of the Canadian forces (CF) and the resulting decline.1 They claim that spending cuts in defence threaten Canada's international standing. They contend that, for the United States, troop cuts make Canada an even more junior (and burdensome) partner in terms of North American defence. They assert that government priorities directed elsewhere have left the Canadian populace poorly protected in the post-g/n environment. In this mix of criticisms, it is also frequently asserted that the CF's growing reliance upon private commercial actors for the execution of critical tasks is representative of this neglect and decline. Reliance upon private actors is a poor second choice because, they contend, it puts the defence of the country in the hands of commercial rather than national interests. Moreover, this policy choice reveals that the government is not serious about protecting Canadians or ensuring the sovereignty of Canada because it has surrendered, for the entire world to see, responsibilities to the private sector. Overall, the complaint is that Canada may no longer be a real state as a result.2While this privatization is partially symptomatic of the government's stance towards defence since the end of the Cold War, this article argues that the net needs to be more widely cast in order to understand fully the rationale behind this shift in the balance between public and private.In fact, the private presence may even have been intended to at least address some of the concerns noted above. As such, many other variables, some of them independent of the Canadian context, have arisen that promote the private presence. To make this case, the article first describes the nature of defence privatization in Canada and then identifies the catalytic effects of neoliberal thinking, technological innovation, recruitment/retention issues, and the influence of the American military model. We will see that the motivators for privatization are often not straightforward; these factors frequently impact upon each other or stand in contradistinction. Additionally, while the change in the public/private balance does not necessarily indicate a lack of government seriousness regarding defence, it does present pitfalls and risks. Challenging issues pertaining to foreign influence, occupationalism in the CF, and governance and policymaking will likely affect Canada in specific ways.CANADIAN DEFENCE PRIVATIZATIONOn the one hand, the control and management of violence has fluctuated between public and private actors over the course of history.3 Civilians have long supported military operations, something explicitly identified in the Hague conventions on warfare. Similarly, while nationalization has sometimes occurred, private firms are usually responsible for producing the weaponry and equipment employed by militaries. This has been the case for Canada. During the Cold War, private firms provided for the CF's needs, whether they supplied the myriad bases and depots across Canada or the forward stockpiles located in western Europe. As for the production of armaments, government policy in recent decades has generally been not to interfere with the dynamics of the marketplace by overly directing, or even taking over, privately owned and operated firms.On the other hand, despite this type of private presence, it has generally been felt over the past 200 years that it is unexpected, inappropriate, and even dangerous for civilians to be overly involved in military endeavours. Civilians, so the argument goes, should not be deployed in large numbers and they should not provide services that are either critical to mission success or are needed near frontlines. It is also thought that military activities are best left to individuals who-imbued with a sense of patriotism-have agreed to the possibility of losing their lives in the course of performing them, rather than the unsavoury forces of the marketplace and private reward. …