Government Purchase Research Articles

PENENTUAN HARGA POKOK BERAS DI KECAMATAN KOTAMOBAGU TIMUR KOTA KOTAMOBAGU

The research with the title "Determination of Floor Price of Rice in the Eastern District Kotamobagu,Kotamobagu City" was designed to determine the base price of rice in the district east of the city KotamobaguKotamobagu, and compare the prices of goods sold at market prices and government purchase price(HPP). This research was conducted from November to December 2010. Data obtained from primary andsecondary data. Primary data obtained from direct interviews using a questionnaire to farmers, and primarydata obtained from the relevant agencies. Determining the location of intentional (purposive sampling)where a small village and village Kobo Moyag chosen because it is the biggest rice producing region inthe Eastern District Kotamobagu. The samples were farmers conducted by simple random sampling.Analysis of the data used is the method of Full Costing by summing the total component cost.The results showed that the size of the average floor price in District of East Kotamobagu isRp4961.56 per kilogram. The average floor price of rice in Sub Moyag higher than Kobo Small Village.

A detailed analysis of the relationship between contract administration problems and contract types

Guided by a conceptual model developed by Davison and Wright (2004), Davison and Sebastian (2009) surveyed National Institute of Government Purchasing (NIGP) and Institute of Supply Management (ISM) members to determine empirically which types of contract administration problems (e.g., delays) were perceived as most likely for seven types of contracts (e.g., small supplies and purchases). The mean ratings of the perceived occurrence of the ten problems for each contract problem were reported. The types of contract that had the greatest overall perceived occurrence of problems across all problem types and the types of problem that were perceived to be the most common across all contract types were also reported. This research extends these analyses by examining specifically which types of contract administration problems were perceived to be most common for each of the seven contract types and by examining which contract types were perceived to be most affected by the ten contract administration problems. The implications of the research results for procurement professionals and the limitations of the research are discussed.

A measurement model for experts knowledge-based systems algorithm using fuzzy analytic network process

This study proposes an experts knowledge-based systems measurement model, the model using fuzzy analytic network process (FANP) to resolve the uncertainty and imprecision of evaluations during pre-negotiation stages, where the comparison judgments of a decision maker are represented as fuzzy triangular numbers. A novel fuzzy prioritization method, which derives crisp priorities (criteria weights and scores of alternatives) from consistent and inconsistent fuzzy comparison matrices, is also proposed. The applicability of the proposed model is demonstrated in a government purchase digital video recorder (DVR) system project study. The stability tests indicate the advantages of the proposal model in determining the value of model. Importantly, the proposed model can provide decision makers a reference material, making it highly applicable for academic and commercial purposes.

BUREAUCRATS AS PURCHASERS OF HEALTH SERVICES: LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR FOR CONTRACTING

AbstractContracting out of health services increasingly involves a new role for governments as purchasers of services. To date, emphasis has been on contractual outcomes and the contracting process, which may benefit from improvements in developing countries, has been understudied. This article uses evidence from wide scale NGO contracting in Pakistan and examines the performance of government purchasers in managing the contracting process; draws comparisons with NGO managed contracting; and identifies purchaser skills needed for contracting NGOs. We found that the contracting process is complex and government purchasers struggled to manage the contracting process despite the provision of well‐designed contracts and guidelines. Weaknesses were seen in three areas: (i) poor capacity for managing tendering; (ii) weak public sector governance resulting in slow processes, low interest and rent seeking pressures; and (iii) mistrust between government and the NGO sector. In comparison parallel contracting ventures managed by large NGOs generally resulted in faster implementation, closer contractual relationships, drew wider participation of NGOs and often provided technical support. Our findings do not dilute the importance of government in contracting but front the case for an independent purchasing agency, for example an experienced NGO, to manage public sector contracts for community based services with the government role instead being one of larger oversight. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

New Keynesian Dynamics in a Low Interest Rate Environment

Recent research has found that the dynamic properties of the New Keynesian model can be very different when the nominal interest rate is zero. Improvements in technology and reductions in the labor tax rate lower economic activity, and the size of the government purchase output multiplier can be well above one. This paper provides evidence that the focus on specifications of the New Keynesian model that produce unorthodox results in a liquidity trap may be misplaced. We show that a prototypical New Keynesian model fit to Japanese data exhibits orthodox dynamics during Japan's episode with zero interest rates. We then demonstrate that this specification is more consistent with outcomes in Japan than alternative specifications that have unorthodox properties.

Patent Landscape of Countermeasures Against Smallpox and Estimation of Grant Attraction Capability Through Patent Landscape Data

The study was concerned with countermeasures against a possible smallpox outbreak. In the process of assessment 18 landscaping sectors were defined and described, the advantages and drawbacks of the corresponding countermeasures being reviewed. The data of the previously published influenza landscape were revisited. The current economic climate of deficit cutting (austerity) also puts emphasis on the optimization of capital investment. We used the materials of the landscape to define and analyze metrics of capital placement optimization. Value score was obtained by fitting patent landscape internals to the sale price of individual patents. Success score was obtained as a product of a-priori parameters that measure likelihood of emergence of a marketable product in a technological sector. Both scores were combined in a qualitative metric. Our methodology defined weight as a product of the sector size by the success score. We hypothesized - based on the material of two landscapes- that a life cycle of a technology begins in IP space with a high patent quality low volume "bud" of low weight, reaches maximum weight and then weight falls again when the technology becomes outdated. The weight and the annual dynamic of weight can serve a measure of investment risk and return. In this report we modeled investment by issue of government grants or purchase of patents by government. In the smallpox landscape the number of patents purchased by government agencies was the highest in the sectors with the highest weight and the trend was confirmed by the count of NIH grants issued in support of the technological sectors. In the influenza landscape only grant issue count was statistically meaningful and the trend was also confirmed. To better fit the grant support levels, the weight expression was optimized by using training coefficients. We propose to use value scores for evaluation of individual patent publications/company portfolios and to use weights for assessment of technological sectors. Such a combination of automated analytical tools may lead to optimized allocation of capital and is intended to support the decisions taken by human experts.

Green Power voluntary purchases: Price elasticity and policy analysis

Green Power schemes offer electricity from renewable energy sources to customers for a higher price than ordinary electricity. This study examines the demand characteristics of Green Power in Australia and policies which could increase its sales. A sample of 250 pooled time series and cross sectional observations was used to estimate a statistically significant elasticity of demand for Green Power with respect to price of −0.96 with a 95% confidence interval of ±68%. The wide variation in market penetration between jurisdictions and between countries for Green Power, and the low awareness of Green Power found by surveys indicate that Green Power sales could be increased by appropriate marketing and government policies. The most cost effective means to increase sales was found to be advertising campaigns although only one Australian example was found, in the state of Victoria in 2005. It was also found that full tax deductibility of the Green Power premium to residential customers, exemption from the Goods and Services Tax and a tax rebate for Green Power are all probably less cost effective for promoting sales than direct government purchase of Green Power, in terms of cost per unit of increased sales.

A Health(y) Image in the Post-Managerialist Age

Concomitant with the intensification of private provision of public services, government purchasers are managing third party service providers’ performance through accountability demands. As the excesses of New Public Management (NPM) are superseded by a post-NPM ethos, these purchasers are encouraged to soften those demands and ‘partner’ with providers. However, we argue that post-NPM reforms ignore the role of organisational identity in structuring accountability processes. Organisational identity can be described through image-laden metaphors. This paper explores how negative and positive organisational metaphors affected government purchasers’ demands for accountability from primary health care providers. Notwithstanding standard contractual arrangements, it found that purchasers’ demands for accountability vary according to the providers’ organisational images. Further, these government purchasers used sense-breaking and negative images to force change in providers’ identity.

Indian Generics Producers, Access to Essential Medicines and Local Production in Africa: An Argument with Reference to Tanzania

Much analysis of the supply chain for essential medicines to Africa assumes broad sustainability of low-cost generics supply from Indian manufacturers. We use Indian data and interviews to question this assumption. In a case study of Tanzania, we then argue for the necessity and feasibility of enhanced local production of essential medicines. We identify key industrial policy interventions, including industrial protection and active government purchasing; public goods including legislative and regulatory frameworks and training; and encouragement and facilitation of joint ventures. We show that a basis has been laid for these activities, and identify the urgency and difficulty of the policy challenge. There are lessons for the Tanzanian case from Indian industrial history, and policy space is provided by Tanzania's Least Developed Country status. Industrial and health policy can be further integrated to the benefit of Tanzania's citizens. The Tanzanian case has broader implications for African policymakers.

Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate: A Comment

The conventional international RBC model and also the traditional Keynesian model predict that an increase in government purchase results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate (Backus et al. 1994). Data show the opposite. Kolmann’s present paper addresses this government purchase-real exchange rate puzzle. He develops a series of micro based models to establish the central point that limited risk sharing is fundamental to resolve this puzzle. The main features of Kollmann’s static baseline model are as follows: (i) there is an extreme form of financial market incompleteness (trade balance is zero), (ii) all intermediate goods are internationally traded while the final good is not, (iii) the nontraded final good uses a mix of foreign and home produced intermediate goods with a local home bias in the technology, (iv) traded intermediate goods are produced with only labour using a CRS technology, (v) exogenous wasteful government purchases are financed by lump-sum taxes, (vi) wage and prices are flexible. In this environment, an increase in home government purchase gives rise to a negative wealth effect. Consumption and leisure being normal goods decrease in demand. People work harder and home production increases. This positive supplyside effect causes real exchange rate to depreciate via the depreciation of terms of trade. This effect is exacerbated if there is greater risk aversion or higher labour supply elasticity. Kollmann also demonstrates that introduction of sticky prices and wages and extending the model to multiperiods does not alter this central result. Kollmann shows that under full risk sharing the effect of government purchase on real exchange rate is exactly opposite to what happens in an incomplete risk sharing environment. Full risk sharing means that the real exchange rate equals the ratio of the marginal utilities of home goods to foreign goods. An adverse wealth effect of an increase in government purchase on home consumption raises the marginal utility of home consumption which means an appreciation of the real exchange rate contradicting the stylized facts. The punch-line is that incompleteness of the asset market is fundamental for resolving this puzzle. Open Econ Rev (2010) 21:65–67 DOI 10.1007/s11079-009-9154-4

The New Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: An Analysis and Assessment

This article describes and analyzes the new, tentatively agreed text of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement; and it compares this text with the existing agreement of 1995, offers interpretation of its provisions and discusses its potential implications for the regulation of international government purchasing. The objective of the article is to examine whether the new text has indeed delivered on its promise, namely to improve the existing agreement and to eliminate any remaining discriminatory measures and practices. To that aim the article presents the critique that has been leveled against the provisions of the existing GPA and examines to what extent the flaws detected by this critique have been rectified in the new text. The article concludes with a scorecard of the new text assessing its overall strengths and weaknesses. Oxford University Press 2009, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating

This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure contracts and supporting institutions. We focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government purchasers of infrastructure services by the supplying companies and by the governments themselves. In particular, we allow for trust updating and trust misalignments, which may give rise to ‘undertrusting’ and ‘overtrusting’. The core of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts with dynamic adjustment of trust perceptions, which we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic efficiency (measured by expected welfare) and on investment levels. We explore flexible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do not allow for post-investment renegotiation), and hybrid contracts. We then compare the efficiency of the flexible contracts to that of hybrid contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare implications of each contract. The model is used to shed light on current issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts in developed and in developing countries, including the role of regulatory institutions.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS FOR CONTRACT TYPES

The primary purpose of this research was to examine the perceived consequences of ten types of contract administration problems for each of seven contract types and to determine how likely each of these consequences were perceived to be. Building upon the earlier research of Davison and Sebastian (in press a, b), the research surveyed National Institute of Government Purchasing (NIGP) and Institute of Supply Management (ISM) members. For each of seven types of contract (e.g., supplies and small purchases) the respondents were asked to indicate the typical consequences they experienced for each of ten contract administration problems (e.g., wrong product). The major problematic consequences examined were contract delays, contract costs, and contract termination. The perceived likelihood of occurrence for each consequence, on the contracting process, was determined for each contract problem within each contract type. The major findings were that when contract administration problems occurred, problematic consequences were more likely than no consequences for all contract types except leases and that the types of problematic consequences that were most likely depended on the type of contract. The implications of the results from this research and Davison and Sebastian’s previous findings for procurement professionals and the purchasing process were discussed along with future research directions.

Measuring pharmacy quality

To describe methods for measuring health care quality and how these methods can be applied to the measurement of pharmacy quality and to describe ways of stimulating the use of quality improvement methods in pharmacy. The health care system is moving toward value-based purchasing of professional services, which is also known as value-driven health care. Value is often described as the balance between quality and costs, and thus, we can enhance value by improving quality while controlling costs. Although community pharmacies have not experienced the demand for evidence of quality and value, this is likely to change in the near future as the federal government and private purchasers expand their search for quality-related evidence to all sectors of health care. PQA, a pharmacy quality alliance, has been created to coordinate the efforts of numerous pharmacy stakeholders in developing measures of pharmacy quality and in educating pharmacists about quality improvement methods. In addition to educational strategies for stimulating quality improvement, the pharmacy sector is likely to experience regulatory changes that mandate quality improvement, public reports on the quality of individual pharmacies, and pay-for-performance systems that reward pharmacies for achieving higher levels of quality. All stakeholders in pharmacy (i.e., pharmacists, owners, managers, technicians, benefits managers) must become more aware of the movement toward value-driven health care and the ramifications for pharmacy practice. Community pharmacists will soon see an increased demand for evidence of quality and value as this sector is integrated within the broader framework for value-driven health care.

The relationship between contract administration problems and contract type

Guided by a conceptual model developed by Davison and Wright, the research was conducted to determine which types of contract administration problems (e.g., delays) were perceived as most likely for seven types of contracts (e.g., small supplies and purchases). The survey was sent electronically to all members of the National Institute of Government Purchasing (NIGP). Postcards with the survey URL were also distributed to a random sample of members of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). Data were obtained from 557 respondents. The results for the perceived relationship of the occurrence of contract administration problems for the various contract types provided partial support for the conceptual model. The results also showed that construction contracts were perceived as having the most problems overall and delay was perceived as the most common contract administration problem. The implications and limitations of the research are discussed.

Data Exclusivity Period Length and Federal Government Savings from Enactment of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007

Senate Bill S.1695, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007 would establish an abbreviated regulatory procedure for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to license follow-on biological (FOB) drugs. The motivation for the bill is to save money for the Federal government and other purchasers of biologics. The Congressional Budget Office estimates Federal savings of $5.8 billion over the ten year scoring window covering 2009-2018. The length of data exclusivity to be awarded to innovator biologics upon FDA approval also is under debate. We show that by setting the data exclusivity period below 14 years, the government saves at most an additional $1.4 billion over ten years which represents only 0.11 percent of expected Federal drug spending, and 0.012 percent of Federal healthcare spending over the scoring window. Furthermore, we show that adopting a data exclusivity period of less than 14 years will have significant impacts on research and development (R&D) spending and thus, fewer, innovative biologics used to treat patients will be brought to market. This is because innovative biotechnology firms will lose a significant portion of their sales to copycat FOB firms. The average biologic does not cover its costs until 17 years after it starts selling the product. Because firms rely heavily on cash flow from sales to fund their R&D, fewer sales imply less R&D spending. We show that biotechnology R&D is likely to fall by at least $41 billion. The long-run effect is likely to be much larger due in part because the high-cost, high-sales breakthrough biologics will face greater FOB competition. Innovator firms may fund more lower-cost, less-innovative biologics because they will face fewer FOBs, allowing them to retain a greater proportion of sales.

The New Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: An Analysis and Assessment

This article describes and analyzes the new, tentatively agreed text of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. It compares it to the existing agreement of 1995, offers interpretation of its provisions and discusses its potential implications for the regulation of international government purchasing. The objective of the article is to examine whether it has indeed delivered on its promise, namely to improve the existing agreement and to eliminate any remaining discriminatory measures and practices. To that aim it presents the critique that has been leveled against the provisions of the existing GPA and examines to what extent the flaws detected by this critique have been rectified in the new text. The paper concludes with a scorecard of the new text assessing its allover strengths and weaknesses.

State-Dependent Pricing and Optimal Monetary Policy

This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy under precommitment in a state-dependent pricing (SDP) environment. Under SDP, monopolistically competitive firms are allowed to endogenously change the timing of price adjustments. I show that this endogenous timing of price adjustment alters the tradeoff and the cost of inflation variation faced by the monetary authority in comparison to the standard time-dependent pricing (TDP) assumption. In particular, it is desirable to let inflation vary more under SDP. Despite the change in the policy tradeoff, however, the optimal response under SDP to either a productivity shock or a government purchase shock under the timeless perspective (longrun) policy can still be characterized as an approximate price stability rule. In addition to a standard first-order approximation to the equilibrium solution, this paper also computes a second-order solution where the effect of state-dependence can play a central role. The policy response under SDP exhibits some degree of nonlinearity, especially in the presence of larger shocks and when the state of the economy is farther away from the steady state. Finally, this paper also studies the optimal policy start-up problem related to the cost of adopting the timeless perspective policy instead of the true Ramsey policy. The SDP assumption leads to different start-up dynamics compared to the dynamics under the TDP assumption in several interesting ways. In particular, the change in the policy tradeoff gives rise to much higher start-up inflation under SDP.

Letter: Another Take on "Why Paulson is Wrong"

Paulson proposes a top-down solution to the financial crisis by government purchase of bad loans from the lenders to "clean" their balance sheets. But, Barton suggests, a bottom-up solution would be a subsidy to borrowers to ensure full payments, restoring the value of the "toxic assets," thereby cleaning up.

A Critique of the ANSI Standard on Role-Based Access Control

In 2004, the American National Standards Institute approved the Role-Based Access Control standard to fulfill need among government and industry purchasers of information technology products for a consistent and uniform definition of role based access control (RBAC) features. Such uniform definitions give IT product vendors and customers a common and unambiguous terminology for RBAC features, which can lead to wider adoption of RBAC and increased productivity. However, the current ANSI RBAC Standard has several limitations, design flaws, and technical errors that, it unaddressed, could lead to confusions among IT product vendors and customers and to RBAC implementations with different semantics, thus defeating the standard's purpose.