Government Misconduct Research Articles

‘The assisting hand’ or ‘the grabbing hand’: experimental evidence from PPP investments in the implementation of official rotation systems

In the context of uneven and insufficient social development, examining the relationship between the official rotation system and the quality of government services offers an effective guide to addressing government misconduct and reducing wealth disparities. This study employs a public goods game experiment to simulate the investment scenario of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, focusing on three pivotal questions: Firstly, do the ‘assisting hand’ and the ‘grabbing hand’ of officials differ between developed and underdeveloped regions? Secondly, can the interregional rotation system enhance the ‘assisting hand’ and weaken the ‘grabbing hand’ in both areas? Lastly, can political tournaments more effectively alleviate the issue of ‘government misconduct’? The experimental results reveal: Firstly, low economic growth potential limits the ‘assisting hand’ of officials while fostering the ‘grabbing hand’; secondly, the interregional rotation system strengthens the ‘assisting hand’ in underdeveloped areas but weakens it in developed regions; finally, compared to the interregional rotation system, the tournament system reinforces the ‘assisting hand’ in developed regions. These findings provide micro-level insights into the relationship between official behavior and regional characteristics, and offer significant implications for the reform of governance policies.

A tripartite evolutionary game study of low-carbon innovation system from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes

Traditional manufacturing industry is in the early stages of transition to low-carbon innovative production, and is in urgent need of a low-carbon innovation system to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. In order to realize the effective supervision of enterprise carbon emissions, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the corporate, government and public from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes. The main results are as follows. First, the increase in government subsidies to a certain extent will help encourage companies to choose low-carbon innovative production strategies, but more subsidies are not always better. Excessive subsidies will increase the cost of government regulation and reduce the probability of government regulation. Second, the tripartite evolutionary game system does not converge under the static subsidies and taxes mechanism. But the system could quickly converges to the stable condition under dynamic subsidies and taxes. The stable point is the situation of corporate low-carbon innovation, government regulation, and public supervision. Third, the public intervention and supervision can effectively prevent the phenomenon of government misconduct and enterprises over-emission production. And the influence of public reward and punishment is more effective for the government than for enterprises.

Prison and Post-Release Experiences of Innocent Inmates

ABSTRACT Over the past thirty years, research on wrongful convictions has mainly spotlighted the causes of wrongful conviction including eyewitness misidentification, false confession, misused forensic evidence, government misconduct, and unreliable incentivized witnesses. More recently, researchers have also investigated post-release effects of wrongful convictions on exonerees. One area of research which has largely been ignored is the exoneree’s prison experience. This exploratory study examined the prison experience through the lens of an “innocent inmate.” Twenty-three exonerees were recruited through the use of snowball sampling and interviewed over the phone about their experiences in prison as well as their lives post-release. The majority of exonerees stated that their prison experience was unique from guilty inmates. Exonerees reported that guilty inmates were well-versed on the criminal justice system while innocent inmates struggled to learn the system. Innocent inmates expressed their daily prison lives as mirroring guilty inmates though, unlike their guilty counterparts, they dealt with additional challenges such as attempting to understand why they were incarcerated. They also carried an extra burden of fighting to prove their innocence and their stories never wavered. Given the challenges faced by exonerees post-release, it is clear that greater support is required for them on release. The results of this study reveal the need for education and training programs for criminal justice practitioners to better understand the unique needs of this ignored population.

Government Misconduct and Convicting the Innocent, The Role of Prosecutors, Police and Other Law Enforcement

This report examines the role of official misconduct in the conviction of innocent people. It is based on first 2,400 exonerations listed in the National Registry of Exonerations: cases in which a person who was convicted of a crime was officially and completely cleared based on new evidence of innocence. The Report is limited to misconduct by government officials that contributes to the false convictions of defendants who are later exonerated—misconduct that produces unreliable, misleading or false evidence of guilt, or that conceals, distorts or undercuts true evidence of innocence. The Report organizes the myriad types of misconduct into five general categories, roughly in the chronological order of a criminal case, from initial investigation to conviction: Witness Tampering; Misconduct in Interrogations of Suspects; Fabricating Evidence; Concealing Exculpatory Evidence; Misconduct at Trial. Official misconduct contributed to the false convictions of 54% of defendants who were later exonerated. In general, the rate of misconduct is higher in more severe crimes. Concealing exculpatory evidence—the most common type of misconduct—occurred in 44% of exonerations. Black exonerees were slightly more likely than whites to have been victims of misconduct (57% to 52%), but this gap is much larger among exonerations for murder (78% to 64%)—especially those with death sentences (87% to 68%)—and for drug crimes (47% to 22%). Police officers committed misconduct in 35% of cases. They were responsible for most of the witness tampering, misconduct in interrogation, and fabricating evidence—and a great deal of concealing exculpatory evidence and perjury at trial. Prosecutors committed misconduct in 30% of the cases. Prosecutors were responsible for most of the concealing of exculpatory evidence and misconduct at trial, and a substantial amount of witness tampering. Forensic examiners committed misconduct in 3% of exonerations, and child welfare workers in 2%. Disciplinary actions against officials who committed misconduct were uncommon for all types of officials, and especially so for prosecutors. For most types of misconduct, we have insufficient data to date to identify changes over time. There is, however, strong evidence that a few kinds of misconduct have become less common in the past 20 years: violence and other misconduct in interrogations; abusive questioning of children in child sex abuse cases; and fraud in presenting forensic evidence. On the other hand, the number of federal white-collar exonerations with misconduct by prosecutors has been increasing. We conclude that the main causes of misconduct that contributed to the false convictions of these exonerated defendants were pervasive practices that permit or reward bad behavior, lack of resources to conduct high quality investigations and prosecutions, and ineffective leadership by those in command. We discuss a range of possible remedies, from specific new rules governing investigations to changes in the work culture of law enforcement officers in particular agencies, in counties and states across the country, and in the nation as a whole.

Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland

This essay is based on a lecture given as part of the McGeorge School of Law's Distinguished Speaker Series. The essay examines Brady v. Maryland as one of the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases that has taken on superhero status, announcing not only an important procedural right, but doing so in ringing moral terms that forever associate the right with the case. In Brady, the majority crafted its holding that an accused has a constitutional right to exculpatory evidence as embodying the prosecutor's ethical duty to pursue justice and not simply victory in the courtroom. By crafting the opinion in this way, Brady joined cases like Gideon, Miranda and Mapp as opinions that possess special rhetorical power because they are expressly founded upon fundamental values like equality, human dignity, and the morality of government. This essay argues, however, that subsequent cases have largely robbed Brady of its superhero powers as a pre-trial discovery doctrine. By setting a very high threshold before exculpatory evidence becomes material and must be turned over - evidence that could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict - the Court essentially has turned Brady from a pre-trial discovery device into a post-trial safety net to catch cases of government misconduct. Indeed, the essay suggests that the materiality standard is now so high that a prosecutor who discovers true Brady evidence prior to trial should ethically be considering dismissal of the charges, let alone the need to turn the evidence over to the defense. Because of Brady's limited usefulness as a pre-trial source for discovery, the essay urges that we not let the mirage of a constitutional right to discovery keep us from debating the need for broader discovery through statutory discovery rights and the rules of criminal procedure.

Defending Environmental Rights: an Ecological Democracy Perspective

Environmental problems are amongst the most complex issues faced by the government. The reason why such problem is difficult to tackle lie within its basic assumption which often contradictory to the country’s development agenda. Take an example of Cement Plant controversy that happened recently – the plant that situated in Mount Kendeng, Pati, Central Java, considered harmful to the surrounding and threatening the environmental right of the people who lives in nearby areas. This case can be referred as government misconduct on neglecting basic environmental right. Environmental rights itself are commonly understood as the reformulation and expansion of existing human rights and duties in the context of environmental protection. However, although it has received much attention at grass root level conveyed by activist group and people based community, environmental rights still do not have strong recognition, whether in domestic level and also in international level. Therefore, this research attempt to modulate recognition on environmental right by emphasizing ecological democracy perspective, particularly in public participation in environmental policy making. Public participation is vital to ecological democracy as the key to sustainable development and in defending the environmental rights. The concept itself tries to bridge the government and public needs – to ensure that the public can participate in any ways by providing feedback and solutions. There are three main types of environmental rights – procedural, substantive, and solidarity. As for this research, we will focus on solidarity aspects, to explain the public engagement in environmental policy making.

Forensic Intelligence and the Deportation Research Clinic: Toward a New Paradigm

Since 2012, the Deportation Research Clinic, part of the Buffett Institute for Global Studies at Northwestern University, has been pursuing research on government misconduct under the rubric of what Jacqueline Stevens calls “forensic intelligence.” The Clinic uses law and publicity, including scholarship, to create new realities, which in turn produce new facts and knowledge. Stevens draws on scholarship by S.M. Amadae, Noam Chomsky, Philip Green, Chalmers Johnson, Kenneth Osgood, Ido Oren, Michael Rogin, and Frances Saunders to explain the relation of “forensic intelligence” to the “national intelligence” paradigm now organizing mainstream political science research. The article concludes by describing how U.S. government and economic elites distort research and teaching priorities, and provides examples from Northwestern University.

Rediscovering Congressional Intelligence Oversight

This Article compares a historical model of congressional intelligence oversight, as demonstrated by Church’s leadership as chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (“Church Committee”), with current intelligence oversight deficiencies that have induced a growing population of citizens to demand greater protections against government overreach and wrongdoing. By examining the difficulties Church and the Church Committee experienced in gathering evidence of government misconduct and publicly disseminating such information, a more historical perspective may reveal the viability of alternative methods of congressional intelligence oversight.

Thoughts on the reform of the drug-compensating-medicine practice at public hospitals

An analysis of the relationship between government regulatory and the drugcompensating-medicine mechanism at public hospitals identified information asymmetry,monopoly of medical services market,price control of medical services and insufficient government financial sports as giving rise to such a mechanism at public hospitals.This setback traces back to the absence,dislocation and offside of government regulations.The authors pointed out that the reformers of abolishing such a practice failed target government misconduct,and attempted to reinforce regulations of public hospital's operational activities instead,which directly results in failure of the reform.The authors proposed to rectify the absence,dislocation and offside of government regulations abovementioned,and that the regulations and reforms should proceed side by side to achieve expected outcomes. Key words: Regulatory; Public hospitals; Drug-compensating-medicine; Mechanism; Reform

Lawyers' Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime

The attached article argues that the conception of lawyers' independence invoked by commentators in the wake of disasters such as Enron is too amorphous a concept to inform analysis. Instead, this article views legal practice as a dialectic between branding and gatekeeping. All lawyers seek to build a brand - to establish a professional identity that is appealing to clients. In addition, however, the legal system requires that all lawyers practice gatekeeping - acting as filters to protect courts, third parties, and the public from misrepresentation or overreaching. To act as an effective intermediary between citizens, entities, and the state, lawyers must achieve an equipoise or balance between branding and gatekeeping norms. The article sets out an equipoise model, and applies it to three important legal arenas: disqualification of criminal defense lawyers, including alleged in-house counsel for the mob; regulation of government misconduct in terrorism prosecutions; and provision of legal advice that allegedly facilitates illegal activity by government, corporations, or terrorist groups.

Abusive Tax Shelters And Government Misconduct

Congress reacted quickly to the accounting professions involvement in the Enron/Tyco International financial collapses in 2001. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted and the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated new reporting regulations aimed at preventing such losses in the future. A more remote effect occurred a year later in 2003 when Congress enacted sweeping reforms affecting the tax shelter industry. Congress targeted accounting firms and related professionals who created, marketed and sold abusive tax shelters. While the culpability of these professionals was clear the resulting criminal prosecutions against some of the accounting professionals were tainted by an overzealous prosecution which relied on unconstitutional tactics to obtain convictions.

Reconceptualizing Federal Courts in the War on Terror

Since 9/11, the United States has created a framework that allows for indefinite detention under the law of war and prosecution in military commissions as alternatives to charging terrorism suspects in federal court. These alternatives have affected how federal courts are represented and perceived. Proponents of using federal courts, for example, increasingly emphasize their toughness as a way of demonstrating their continued viability as a forum for terrorism prosecutions. At the same time, federal courts are criticized for risking disclosure of classified or other sensitive information, infringing on executive prerogatives, and undermining military and intelligence operations. These criticisms have not only helped legitimize military alternatives to federal criminal prosecution for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects; they have also supplied justifications for denying civil litigants - particularly, victims of torture, arbitrary detention, and other forms of mistreatment - a judicial remedy and for dismissing legal challenges to controversial government programs under various justiciability doctrines. This Article explores how Guantanamo and the war on terror more generally have altered the perception and operation of federal courts. Part I describes the growth after 9/11 of a new type of military detention system that provides an alternative to Article III-court prosecutions of terrorism suspects. Part II examines how this parallel military detention system has affected the way federal courts are defined and represented as a forum for terrorism prosecutions. Part III looks at federal courts from the perspective of their role in providing a forum for plaintiffs seeking redress for torture, unlawful detention, and related abuses. It describes how many of the same reasons cited in opposition of federal criminal prosecution of terrorism suspects are invoked - often by federal judges themselves - to prevent federal court adjudication of civil damages litigation arising out of government misconduct during counterterrorism operations. Part IV examines federal courts from another vantage point, describing their engagement with the new, post-9/11 military detention system through the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Here, federal courts have performed two, inter-related functions: first, articulating general rules and principles to govern military detention and trial, and second, acting as quasi national security courts by reviewing the validity of individual prisoners’ military confinement. While federal courts have imposed some constraints on the government’s ability to hold terrorism suspects outside the criminal justice system, they have largely accommodated the new forms of military detention that emerged after 9/11 under the rubric of the war on terrorism and have shown considerable deference to the government’s allegations in individual cases.

Response to Leonard S. Rubenstein

Response to Leonard S. Rubenstein Kenneth Roth (bio) Leonard S. Rubenstein offers a thoughtful response to my article on how international monitoring and advocacy organizations that use a methodology of public shaming can best advance economic, social, and cultural (ESC) rights. His article makes three basic points. First, he notes that such organizations can make useful contributions beyond exposing government misconduct and subjecting it to public opprobrium. Namely, he suggests that they can provide technical assistance to governments on implementing ESC rights and help with capacity building for national or local NGOs that seek such rights. Second, he contends that such international organizations need not be as concerned with advocating tradeoffs among competing ESC rights because fears of limited resources—a "zero-sum game"—are overblown. Third, he disagrees with my perceived preference for condemning "arbitrary" government conduct to the exclusion of violations of particular ESC rights. On the first point, I largely agree with him. On the second, I regretfully suspect he has an overly sanguine view of the problem. And on the third, I fear he has misunderstood me. As I stated at the outset of my article, its focus is "organizations such as Human Rights Watch that rely foremost on shaming and the generation of public pressure to defend rights." Rubenstein apparently misunderstands this focus when he says that I believe that "naming and shaming" is "the only appropriate method for international human rights organizations to use." On the contrary, I explicitly acknowledge "various ways to promote ESC rights," such as public mobilization, standard setting, litigation, and [End Page 873] technical assistance. However, my essay focuses on the practical question: When does "our ability to investigate, expose, and shame" work most effectively? In asking that question, I do not mean to preclude other important methodologies. But given the number of organizations that are interested in using a shaming methodology—and given Human Rights Watch's own parochial interest in when this methodology works—I focus on shaming. Rubenstein responds by highlighting two forms of technical assistance that might usefully be pursued: helping governments develop systems that will best implement ESC rights and building the capacity of national or local NGOs to better lobby for ESC rights. Both of these tasks are undoubtedly useful. Obviously, however, they have nothing to do with the main question posed in my article: When does shaming work? Second, Rubenstein takes issue with my argument that realizing ESC rights often requires tradeoffs in scarce public resources—a sort of zero-sum game. In my view, international organizations that use public shaming are well-placed to point out when a government is not making a conscientious effort to progressively realize ESC rights—for example, when the government allocates resources in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. But shaming is relatively ineffective when the issue is only how a government that is conscientiously committed to realizing ESC rights should divide up scarce resources—for example, whether funds should be spent on health care or education, or even on infrastructure projects that it is hoped will expand the economy and provide more resources for basic needs. At times, Rubenstein recognizes the inevitability of these tradeoffs, but other times he seems to want to wish them away. For example, he concedes that governments face "competing priorities as well [as] constituencies to satisfy." But he then offers several unsatisfactory arguments to suggest that these zero-sum allocations of resources can somehow be avoided, and thus that public shaming can work even when an unfulfilled ESC right is due solely to inadequate resources. For example, he contends, "The question . . . is not simply about allocation, but level of investment." But that's a word game because there are limited resources for "investment" as well, and governments must still decide whether to "invest" in, say, housing or food, health or education. Public shaming doesn't work any better when there are inadequate funds for "investment" than it does when there are inadequate funds for ordinary government operations to promote ESC rights. He goes on to suggest that these tradeoffs might be avoided by focusing on "core obligations." He explains that those obligations include, for example, "minimum essential levels of health," meaning "primary...

Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs

Instrumental analysis of private law damage remedies noncontroversially assumes rational economic actors in a market environment. A privately-owned factory forced by the tort system to internalize $1000 in pollution costs suffered by a downstream neighbor will continue to pollute if, and only if, the private benefits of the pollution-producing activity exceed $1000. At least within the law and economics paradigm, we can safely take for granted the rather strong assumptions upon which this analysis rests. No one doubts, for example, that a profit-maximizing firm will tend to ignore social costs that are not reflected in financial outflows, or that it will take account of costs that are reflected in financial flows and, perhaps, change its behavior in response. These assumptions become problematic, however, when government is substituted for the private firm in this analysis. This substitution takes place routinely in discussions of constitutional remedies such as just compensation for takings, damages for constitutional torts, and the liability or property rule represented by the constitutional prohibition against federal commandeering of state governments. Each of these remedial systems seeks to deter government, to some socially optimal extent, from violating constitutional rights by forcing government agencies to internalize the costs of their constitutionally problematic conduct. But government does not internalize costs in the same way as a private firm. Government actors respond to political incentives, not financial ones. We cannot assume, therefore, that government will internalize social costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay. While imposing financial outflows on government will ultimately create political costs (and benefits), the mechanism is complicated and depends on the model of government behavior used to translate between market costs and benefits and political costs and benefits. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, for all we currently know, government cannot be expected to respond to forced financial outflows in any predictable, let alone socially desirable, way. Having reached this conclusion, the paper proceeds to explore potential justifications for constitutional cost remedies other than optimal deterrence of government misconduct. As it turns out, the efficiency consequences of paying compensation, based on the incentives and welfare of private actors, are more likely to be perverse than beneficial. And the conventional philosophical justifications for compensation, offered in terms of morality or justice, are universally problematic and contestable. Discouraged by the seeming futility of compensation in the public law context, the paper concludes by suggesting how we might go about reinventing constitutional remedies in light of the insight that government responds to political, not market, incentives.

Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs

Instrumental analysis of private law damage remedies noncontroversially assumes rational economic actors in a market environment. A privately-owned factory forced by the tort system to internalize $1000 in pollution costs suffered by a downstream neighbor will continue to pollute if, and only if, the private benefits of the pollution-producing activity exceed $1000. At least within the law and economics paradigm, we can safely take for granted the rather strong assumptions upon which this analysis rests. No one doubts, for example, that a profit-maximizing firm will tend to ignore social costs that are not reflected in financial outflows, or that it will take account of costs that are reflected in financial flows and, perhaps, change its behavior in response. These assumptions become problematic, however, when government is substituted for the private firm in this analysis. This substitution takes place routinely in discussions of constitutional remedies such as just compensation for takings, damages for constitutional torts, and the liability or property rule represented by the constitutional prohibition against federal commandeering of state governments. Each of these remedial systems seeks to deter government, to some socially optimal extent, from violating constitutional rights by forcing government agencies to internalize the costs of their constitutionally problematic conduct. But government does not internalize costs in the same way as a private firm. Government actors respond to political incentives, not financial ones. We cannot assume, therefore, that government will internalize social costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay. While imposing financial outflows on government will ultimately create political costs (and benefits), the mechanism is complicated and depends on the model of government behavior used to translate between market costs and benefits and political costs and benefits. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, for all we currently know, government cannot be expected to respond to forced financial outflows in any predictable, let alone socially desirable, way. Having reached this conclusion, the paper proceeds to explore potential justifications for constitutional cost remedies other than optimal deterrence of government misconduct. As it turns out, the efficiency consequences of paying compensation, based on the incentives and welfare of private actors, are more likely to be perverse than beneficial. And the conventional philosophical justifications for compensation, offered in terms of morality or justice, are universally problematic and contestable. Discouraged by the seeming futility of compensation in the public law context, the paper concludes by suggesting how we might go about reinventing constitutional remedies in light of the insight that government responds to political, not market, incentives.

Samuel L. Morison and the Government Crackdown on the Leaking of Classified Information

In July 1984, Samuel Loring Morison took several satellite photos from the desk of a colleague at the Naval Intelligence Support Center, clipped off the secret classification, and sent the photos to a British military magazine. The magazine, Jane's Defence Weekly, published the photos which showed the Soviet Union's first nuclearpowered aircraft carrier under construction in a shipyard on the Black Sea. Morison was arrested, charged with espionage and theft, and convicted. He served eight months of a two-year sentence before he was paroled. Morison was the first person convicted under U.S. espionage laws for releasing classified information to the news media. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were tried under the same laws for releasing the Pentagon Papers to the press in 1970. But the case against Ellsberg and Russo was dismissed because of government misconduct after it was revealed that people working for the government had broken into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. The purpose of this study is to answer the following research question: What circumstances led to the first successful prosecution for leaking to the news media under the Espionage Act? This article adds to our understanding of the prosecution of Morison by examining internal Justice Department memos obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, some of them previously classified as secret. The article also draws upon the Willard Report, an internal government document prepared by an interdepartmental team appointed to find ways to stop leaks of classified information. Research has tended to focus on the implications of the Morison case for the news media and not on the circumstances leading to Morison's prosecution. Eberhard discussed the case in some detail and concluded that it was basically a minor skirmish in the continuing war over secrecy between the government and the news media.1 Teeter and Le Duc stated that the case was important because it marked the first use of the Espionage Act to prosecute someone for leaking information to the media.2 Burkholder suggested that much of the press was slow to realize the significance of the Morison case for itself and for the public as a whole. 3 In an article in Harper's, Philip Weiss argued that the case was a quiet coup that gave the federal government a powerful weapon to use against leakers.4 Curry suggested that the implications of the case were enormous because it gave the executive branch almost total control over what information is released to the public.5 On August 8, 1984, a satellite photo of a nuclear aircraft carrier under construction in a Soviet shipyard appeared in the Washington Post. The same photo, along with two others, appeared in the August 11 issue of the British magazine Jane's Defence Weekly. At about the same time, one or more of these photos appeared in the New York Times and on the evening newscasts of the three major television networks. The photos showed a 75,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier being constructed in two large sections at the Nikolaiev 444 shipyard on the Black Sea.6 The photos in Jane's Defence Weekly reveal a level of detail that comes as a surprise to viewers accustomed to seeing previous satellite photos in the news media. Two of the photos were taken from a satellite at an oblique angle, and they clearly show large gantry cranes rising above the carrier in its dock at the shipyard. Captions published with the photos point out that the carrier was being built in two sections because it was too large to fit in the standard shipyard dock. The captions report some interpretation of the photos by analysts, including the statement that the carrier flight deck amidship appears to have been completed. Investigators for the U.S. Government identified the photos as classified photographs assigned to the Naval Intelligence Command for analysis and reported as missing on July 30, 1984. Samuel L. …

The constitution and criminal procedure: first principles

Akhil Amar examines the role of search warrants, the status of the exclusionary rule, self-incrimination theory and practice, and a host of Sixth Amendment trial-related rights. Through a close and original analysis of constitutional text, history, structure, and precedent - leavened with a healthy measure of common sense - he challenges conventional wisdom on a broad range of topics. He argues that the exclusion of reliable evidence in criminal trials is wrong in principle and in practice and that unlawfully seized evidence and fruits of immunized testimony should be constitutionally admissible in criminal trials. Deterrence of government misconduct should in general occur through civil damage suits and administrative sanctions rather than through criminal exclusion. Although addressed to lawyers, judges, and law students, this bold book ultimately targets a much broader audience of policymakers and citizens who seek to understand the principles of this controversial area of constitutional law.

Criminal Law. In General. Government Misconduct in Proceedings before Grand Jury Returning Indictment Does Not Invalidate Conviction for Perjury at Trial

Criminal Law. In General. Government Misconduct in Proceedings before Grand Jury Returning Indictment Does Not Invalidate Conviction for Perjury at Trial