Abstract This article examines the role of the International Monetary Fund in Russia’s 1993 constitutional crisis. The IMF’s role in the crisis remains as politically contested as it is empirically unknown. Critics of Yeltsin’s actions have implied that he was acting at the behest of the United States and, by extension, the IMF. By contrast, many scholars of post-Soviet Russia have concluded that the IMF had little effect on Russian political decision making throughout the 1990s. This article adds to this debate by bringing to light for the first time the IMF’s own detailed records of its interactions with the Russian government in the latter half of 1993 and early 1994. The picture that emerges is a complex one: there is no evidence that the IMF was anything more than an observer of the violent standoff between Yeltsin and Parliament. But IMF officials did hope the dissolution of parliament would clear the way for deeper economic reforms, and they pushed the government that emerged from December 1993 elections into accepting a number of austerity measures. Therefore, the Fund’s relations with Moscow at the time of the 1993 crisis form one important chapter in a longer history of the IMF gaining control over Russian economic policy during the course of the 1990s.
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