Gorbachev's Program Research Articles

1990 USSR: Reform, Revolution, or Retrenchment (A)

In August 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, confronted one of the most difficult dilemmas of his career: how to improve the country's economic performance. This case set highlights Gorbachev's reform efforts from 1985 to 1990. Numerous measures of economic performance had declined, and the USSR faced serious crises of economics (declining productivity and financial insufficiency), federalism (challenges to the primacy of the Soviet Union), and separatism (ethnic and nationalist agitation). Three groups of advisers offered competing plans. One plan focused on economic revolution toward a market economy; one on reform of the existing centrally planned economy; and a third on economic retrenchment and reinforcement of socialist discipline that had prevailed over the previous 73 years. Students must evaluate the benefits and risks of each alternative and recommend a course of action. Excerpt UVA-F-1969 Dec. 4, 2020 1990 USSR: Reform, Revolution, or Retrenchment (A) In July 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter USSR or Soviet Union) and general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, confronted one of the most difficult dilemmas of his career. The program of economic and political reform that he had advanced over the past five years had now reached a critical phase. Should he push forward or slow the reform agenda? The situation was urgent: deep recession, high inflation, civil unrest, separatist movements, worsening polarization, and a financial crisis. The Eastern bloc of Soviet-controlled countries was disintegrating. The combination of price controls, mismanagement, and inflation produced alarming shortages, forcing citizens across the Soviet Union to stand in line for hours to obtain such simple essentials as bread and milk. Meanwhile, episodes of looting and ethnic violence had begun, as opportunists sensed cracks in the once-unchallengeable state security apparatus. At the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the first half of July, opposition leader Boris Yeltsin dramatically resigned in protest against the slow pace of Gorbachev's program. At the other extreme, conservatives opposed the rapid pace of ambitious change. With varying support for his own policies, Gorbachev needed to find a way to absorb his challengers' demands, fend off revolt from the Communist Party establishment, and—most challenging of all—get his nation's government and economy back on stable footing. Three groups proposed competing strategies: . . .

Adrift in Turbulent Seas: The Political and Ideological Struggles of Ivan Kuz'mich Polozkov

In the winter of 1989-90 the unintended consequences of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's program of political and economic refonn had become obvious to all but his most optimistic spokesmen. The General Secretary's attempt to create a new ideology of perestroika by grafting "bourgeois" and "social democratic" concepts onto the conventional ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had divided the party, created immense ideological confusion, and led to the formation of non-Communist and anti-Communist political organizations. The attempt to shift authority from party officials to elected soviets on the union and republican levels had led to the emergence of separatist and nationalist movements in many of the USSR's republics, including the RSFSR. The decentralization of the state's administration of the economy and the encouragement of both private and cooperative economic activity had failed to reverse the deterioration of economic conditions. As anxiety swept through the CPSU, orthodox party leaders called for the establishment of an autonomous Communist Party for the RSFSR to counter Gorbachev's policies and to "save Soviet Russia" from destruction.

Weapons modernization, doctrine, and the decline of the Warsaw pact

As the Soviet Union moves precariously into the 1990s, the attention of Western statesmen and analysts remains fixed upon Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to implement perestroika and glasnost at home and his still ambiguously defined new thinking abroad. Whether the topic is arms control negotiations with the West, the introduction of elements of pluralism into the long moribund Soviet political scene, or the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet power from forward vantage points in the Third World (i.e. Afghanistan), few Western observers any longer doubt that a fundamental transformation has taken place in the Soviet system. Indeed, as Western scholars increasingly acknowledge the significance of the Gorbachev revolution, it has also become apparent that the particular region most heavily influenced by this reform program has been the USSR's former East European empire. The implications of change have been most dramatic for Eastern Europe precisely because events have been propelled by both of the key elements in the Gorbachev program—the Soviet leader not only pushed glasnost and perestroika upon his East European allies (with what were probably unforeseen results), but the ultimate test of new thinking in the foreign policy realm has been the tolerant Soviet response to the collapse of Communist Party authority throughout the bloc. In this sense the movement toward liberal reform in Eastern Europe was both initiated and insulated by the dynamics of Gorbachev's own domestic and foreign reform programs. The apparent Soviet willingness to accept a reunified Germany on Western terms represents, of course, the ultimate Soviet concession along these lines. While the prospects for a peaceable transition away from communism for Eastern Europe may not be decided for some time, one more certain by-product of these developments has been the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) as a viable security system. As the institutional linchpin of the Soviet-East European relationship, the Warsaw Pact could hardly have been expected to remain unaffected by the dramatic changes sweeping bloc affairs. In many respects, the high level of Soviet-East European military integration fostered over the

Transition Shock: Can the East Get There from Here?

After sudden political liberalization, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union seem poised to abandon administrative-command planning and embrace market socialism (which stops somewhere short of American-style capitalism). However, using the Soviet Union as a case in point, careful analysis of all plausible transition paths from the current system to Westernstyle markets suggests that prospects for success are dim. The revolution of rising expectations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe sparked by Gorbachev's program of political liberalization is on a collision course with the immediate possibilities for fundamental economic change. The East is likely to be politically unstable for a long period, nor can the West alter this situation with massive foreign assistance because the Eastern nations cannot utilize the credits effectively. The Western business community therefore must be very constrained in its expectations about progress in the East and should approach the issues of private investment and governmental aid accordingly.

The Khrushchev Détente and Emerging Internationalism in Particle Physics

Mikhail Gorbachev's program of glasnost and perestroika—now in its fifth year—has wrought striking changes inside the Soviet Union, and even more spectacular metamorphoses outside its borders. Among the positive repercussions of the Gorbachev program on the international scene, we have seen major improvements in international scientific cooperation. In particle physics the improvement during the years of the Gorbachev détente appears less dramatic than it does in space science, for example. But that's largely because the opportunity to solidify East-West cooperation in particle physics had been seized much earlier—during the Khrushchev détente of 1956–60, a time when this field, with its large and expensive accelerators, stood alone as the epitome of “big science.”

Mobilization and Reform: Political Communication Policy Under Gorbachev

Mikhail Gorbachev's program for the renovation of the Soviet political system is a reform of considerable magnitude. The sequencing of policies provides important information about the nature of the Soviet system and the dynamics of change, and in that sequence, communications policies shifted earliest and most radically. Virtually from the beginning of Gorbachev's tenure in power, an observer of Soviet politics could detect in the use of the media the operation of a key mechanism in effecting major change. Glasnost, the new openness and public discussion, is a media phenomenon. The new role accorded the media is in many ways a revolutionary one. The expanded functions of the media in the Gorbachev administration require them to precipitate institutional change in the Soviet political system. Mobilization will be temporary if there is insufficient structural change to support it, and the media system itself has become a principal factor in breaking down dysfunctional institutions inherited from previous regimes, strengthening weak institutions (such as the Soviets) and developing new types of institutions. As a consequence of this dynamic, systemic change in the media system precedes other large-scale change, and, in fact, before any major economic and political reforms of the Gorbachev administration were launched, extensive changes in the system of political communication had been made.

Mobilization and Reform: Political Communication Policy Under Gorbachev

Mikhail Gorbachev's program for the renovation of the Soviet political system is a reform of considerable magnitude. The sequencing of policies provides important information about the nature of the Soviet system and the dynamics of change, and in that sequence, communications policies shifted earliest and most radically. Virtually from the beginning of Gorbachev's tenure in power, an observer of Soviet politics could detect in the use of the media the operation of a key mechanism in effecting major change. Glasnost, the new openness and public discussion, is a media phenomenon. The new role accorded the media is in many ways a revolutionary one. The expanded functions of the media in the Gorbachev administration require them to precipitate institutional change in the Soviet political system. Mobilization will be temporary if there is insufficient structural change to support it, and the media system itself has become a principal factor in breaking down dysfunctional institutions inherited from previous regimes, strengthening weak institutions (such as the Soviets) and developing new types of institutions. As a consequence of this dynamic, systemic change in the media system precedes other large-scale change, and, in fact, before any major economic and political reforms of the Gorbachev administration were launched, extensive changes in the system of political communication had been made.

Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects

In the fall of 1987, the Soviet Union had become the most interesting country in the world. What is happening there is nothing less than a gigantic experiment, now only in its infancy. The massive changes initiated in the Soviet Union call to mind Robespierre's observation that one week in the life of a revolution may produce more significant events'than an entire year of normalcy. But to change the Soviet system, the new course initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev needs far more than a single year. It will require at least a decade. In one of the world's most secretive countries, there is now official talk of openness. In a society that has known not a single day of genuine democracy, the leadership preaches democratization and grass roots participation in the institutions of governance. A state that has put an extraordinary premium on stability and conformity is shifting toward innovation and individuality. Today, authorities promote clashing views where once a single truth was proclaimed the only truth. While continuing to emphasize patriotism, the authorities no longer equate it with a cult -of the military. They are retreating from the idea of a "perfect society," from the goal of a secular utopia that they invoked in the past to justify the shortcomings of Communist rule. They are now beginning to recognize the errors of the past in order to avoid perpetuating or repeating them. In this sense, the new mood reflects