Good Equilibrium Research Articles

Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edg...

Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

We study firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified at a cost. We characterize all reputation-dependent MPEs. They vary in frequency of certification and payoffs. Low payoffs arise in equilibria because of over-certification traps. We contrast the MPEs with the highest payoff equilibria. Industry certification standards can help firms coordinate on such good equilibria. The optimal equilibria allow firms to maintain high quality forever, once it is reached for the first time. They are either lenient or harsh, endowing firms with multiple or one chance to improve and certify quality. (JEL D21, D43, D83, L13, L15)

Private Money Creation and Equilibrium Liquidity

Can creation of private money fulfill the liquidity needs of the economy? The answer is no if the market of private money is run only by forces of perfect competition. Multiple equilibria are possible: there exist good equilibria with complete satiation of liquidity and absence of default on private money, and bad equilibria characterized by shortage of liquidity and partial default. In this framework, capital requirements, distortions to the demand or supply of private money, and the role of public liquidity in substituting private liquidity or in offsetting liquidity crises are investigated.

The changing nature of the OECD shadow economy

Traditionally, the presence of the shadow economy (SE) has been associated, mainly and positively, with taxation. Recently, some authors have suggested that the SE may be also linked to the institutional setting (efficiency of the bureaucracy, regulations, corruption, etc.) so that just two stable equilibria are possible. In the “good” one, there is a small hidden sector, large fiscal revenues and honest/appreciated institutions. The other, “bad”, equilibrium is the opposite. Unlike the traditional approach, therefore, the recent literature argues that the tax burden and SE can be negatively correlated. Examining the links between these variables in relatively uncorrupt systems, this paper reconciles the two views. Theoretically, it claims that many different good equilibria can emerge whereby SE and its determinants are linked in complex and different ways. For instance, taxation and SE can go hand-in-hand, even taking into account the institutional framework. Empirical evidence for OECD countries supports both the model and the changing nature of the SE.

Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games

We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets of good and bad equilibria. The good equilibria are those that cannot be destabilized by another good equilibrium. The remaining equilibria are bad. An equilibrium for the original game is communication proof if its is a good equilibrium in a partition of this form. We prove that communication-proof equilibria exist and, for a class of common-interest games, communication-proof outcomes are efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D80.