Gold Sales Research Articles

Borrowing Agreement with the Swedish Riksbank

This paper reviews the Fund’s income position for FY 2010 and FY 2011. The paper updates projections provided at the FY 2010 midyear review and sets out related proposed decisions for the current and next financial years. The paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the FY 2010 income position and the main changes from the midyear projections; Section III makes proposals on the disposition of FY 2010 net income, which includes the General Resources Account (GRA) net operational income and profits from the limited gold sales; Section IV discusses the FY 2011 income outlook, the margin on the rate of charge, and projected burden sharing adjustments; and Section V reviews special charges.

Veto Players and Central Bank Gold Sales

In this article I explore the effects of veto players in formal government institutions on gold sale policies in Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Germany. One of the most active areas of recent ...

An examination of Australian gold mining firms’ exposure over the collapse of gold price in the late 1990s

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the exposures of Australian gold mining firms in the highly volatile period from 1995 to 2000. This period has been characterized by significant changes in gold price due to bulk sale of gold by collective central banks. Specifically, the paper aims to investigate several firm‐specific factors that are hypothesized to carry substantial influence on gold beta.Design/methodology/approachTo estimate gold beta, we use the following multifactor model: Rg,t = α + βg GPRt + βx FXRt + βm Rm,t + εt, where Rg,t is the return on the gold stock Index at time t, GPRt is the gold price return denominated in US dollar at time t, FXRt is the foreign exchange return of Australian dollar in terms of US dollar at time t, Rm,t is the market return at time t, and εt is the random error term at time t.FindingsThe paper finds that the values of gold beta are consistently greater than one, implying the sensitive nature of firms’ stock returns to gold price changes. This also suggests that investors holding gold mining stock would receive higher percentage increases in stock returns from a percentage increase in gold price returns, as opposed to investors holding gold bullion. Furthermore, these values have changed substantially over time with significant changes in gold price volatility. The most important and consistent relationship that we find is the impact of firms’ hedging behavior on their respective gold betas. This is consistent with Tufano's study. It implies that firms, which hedge a greater proportion of their gold reserves, are less sensitive to movements in gold prices. The finding therefore supports the risk management theory that hedging increases shareholder's wealth. However, cash operating costs, cash reserves and the level of gold production seem to influence very little on the firms’ exposure to gold price changes.Originality/valueThis study is of interest and important to the stock mining companies and investors because the extent of the effect of gold price movements on the stock returns of gold mining companies has significant impacts on returns for both firms and investors especially in their risk management and investment decisions, respectively.

The benefits of expediting government gold sales

Additional gold can be made available either by mining at high cost (approximately $250 per ounce in 1997 dollars) or by mobilizing government stocks at zero cost. Governments own massive above-ground stocks but loan out only a small percentage of these stocks. Making all government gold available for private uses immediately through some combination of sales and loans maximizes total welfare from private uses, a consequence of the first welfare theorem. We simulate a calibrated version of our model to quantify the effects of liquidating government stocks on alternative dates. If governments sell immediately rather than never, total welfare increases by $340 billion; if they make an unanticipated sale in 20 years, $105 billion of that amount is lost. By depressing prices, such sales benefit depletion and service users but injure private owners of stocks above and below-ground. However, the injury to above-ground stock owners is more than offset by the benefits to service users—often the same individuals. Mine owners would be the principal losers; however, they could be compensated (twice over) from government sales revenue without any need for tax increases.

The partisan politics of gold: Switzerland and the sale of gold

This paper explores the relative strength of social, economic and political factors in determining public attitudes towards the sale of a portion of Switzerland's gold reserves and how the money realised from these sales should be used. Partisan political allegiance and generational economic interest are the major factors in determining attitudes towards gold sales in Switzerland in the early 2000s. Cantons and individuals that had supported the Swiss People's Party were more inclined to support its Gold Initiative than supporters of the Swiss Social Democratic Party and other parties of the left which actively campaigned against it. This pattern suggests that, contrary to the suggestions of previous studies, Swiss political parties can play a substantial role in framing political options in referendum campaigns.

Mobilizing IMF Gold for Multilateral Debt Cancellation

Sony Kapoor examines how using IMF gold sales to fund multilateral debt cancellation could release much needed resources for meeting the millennium development goals (MDGs). He shows why multilateral debt cancellation is so critical and how the sale of IMF gold could finance it for the IMF as well as the World Bank. He addresses the concerns of the gold-producing poor countries by highlighting two distinct mechanisms by which the gold could be sold while eliminating or at least minimizing price impact. Finally, he underlines the fact that selling this gold and using its proceeds for debt cancellation would not in any way jeopardize the operations of the IMF.

South African gold sales policies during the 1980s

The gold sales policies of South Africa continued to be a focal point of interest during the period of Dr Gerhard de Kock's leadership of the Reserve Bank from 1980 to 1989, partly because of the dominant position of the Republic as a gold producer even though South African production of the metal declined materially. Although sales policies remained basically conservative they were adapted to changing circumstances during the 1980s, which included the steady decline on balance in the dollar price of gold. In particular, the growth of gold futures and options markets created new opportunities for the marketing of South African gold production. In this article the country's gold sales policies are analysed in the light of contemporary developments in the international gold markets during the 1980s, and the main changes in marketing arrangements are delineated.

Holocaust Assets and German Business History: Beginning or End?

I would like to begin this discussion with an anecdote that will, I believe, illuminate some of the problems I want to discuss here.* In February of 1999, the Deutsche Bank reported the discovery of records showing that its Kattowitz branch had given operating credits to a middle-sized construction firm involved in the building of the IG Farben Bunawerke at the Monowitz concentration camp which was supplied with slave labor from nearby Auschwitz.' The relevant documents had been found in the cellars of the Hannover branch of the Deutsche Bank in the course of a general effort by the Deutsche Bank Historical Institute, that is, its archive, to comb out its branches and centralize its archival holdings. The Hannover branch had served as a place of storage for the accounts and records of the Kattowitz branch at the end of the war, but as customers of the former branch transferred their accounts and there was no longer much call for the Kattowitz records, these and other records were stored in the basement of the Hannover branch and more or less forgotten. In any case, there they were, and they obviously implicated the bank in the financing of a firm-one, in fact, of a number-that employed forced labor from Auschwitz under what could only have been terrible conditions. This had not been the first time the Deutsche Bank had been unpleasantly surprised by the discovery of previously unknown or unreported documents. Two years earlier balance sheets had turned up showing that the bank had been engaged in the purchase and sale of gold, all of which was stolen by the Nazi regime and some of which was victim gold, that is, gold in the possession or from the teeth of murdered Jews. This triggered the creation of the Historical Commission of the Deutsche Bank in November 1997 composed of three of the original authors of the history of the bank published in 1995,2 Harold James, Lothar Gall, and myself along with Jonathan Steinberg, then of Cambridge, now of the University of Pennsylvania, and the distinguished Israeli historian Avraham Barkai, for the purpose of pursuing

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

في دراسات سابقة تم التركيز على آراء جمهور الأئمة والعلماء ، في مبادلات الحلي الذهبية والفضية ، حيث اشترطوا فيها التماثل والتعجيل . وفي هذه الدراسة يتم التركيز على رأي الإمامين ابن تيمية وابن القيم ، اللذين أجازا التفاضل والتأجيل . ووجه هذا الرأي أن الصناعة تنقل الذهب والفضة من مال ربوي إلى مال غير ربوي ، فإذا كانت علة الربا في الذهب والفضة الواردين في الحديث النبوي الشريف هي الثمنية ، فإنهما بالصناعة لم يعودا من الأثمان ( النقود) . وهذا الرأي فيه الكثير من التيسير على الصاغة والمتعاملين معهم ، إذ يصبح التعامل بهذه الحلي كالتعامل بالسلع العادية التي لا تخضع لأي قيود ربوية . لم يكتف الباحث ، في هذا البحث ، بإبراز هذه الرأي فحسب ، بل اهتم أيضا ببيان أصوله ، من حيث التعريف بالعملاء الذين أجازوا التفاضل في هذا النوع من المبادلات ، والعلماء الذين أجازوا النساء ( تأجيل أو تأخير البدل) .

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

-- أود أن أشـكر الأساتذة الذين تكـرموا بالتعقـيب على بحثي المتواضع، وانتفعت بملاحظاتهم. إن بحثي هذا قد حكمه محكمان، وعقب عليه نزيه حماد (في العدد الذي نشر فيه البحث)، وابن منيع، والسالوس، والأشقر، وريحاوي، وعجم، وهيئة تحرير المجلة. وقد يظن القارئ أن هذه التعليقات الكثيرة تلقائية، والحقيقة أنها كانت بتكليف من هيئة تحرير المجلة، التي أمطرتني بهذا الوابل من التعقيبات، لأن الموضوع خلافي، وشائك، وساخن. وأشكر جميع الأساتذة الذين تكرموا بالتعليق. ومن الطبيعي أن كل جديد يثير حوارا ومقاومة، والله المستعان.

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

Shariah Rules Relating to Sale and Purchase of Gold and Silver

South African monetary policies during the 1970s

The 1970s have been described as 'years of frustration' where monetary policies were concerned. The situation that had emerged in the previous decade was carried over into the 1970s. Inflation established itself firmly in the 10 to 20 per cent range, and the natural development of financial markets was suppressed by the resort to direct controls over banks and other financial institutions. Moreover, the Reserve Bank faced a challenging task in marketing South Africa's gold production during this period in a significantly changing global environment. The gold marketing policy of the Reserve Bank exerted an influence on the free market price of gold during the 1970s, and monetary policies to some extent were geared to improving the flexibility of the bank on the gold sales front.

THE DOUBLE-ENTRY BOOKKEEPING METHOD APPLIED IN SPAIN TO ACCOUNT FOR TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO THE MINTING PROCESS OF GOLD AND SILVER IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

This paper represents a summary of broad research undertaken in the Archivo General de Indias of Seville. Gold and silver were shipped from America, received in the Treasury Room, minted, and sold in public auctions to merchants. Because single-entry was the usual accounting method applied by the Casa de la Contratación de las Indias, it was surprising to find several books which provide evidence of the application of the double-entry accounting method to account for those transactions related to the minting process. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the documents related to the accounting procedures of the Casa treasury represent the earliest evidence found of the utilization of the double-entry method by a public institution. The study concludes that the treasury utilized the double-entry bookkeeping procedure as early as 1555 to account for the transactions involved in the minting process of gold and silver. Although the focus of this research is on the period 1555–1600, this method was utilized until the middle of the 17th century. This paper examines the accounting procedures used to account for the sale of gold and silver during 1560.

Political Implications of US‐EC Economic Conflicts (II): Atlantic Trade: Problems and Prospects

THE 1960s APPEAR IN RETROSPECT AS THE BELLE ÉPOQUE of the postwar era. The IMF— a Cinderella while convertibility remained limited to the EPU-area—came into its own, as did the GATT with the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds. There were plenty of storm clouds, however. The monetary system, for one, was built on the shakiest of foundations. The gold/dollar parity had been fixed by an Act of Congress at $35 in 1933, a quarter century before convertibility became a reality. Four years after convertibility, in 1962, the gold pool had to be set up: a massive commodity agreement between the six richest countries, with the Bank of England as the buffer stock manager. That agreement limped on to the mid-1960s by the grace of the Russians, whose bad harvests forced them into substantial gold sales. After that, the combined effects of American arm twisting and the hubris of highly dirigiste central bankers shored up the system, until its final collapse in 1971.

Review of the gold sales policy of the United States Treasury (1978–79)

Review of the gold sales policy of the United States Treasury (1978–79)

The Recognition Lag of the Federal Advisory Council

The Journal of FinanceVolume 34, Issue 1 p. 237-240 Note The Recognition Lag of the Federal Advisory Council EDWARD B. SELBY JR., EDWARD B. SELBY JR.Associate Professor of Finance, The University of Georgia. The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions of William Beranek and the comments of Anthony Santomero.Search for more papers by this author EDWARD B. SELBY JR., EDWARD B. SELBY JR.Associate Professor of Finance, The University of Georgia. The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions of William Beranek and the comments of Anthony Santomero.Search for more papers by this author First published: March 1979 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02083.x Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume34, Issue1March 1979Pages 237-240 RelatedInformation

Monetary Effects of the Treasury Sale of Gold

At the beginning of 1975, it became legal for U.S. residents to hold gold for the first time in 41 years. In early December, the U.S. Government announced its intention to offer 2 million ounces of gold for sale to the public early in January 1975 from its holdings of 276 million ounces. The Treasury received bids for only about one million ounces of gold and accepted bids for only 753,600 ounces. The gold was sold at an average price of $165.65 per ounce, hence the sale added about $125 million to the revenues of the Treasury.