Global Security Policy Research Articles

Le Japon, sa politique de défense et l'avenir de son alliance avec les États-Unis

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have forced Japan to question its defence policy. In the past this policy has been firmly based on a purely defensive posture which relied totally on Japan's alliance with the United States. Because the Cold War dragged on in East Asia for much longer than in Europe, Japan could carry on the same defence policy as before. Japanese defence planners found it convenient to emphasize the « Soviet threat » as a way to maintain annual increases in the military budget, and refusing to normalize their relations with the Soviets, until the question of the Northern Territories had been settled. They can no longer ignore the various signs of détente in East Asia. Yet they have had limited effects on Japan's defence policy. The Americans have called on Japan to play a role more commensurate with its economic power but want to avoid any hint of an autonomous Japanese defence policy. They pressured Japan into playing a more active part in the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war, but the government failed to muster sufficient support, at home and amongst the other countries of East Asia, for any role for its military outside Japan, even in a non combat capacity. So Japan has sought other regional and global security policies to compensate for this handicap and has met with mixed success. The recent failure to pass legislation allowing its Self-defence Forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations has seriously jeopardized Japan 's search for a more active role in regional affairs. But will the Japanese continue for much longer to play a second role in the United States' System of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region which that country can afford less and less ? This is the real dilemma of Japanese defence policy : it can neither remain as it is nor can it easily change direction.

Crude awakenings: global oil security and American foreign policy

Crude awakenings: global oil security and American foreign policy

Untying the Gordian Knot: Evaluating the Legal Dimensions of the UN Weapons Inspection Programme in Iraq and Rethinking the Future

A variety of legal problems exist with the UN weapons inspection régime applicable to Iraq. These problems hinder the assurance that Iraq can be disarmed of the ability to produce biological or chemical weapons. Given this fact, the stalemate produced by the mid-December 1998 air strikes against that country might be best resolved by a reconfigured inspection program which aims at addressing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction efforts in the context of global security policy regarding such weaponry, with due account taken of the desires of Iraq's neighbors and the importance of reintegrating that nation into the world community.

Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France, and China in the Global Governance of Nuclear Arms, by Bruce D. Larkin

Global politics has changed with unaccustomed swiftness since the end of the Cold War. Eastern Europe is free; the Soviet Union has broken up; China presses free market economic reform; and the United States and Russia have declared a joint commitment to end nuclear war. The force of these changes has created a new agenda for global politics and security policy. This does not mean that nuclear weapons have lost their centrality. Nuclear development programs continue in the major holders of advanced weapons. In Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran nuclear intentions are subject to widespread speculation and scrutiny. Negotiations for renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remind us that the treaty requires serious efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. Nuclear Choices points out that the Cold War's end has not banished mistrust. Instead, it has opened the door to frank conversation about the usefulness of force and the need to address common fears. States now face a global choice among alternative nuclear futures. If they desire to avoid runaway nuclear development, the choices come down to three: the status quo, disengagement, or abolition. Larkin argues that if they chose the status quo, they elect a world in which only terror and self-restraint keep devastation at bay, a world in which instant destruction is possible. This study focuses on the nuclear weapons programs of Great Britain, China, and France, because they may be less familiar to students of international affairs. Each of these countries has developed a substantial nuclear capability that could decisively shape the result of coming global nuclear decisions. Larkin concludes that these three minipowers could conclude that nuclearism serves their interests, refuse disengagement, and encourage proliferation. If they are prepared to abandon nuclearism, they have tremendous political leverage on Russia, the United States, and also on undeclared and aspiring nuclear weapons states. For now, only the United Kingdom, France, and China maintain sufficient warhead inventories and production capabilities to have strong effects on how the United States and Russia view their own strategic capabilities. Nuclear Choices asserts that governments, polities, and parties today do not know how to guarantee themselves against weapons of mass destruction. They must either acquire the political and social means to achieve such guarantees or accept a world in which nuclearism will continue to cast its shadow over all aspects of nation building. It will be of interest to political scientists, policymakers, military analysts, and those interested hi the nuclear issue.

Distributed systems security

The increasing complexity of networking, and distributed information processing in particular, requires that greater attention be given to ensuring security within these systems. The heterogeneous nature of many cooperating inter-organisational systems, coupled with the strategic importance of inter-operability and inter-connectivity between those organizations has made the efficient and effective operation of security and other management functions essential. The need is to negotiate compatible global and local security policies which will ensure that the required levels of secure interaction are achieved. International standards developments are helping to establish the frameworks upon which such policies may be established. The implementation of such complex systems, however, introduces problems novel to users and systems designers alike. The level of integration necessary to achieve true open networking remains questionable.

The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960

The allied victory in World War II led to a feeling in the US of grandeur and omnipotence, as America became the most powerful country in recent history and US dollars were used to rebuild war-torn Europe. Russian acquisitiveness and ideology, however, soon changed the national euphoria to fear. As Washington reverberated with reports of a planned Communist monolith, national defense and negotiation from strength became the rallying cries of the country. This collection of essays explores the national security policies developed in response to this threat by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. More pointed and analytic than any other book on the subject, it shows clearly that the makers of Cold War policy were motivated by assumptions of a global Soviet danger. It also examines the nature of US security policy and points to the growing gap between the ends of a global security policy - to protect Western democracy from the 'Red menace' - and the means - a nuclear strategy with limited applications.