Theory Of Global Justice Research Articles

Coercion and (Global) Justice

In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice (in general) are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice (in particular). Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying both. The justification of interactional coercion requires principles regulating interstate interference; that of systemic coercion requires principles of global socioeconomic justice. I argue that the proposed view not only helps us make progress in the debate on global justice, but also offers an independently compelling and systematic account of the function and conditions of applicability of justice.

Desigualdad, exclusión y justicia global

The process of globalization has affected the national State to the point of crisis and has increased inequality and exclusion in the world. Therefore, justice cannot keep being thought exclusively, as done in the past century, within certain limits all concerned to the State. Facing citizenship and State process of hierarchy in the new world order, a global justice theory must consider long-term the consolidation of a global constitutionalism that guarantees fundamental rights for everyone and promotes a fair distribution of the benefits generated by globalization.

Liberalismo, inmigración y justicia global: Obligaciones especiales hacia nuestros conciudadanos

The article defends the thesis that an egalitarian liberalism leads to a theory of global justice and, as part of it, to the right of immigration. Thus, the burden of proof against global justice and immigration moves to the side of those who wish to limit it. A common argument is that special obligations towards our fellow citizens take priority over general obligations of justice. The article examines particularistic and reductionist arguments in favor of these special obligations, and argues that they can not justify the restriction of justice towards our fellow citizens, nor the absolute discretionary power of the states in controlling its borders

Sprawiedliwość globalna: szlachetny ideał czy rzetelna teoria? Miłowit Kuniński

In the article two seminal theories of global justice are compared: one concerned with individuals (Pogge’s), the other with peoples (Rawls’s). The striking feature of Pogge’s theory is that noble aims are to be achieved through the implementation of global justice for the permanent betterment of the situation of people living in extremely severe conditions. It is not entirely clear, however, whether helping them is a moral obligation or is due rather to a sense of guilt towards the descendants of the exploited. Justice among peoples, in turn, is a set of rules of the well-ordered society of peoples based on a social contract decided upon by the representatives of peoples. Rawls’s theory of relations among peoples is realistic, although he unconvincingly argues in favour of peoples as moral agents, neglecting the fact that the representatives play a governmental role, and that the social contract is in the end achieved by states rather than peoples.

GMOs and Global Justice: Applying Global Justice Theory to the Case of Genetically Modified Crops and Food

Proponents of using genetically modified (GM) crops and food in the developing world often claim that it is unjust not to use GMOs (genetically modified organisms) to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in developing countries. In reply, the critics of GMOs claim that while GMOs may be useful as a technological means to increase yields and crop quality, stable and efficient institutions are required in order to provide the benefits from GMO technology. In this debate, the GMO proponents tend to rely on a simple utilitarian type of calculus that highlights the benefits of GMOs to the poor, but that overlooks the complex institutional requirements necessary for GMO production. The critics, recognizing the importance of institutional conditions, focus primarily on the negative impacts of institutional deficiencies, thereby overlooking the basically Rawlsian claim that institutions per se may generate claims to justice. This article investigates how GMOs might generate claims to global justice and what type of justice is involved. The paper argues that the debate on GMOs and global justice can be categorized into three views, i.e., the cosmopolitan, the pluralist, and the sceptic. The cosmopolitan holds that GMOs can and should be used for alleviating global hunger, whereas the sceptic rejects this course of action. I will argue here for a moderately cosmopolitan approach, relying on the pluralist view of institutions and the need to exploit the benefits of GMOs. This argument rests on the premise that global cooperation on GMO production provides the relevant basis for assessing the use of GMOs by the standard of global distributive justice.

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls The paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract—contractualism. This problem inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate.

‘… restoring the dignity of the victims’. Is global rectificatory justice feasible?

The discussion of global justice has mainly focused on global distributive justice. This article argues for global rectificatory justice, mainly by former colonial states in favor of former colonized peoples. The argument depends on the following premises: (1) there is a moral obligation to rectify the consequences of wrongful acts; (2) colonialism was on the whole harmful for the colonies; (3) the present unjust global structure was constituted by colonialism; and (4) the obligation of rectificatory justice is trans-generational so long as there are at present identifiable beneficiaries and victims of past injustice. Although it is too demanding to ask for full compensation for 450 years of colonialism, the former colonial powers can in different ways and to the best of their efforts contribute to change the present inequalities that are the legacy of history. A theory of global rectificatory justice is complementary to a theory of global distributive justice and enables us to develop a fuller understanding of the meaning of global justice.

Resisting ‘Global Justice’: disrupting the colonial ‘emancipatory’ logic of the West

This paper takes issue with global justice theory, seeing it as a ‘global–local’ in which the perspectives and demands of post-Kantian Western liberalism silence ways of being in the world that move beyond a narrowly circumscribed definition of ‘reasonableness’. Taking its cue from critics of dominant liberal conceptions of the self, such as Spivak, Deleuze and Freire, the paper examines the impact of epistemological diversity and the radical ‘otherness’ of indigenous, peasant and marginal epistemologies on how Western intellectuals might think about global justice. We look at a number of examples of indigenous and marginal resistance to injustice in the global system, including the West Papuan and Zapatista movements, and conclude that the goals of such movements cannot be encapsulated in distributive or juridical terms. An alternative theorisation of global justice might, contra global justice theory, insist on a dialogical, contingent basis for discussing justice, whether local or global.

Liberal internationalism and global social justice

Theories of global justice have moved from issues relating to crimes against humanity and war crimes or, furthermore, ‘negative duties’ with respect to non-citizens, towards problems of distributive justice and global inequality. Thomas Nagel's Storrs Lectures from 2005, exemplifying Rawlsian internationalism, argue that liberal requirements concerning duties of distributive justice apply exclusively within a single nation-state, and do not extend to duties of this nature between rich and poor countries. Nagel even argues that the demand for global equality is not a demand of justice at all. In the present article I will try to offer a normative basis for the criticism of such a view. Following Kant and more recently Philip Pettit, I locate this normative basis on political freedom conceived as non-domination. Such a conception opens up the possibility of a political cosmopolitanism, which is based not on an empirical interdependence among people at a global level, but on a normative interdependence. Subsequent cosmopolitan duties extend both to the elimination of domination everywhere in the world and to the equal enjoyment of non-dominated choice. Thus, it will be argued that modern republicanism is falsely identified with a particular, bounded community, but supports a political, not simply a moral, cosmopolitanism. This kind of cosmopolitanism conceives of sovereign states neither as useless constructions, nor as mere instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is what gives the value of justice its application. Cosmopolitanism is not after all about the abolishment of all boundaries, but about the essential capacity to draw and redraw them infinitely under conditions of global justice.

Global justice: From theory to development action

AbstractOne of the new forces likely to influence the future of global change and re‐shape development agendas is the growing theory and practice of global justice. The latter is founded upon the moral and political claim that, in today's globalising world, our duties and obligations to other persons extend beyond state borders. Two frontiers of the current theory and practice of global justice are poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. This paper draws on the discussion of the emerging theory and practice of global justice at the Development Studies Association conference 2008 on ‘Development's Invisible Hands’. However, the idea of global justice is a source of intentional action and the basis of social and political struggles, not an ‘invisible hand’ of development. The focus of the paper is on particular cases of campaigns in the field of poverty reduction and environmental sustainability such as the Jubilee 2000 Debt Cancellation campaign, Make Poverty History and the campaign for farmers' rights. The argument of the paper is that global justice is both a normative claim and an instrument of social and political action. This is clearly reflected in campaigns for and debates on extending the idea of fairness beyond state borders. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

National responsibility and global justice

This chapter outlines the main ideas of my book National responsibility and global justice. It begins with two widely held but conflicting intuitions about what global justice might mean on the one hand, and what it means to be a member of a national community on the other. The first intuition tells us that global inequalities of the magnitude that currently exist are radically unjust, while the second intuition tells us that inequalities are both unavoidable and fair once national responsibility is allowed to operate. This conflict might be resolved either by adopting a cosmopolitan theory of justice (which leaves no room for national responsibility) or by adopting a ‘political’ theory of justice (which denies that questions of distributive justice can arise beyond the walls of the sovereign state). Since neither resolution is satisfactory, the chapter defends the idea of national responsibility and proposes a new theory of global justice, whose main elements are the protection of basic human rights worldwide, and fair terms of interaction between independent political communities.

Does global egalitarianism provide an impractical and unattractive ideal of justice?

In his important new book National responsibility and global justice, David Miller presents a systematic challenge to existing theories of global justice. In particular, he argues that cosmopolitan egalitarianism must be rejected. Such views, Miller maintains, would place unacceptable burdens on the most productive political communities, undermine national self-determination, and disincentivize political communities from taking responsibility for their fate. They are also impracticable and quite unrealistic, at least under present conditions. Miller offers an alternative account that conceives global justice in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Primary responsibility for securing such rights for an individual lies with his or her state, but in so far as these rights go unprotected, responsibilities for fulfilling them may fall on outsiders. While less ambitious that cosmopolitan egalitarian justice, Miller argues that his own view would nevertheless enable us to articulate what is most morally objectionable about our current world. In this article it is argued that none of Miller's critiques of cosmopolitan egalitarianism is effective, and that while certainly preferable to the status quo, a world governed by Miller's principles is not an attractive ideal.

Realizing Honneth: redistribution, recognition, and global justice

The purpose of this article is to explore the potential contribution of Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition to empirical and normative debates on global justice. I first present, very briefly, an overview of recent theories of global distributive justice. I argue that theorists of distributive justice do not pay enough attention to sources of self-respect and conditions for identity formation, and that they are blind toward the danger of harming people's sense of self even by well-intentioned redistributive policies. Honneth's theory suffers from complementary shortcomings; it is anti-technocratic but largely oblivious to the global nature of many contemporary justice claims. Given this situation, I seek to broaden the theory's scope by outlining transnational extensions of the recognition principles of love, rights and solidarity identified by Honneth. In conclusion, I show how utilizing a broadened conceptualization of the struggle for recognition allows us to better understand the changing logic of justice-oriented foreign policies.

The Moral Arbitrariness of State Borders: Against Beitz

In this paper, I critically examine an important premise in theories of global distributive justice that, despite its widespread influence, has remained largely unexamined. This is the claim that state borders are morally arbitrary with respect to a just distribution of goods. I examine two common arguments for this claim, the argument that state borders are historically unjust and therefore morally arbitrary; and the argument first made by Charles Beitz that the conditions of a fair, hypothetical social contract (such as the Rawlsian original position) would not include knowledge of one's location with respect to the distribution of natural resources between state borders. I argue that there are good reasons to reject both arguments. Beitz's immense contribution to international justice can be gauged by the fact that it is difficult to find a contemporary work on global justice that does not reference his arguments in Political Theory and International Relations (Beitz, 1979). Although some authors find Beitz's cosmopolitan theory objectionable, no author has, to my knowledge, criticized Beitz's pivotal arguments that our placement in the distribution of natural resources is morally arbitrary. The aim of this paper is to do just that.

Fair Equality of Opportunity in Global Justice

Many political philosophers argue that a principle of 'fair equality of opportunity' (FEO) ought to extend beyond national borders. I agree that there is a place for FEO in a theory of global justice. However, I think that the idea of cross-border FEO is indeterminate between three different principles. Part of my work in this paper is methodological: I identify three different principles of cross-border fair equality of opportunity and I distinguish them from each other. The other part of my work in this paper is normative: I argue that we should endorse only two of the three principles of cross-border fair equality of opportunity and that we should reject the third. Importantly, I think that we should reject the one version of transnational fair equality of opportunity that most advocates of such a principle appear to endorse.

Coercion, Care, and Corporations: Omissions and Commissions in Thomas Pogge's Political Philosophy

This article argues that Thomas Pogge's important theory of global justice does not adequately appreciate the relation between interactional and institutional accounts of human rights, along with the important normative role of care and solidarity in the context of globalization. It also suggests that more attention needs to be given critically to the actions of global corporations and positively to introducing democratic accountability into the institutions of global governance. The article goes on to present an alternative approach to global justice based on a more robust conception of human rights grounded in a conception of equal positive freedom, in which these rights are seen to apply beyond the coercive political institutions to which Pogge primarily confines them (e.g. to prohibiting domestic violence), and in which they can guide the development of economic, social and political forms to enable their fulfillment.

Globalization and democratization in Brazil: an interpretation of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism

This paper reflects the findings of an ongoing research on the normative thrust of globalization within the Brazilian transition to democracy in light of a Rawlsian-inspired theory of global justice. By resorting to what I term “the Brazilian reception of Rawls’s political liberalism,” –in particular, to his contribution to a theory of global justice–, I argue for an idea of public reason that subscribes both to an autonomous, deliberative ethos for local action (Brazilian undergoing democratization) and to a universalizable, egalitarian conception of justice and liberty (a Rawlsian-inspired recasting of social-democracy). It is my contention here that the main challenge of global justice consists in making the normative dimension of globalization work for the consolidation of democracy in the social, political, and economic institutions of so-called emergent societies, such as Brazil. By resorting to a theory of global justice that avoids the pitfalls of both neoliberalism and state socialism, an attempt is made at recasting Rawls’s idea of public autonomy and deliberative democracy within a society whose democratic institutions are still in the making. I am drawing on Rawls’s trilogy (A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, and The Law of Peoples) to account for the defense of social-democracy in Brazil and its insertion in the globalizing process without subscribing to a neoliberal agenda or succumbing to the universalist-communitarian dilemma. Key words: Democracy; globalization; egalitarianism; justice; liberalism; public reason.

Institutional implications of global justice as impartiality: Cosmopolitan democracy

This article develops an argument on the type of implications a theory of global justice as impartiality would generate for global institutions. The main conclusion is that a theory of citizenship including political obligations towards fellow citizens could be used as a basis for a theory of global citizenship with duties towards fellow human beings. The article ends with a sketch of improvements to existing institutions like the United Nations and the Human rights doctrine, especially the inclusion of the aim of democracy in international law.

Book Review: Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State

Book Review: Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State

Why Global Distributive Justice Cannot Work

This paper argues that a political theory of global distributive justice, as envisaged by neo-Rawlsian cosmopolitans, makes no sense. Political theorists such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, and Darrel Moellendorf have argued that John Rawls's egalitarian conception of distributive justice should be applied globally, despite Rawls's own insistence on its limited applicability to domestic society. Against this position, two main arguments for skepticism about global egalitarian distributive justice are offered. First, the world cannot plausibly be understood in terms of a society in Rawls's sense, and a Rawlsian global original position cannot generate politically meaningful principles of distributive justice. Second, global distributive justice cannot serve as an achievable goal of international political endeavor within an environment that is, and should remain, anarchic; the utopian world government that it requires seems unrealistic, and in any event is politically undesirable from a liberal perspective. The cosmopolitan ideal of global distributive justice should have no weight in moral reasoning about international political choice.