Global Jihadism Research Articles

China and the Global Jihad Network

The global jihadist network in Eurasia is growing as terrorism spreads from the Middle East to the geographically broader “arc of instability,” which covers North Africa, West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia. Influenced by their close ties with global jihadism, the terrorist groups targeting China openly challenge the legitimacy of China's administration in Xinjiang by raising the banners of liberty, freedom, and human rights, while advocating attacks against civilians to arouse worldwide attention. Pressured by the terrorists, some nonviolent Xinjiang separatist groups are becoming increasingly radical in their actions. To address the “three evil” forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, Beijing has emphasized economic and social development in western China and pursued a “three-ring” strategy for antiterrorism consisting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-India-Israel antiterrorism cooperation, and tacit China-U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. The 2010 Shanghai World Expo and its counterterrorism protocols will test the efficacy of this approach.

Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection?

The lack of internal order in Somalia has left the country vulnerable to the rise of hard-line Islamist groups, most notably al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab purports to be committed to global jihadism, has self-professed connections to al-Qaeda, and of late, has proved able to capture and control territory. Consequently, al-Shabaab and other like-minded Somali radicals are viewed as a threat to the Somali Transitional Federal Government, to Somalia's neighbours, and to the broader international community, particularly the United States and other Western countries. However, it is argued here that al-Shabaab's particular rise to prominence is partly a factor of the policy follies of regional and international players in Somalia. Morever, despite the threat the organisation poses, al-Shabaab quite likely faces implosion.

Al Qaida's Views of Authoritarian Intelligence Services in the Middle East

Al Qaida and its jihadist allies shape their plans and operations substantially in response to threats they face from authoritarian intelligence services of the Middle East. While most jihadists initially believed that victory over their ‘near enemies’– so-called ‘apostate’ regimes – should be their top priority, the ruthlessly effective security apparatuses of their home countries were significant factors in the transition to ‘global jihadism’, which emphasized the fight against the ‘far enemy’: the United States. This article presents al Qaida's views of the region's domestic intelligence services by examining captured documents and open source materials.

The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington DC there has been an ongoing controversy about whether the real threat of global terrorism is posed by al-Qaeda, its territorial extensions and affiliated organisations, or by decentralised groups inspired by, but unconnected to, such entities. The 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings are often held up as the archetype of an independent local cell at work, and the perpetrators depicted as self-recruited, leaderless terrorists. Six years after the blasts, however, new evidence connecting some of the most notorious members of the Madrid bombing network with al-Qaeda's senior leadership, along with features of the terrorist network itself and distinctive elements of the likely strategy behind the blasts, suggest that these assumptions are misleading. Judicial documentation now fully accessible at Spain's National Court and other relevant primary or secondary sources can help us better understand what the attacks can tell us about al-Qaeda and a global terrorism in transition, as well as about the changing nature of the threat to open societies.

Islamist violence and regime stability in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, homeland of Osama bin Laden and 15 of the 19 hijackers of September 11, 2001, experienced low levels of internal violence until 2003, when a terrorist campaign by ‘Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’ (QAP) shook the world's leading oil producer. Based on primary sources and extensive fieldwork in the Kingdom, this article traces the history of the Saudi jihadist movement and explains the outbreak and failure of the QAP campaign. It argues that jihadism in Saudi Arabia differs from jihadism in the Arab republics in being driven primarily by extreme pan-Islamism and not socio-revolutionary ideology, and that this helps to explain its peculiar trajectory. The article identifies two subcurrents of Saudi jihadism, ‘classical’ and ‘global’, and demonstrates that Al-Qaeda's global jihadism enjoyed very little support until 1999, when a number of factors coincided to boost dramatically Al-Qaeda recruitment. The article argues that the violence in 2003 was not the result of structural political or economic strains inside the Kingdom, but rather organizational developments within Al-Qaeda, notably the strategic decision taken by bin Laden in early 2002 to open a new front in Saudi Arabia. The QAP campaign was made possible by the presence in 2002 of a critical mass of returnees from Afghanistan, a clever two-track strategy by Al-Qaeda, and systemic weaknesses in the Saudi security apparatus. The campaign failed because the militants, radicalized in Afghan camps, represented an alien element on the local Islamist scene and lacked popular support. The near-absence of violence in the Kingdom before 2003 was due to Al-Qaeda's weak infrastructure in the early 1990s and bin Laden's 1998 decision to suspend operations to preserve local networks. The Saudi regime is currently more stable and self-confident—and therefore less inclined to democratic reform—than it has been in many years.

Introduction: Strategies for Regional Cooperation in the Mediterranean: Rethinking the Parameters of the Debate

This account maps out the key discourses and policies that shape the response of regional political actors to the ‘new terrorism’ associated with radical Islamist groups after 9/11. It details the dominant representations of international security before and after 9/11 in relation to an elusive notion of security community in the Mediterranean. In particular it stresses the dilemmas of securitization at the regional level in a context where the state system remains the dominant frame of reference for conceiving and organizing cooperation. Finally it highlights how the discourse on the ‘new terrorism’ creates a superficial agreement between states north and south of the Mediterranean but largely fails to recognize the different security dilemmas experienced by each state and does not meaningfully capture the dynamics of national and global jihadism.

Global Jihadism After the Iraq War

How has the invasion of Iraq influenced global jihadist ideology? Based on primary sources in Arabic, this article highlights important ideological changes; Iraq is considered a crossroads in the global jihad against the “Crusaders.” New strategic dilemmas have caused divisions among militants, and Iraq's attractiveness has undermined other battlefronts. A new “strategic studies” genre has emerged in jihadist literature. Countries in Europe and the Gulf are increasingly highlighted as enemies and potential targets.