This paper reviews three interpretations of an international debt crisis now stumbling to some sort of ‘first-stage resolution’-if the Financial Times (24/11/83) is right so to describe a situation where the Third World is in debt to the tune of 590 billion dollars, and where the IMF is active in the economic management of at least 14 Southern nations. It looks first at the monetarist perspective advanced by Lal and Beenstock, and given political expression at the Recent Williamsburg summit by the governments of the USA, the UK and West Germany. This draws a distinction between a crisis of global insolvency and (today’s) temporary liquidity shortfall in a self-equilibrating world system. Politically, it cautions Northern treasuries against a precipitate increase in world reserves, and asks them to sit tight for the spontaneous recovery which will follow present sound money policies. Section two contrasts this view with the Keynesian theorizing that underlies the second report of the Brandt Commission, Common Crisis (1983), and which is evident in the calls of the French Government for a second Bretton Woods conference. This challenges the cyclical schemas of monetarism and insists that the present crisis must be understood as the secular outcome of: (1) the relative decline of official capital flows, (2) the increased importance of petrodollars recycled through the Eurocurrency markets, (3) the second oil price hike, and (4) the policies of competitive deflation pursued by the major Western powers. In political terms it rejects the self-balance hypothesis and urges Northern governments to reflate the world economy by a new and significant issue of Special Drawing Rights (that is, by a net addition to global liquidity). Finally, the paper submits these recommendations to the geopolitical critique of Riccardo Parboni. His analysis suggests that if the Keynesians have correctly identified the proximate economic loci of the current malaise, they have failed to identify its deeper geopolitical roots. Specifically, they have failed to see that the United States has a vested interest in maintaining the hegemonic position of the dollar, and will continue to resist a healthy new issue of SDRs so long as it can use this ‘financial seignorage’ to ward off the economic onslaught of its more competitive rivals in the EEC and Japan. More than this, it suggests that the Brandtian goal of easing North/South tensions may itself depend on a prior resolution of the geopolitical disputes now racking ‘the disintegrating West’ (Kaldor,
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