Global Demand Shocks Research Articles

Labour Markets in the Global Financial Crisis: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

This note examines labour market performance across countries through the lens of Okun's Law. We find that after the 1970s but prior to the global financial crisis of the 2000s, the Okun's Law relationship between output and unemployment became more homogenous across countries. These changes presumably reflected institutional and technological changes. But, at least in the short term, the global financial crisis undid much of this convergence, in part because the affected countries adopted different labour market policies in response to the global demand shock.

Labor Markets in the Global Financial Crisis: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

This note examines labor market performance across countries through the lens of Okun’s Law. We find that after the 1970s but prior to the global financial crisis of the 2000s, the Okun’s Law relationship between output and unemployment became more homogenous across countries. These changes presumably reflected institutional and technological changes. But, at least in the short term, the global financial crisis undid much of this convergence, in part because the affected countries adopted different labor market policies in response to the global demand shock.

Speculation in the Oil Market

The run-up in oil prices since 2004 coincided with growing investment in commodity markets and increased price co-movement among different commodities. We assess whether speculation in the oil market played a role in driving this salient empirical pattern. We identify oil shocks from a large dataset using a dynamic factor model. This method is motivated by the fact that a small-scale vector autoregression is not informationally sufficient to identify the shocks. The main results are as follows. (i) While global demand shocks account for the largest share of oil price fluctuations, speculative shocks are the second most important driver. (ii) The increase in oil prices over the last decade is mainly driven by the strength of global demand. However, speculation played a significant role in the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008 and its subsequent collapse. (iii) The co-movement between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is mainly explained by global demand shocks. Our results support the view that the recent oil price increase is mainly driven by the strength of global demand but that the financialization process of commodity markets also played a role.

Oil prices, US inflation, US money supply and the US dollar

AbstractA central proposition in many macroeconomic models is price stickiness, while it is agreed that commodity prices are determined in auction markets, and are necessarily fully flexible. The overall price level is a weighted average of commodity prices and consumer prices. An exogenous increase in the money supply, keeping everything else constant, increases the overall price level proportionately. Because of stickiness of consumer prices, commodity prices overshoot the increase in the money supply. The purpose of this paper is to re‐examine the relations between the price of one specific commodity which is oil with US inflation, US money supply and the US dollar. One empirical fact is that during the sample period, global and US demand shocks have raised oil prices immediately while their effect on consumer prices was delayed. This overshooting of oil prices is expected to occur in the short run and to wane in the long run as consumer prices fully adjust. The overshooting of oil prices is the mirror image of the overshooting of the US dollar. This is true for two main reasons. One, both oil and the US dollar react in the same manner to money supply changes. Two, oil prices are quoted in US dollars and a depreciation of the US dollar is instantly compensated by a rise in the US price of oil. Additionally, the paper analyses and discusses the evidence on an apparent long run overshooting of oil prices and explains why it is just a statistical artefact that stems from the salient features of oil.

Estimation of the Impact of Oil and Gas Price Shocks on GDP Growth and Stock Returns in Central and Eastern Europe

This study attempts to estimate the path-through effects from oil and gas-related shocks to GDP growth and stock returns in twelve CEE countries using structural VAR approach recently developed in the literature. The baseline model is the global oil market model which endogenizes oil price changes. This model is modified by the author and applied to the European gas market. Then the impact of identified structural global oil and European gas-related shocks on GDP dynamics and stock market returns is studied using finite distributed lag models and another structural VARs. The study confirms recent findings that the factors behind oil and gas price changes do matter – different underlying shocks impact GDP growth and stock returns in the CEE region in different ways. It’s shown that in certain CEE countries oil and gas price increasing global and European aggregate demand shocks lead to higher GDP and positive stock returns over 6-8 months horizon despite the fact that some of these countries are net oil and gas importers. However, if fuels price increases are due to oil and gas-specific demand shocks, then GDP and stock prices tend to fall over 10-12 months horizon. In general, gas-related shocks were found more important for CEE economies and stock markets than oil-related shocks, what is in line with regional energy mix fundamentals.

Global and Regional Business Cycles - Shocks and Propagations

We study the synchronization of real and nominal variables across four different regions of the world, Asia, Europe, North and South America, covering 32 different countries. Employing a FAVAR framework, we distinguish between global and regional demand and supply shocks and document the relative contributions of these shocks to explaining macroeconomic fluctuations and synchronization. Our results support the decoupling hypothesis advanced in recent business cycle studies and yield new insights regarding the causes of business cycle synchronization. In particular, global supply shocks cause more severe activity fluctuations in European and North American economies than in Asian and South American economies, whereas global demand shocks shift activity in the different regions in opposite directions at longer horizons. Furthermore, demand shocks play a larger role than that found in related studies. Finally, only innovations to the Asian activity and price factors have significant spillover effects on shared global factors, demonstrating the growing importance of Asia in the global economy.

Oil Price Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Data-Rich Environment

This paper examines the impact of dierent types of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy, using a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) approach. The results indicate that when examining the eects of oil price shocks, it is important to account for the interaction between the oil market and the macroeconomy. I nd that oil demand shocks are more important than oil supply shocks in driving several macroeconomic variables, and that the origin of demand shocks matter. Specically, the U.S. economy and monetary policy respond dierently to global demand shocks that have the eect of raising the price of oil and to oil-specic demand shocks.

Oil shocks and the US terms of trade: gauging the role of the trade channel

Recent theoretical literature claims that demand-driven transmission mechanisms are the key to understand how oil shocks affect the economy. Following this literature, we measure the economic strength of one of these demand-driven channels, the trade channel, in the transmission of oil shocks to the US economy. We use Kilian's (2009) decomposition of oil price shocks to identify three possible sources of oil shocks: oil supply, oil-market specific demand and global demand shocks. We then estimate the impact of each shock on the US terms of trade controlling for nonlinear effects in the sign and the size of the shocks. All oil shocks have persistent and statistically significant effects on the US terms of trade. However, we find that only oil supply shocks have an impact on the terms of trade that is nonlinear in the size of the shock. This last result is in accordance with the theoretical findings in Maravalle (forthcoming).

International Policy Spillovers at the Zero Lower Bound

In this paper, we consider how monetary policy in a large, foreign economy affects optimal monetary policy in a small open economy ('home') in response to a large global demand shock that pushes both economies to the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. We show that the inability of foreign monetary policy to stabilise the foreign economy at the ZLB creates a spillover that affects how well the home policymaker is able to stabilise its own economy. We show that more stimulatory foreign policy worsens the home policymaker's trade-off between stabilising inflation and the output gap when home and foreign goods are close substitutes. This reflects the fact that looser foreign policy leads to a relatively more appreciated home real exchange rate, which induces large expenditure switching away from home goods when goods are highly substitutable -- just at a time (at the ZLB) when home policy is trying to boost demand for home goods. When goods are not close substitutes the home policymaker's ability to stabilise the economy benefits from more stimulatory foreign policy.

Speculation in the Oil Market

The run-up in oil prices since 2004 coincided with growing investment in commodity markets and increased price comovement among different commodities. We assess whether speculation in the oil market played a role in driving this salient empirical pattern. We identify oil shocks from a large dataset using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model. This method is motivated by the fact that a small scale VAR is not infomationally sufficient to identify the shocks. The main results are as follows: (i) While global demand shocks account for the largest share of oil price fluctuations, speculative shocks are the second most important driver. (ii) The comovement between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is mainly explained by global demand shocks. (iii) The increase in oil prices over the last decade is mainly driven by the strength of global demand. However, speculation played a significant role in the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008 and its subsequent collapse. Our results support the view that the recent oil price increase is mainly driven by the strength of global demand but that the financialization process of commodity markets also played a role.

Did Unexpectedly Strong Economic Growth Cause the Oil Price Shock of 2003–2008?

ABSTRACTRecently developed structural models of the global crude oil market imply that the surge in the real price of oil between mid 2003 and mid 2008 was driven by repeated positive shocks to the demand for all industrial commodities, reflecting unexpectedly high growth mainly in emerging Asia. We evaluate this proposition using an alternative data source and a different econometric methodology. Rather than inferring demand shocks from an econometric model, we utilize a direct measure of global demand shocks based on revisions of professional real gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecasts. We show that forecast surprises during 2003–2008 were associated primarily with unexpected growth in emerging economies (in conjunction with much smaller positive GDP‐weighted forecast surprises in the major industrialized economies), that markets were repeatedly surprised by the strength of this growth, that these surprises were associated with a hump‐shaped response of the real price of oil that reaches its peak after 12–16 months, and that news about global growth predict much of the surge in the real price of oil from mid 2003 until mid 2008 and much of its subsequent decline. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A Global Perspective on Inflation and Propagation Channels

This paper revisits the evidence on the monetary policy transmission channels. It extends the existing literature along three lines: i) it takes a global perspective with aggregate series based on a broader set of countries (ca 70% per cent of the global economy) and a longer time (1960-2010) than previous studies. It, thereby, internalises potential international transmission channels (i.e. via global commodity prices); ii) it examines the interaction between monetary variables, asset prices (notably residential property) and inflation; and iii) it looks at the role of public debt for consumer price developments. On the basis of a VAR analysis, the study finds that i) global money demand shocks affect global inflation and also global commodity prices, which in turn impact on inflation; ii) global asset/property price dynamics appear to respond to financing cost shocks, but not to shocks to global money demand. Moreover, positive house price shocks exert a significant influence on inflation. From a global perspective, the study suggests recognition of global externalities of commodities and asset values as well as the close monitoring of real estate price developments. JEL Classification: E31, E51, E62, C32, F42

Global and Regional Spillovers to Pacific Island Countries

Regional integration of Pacific Island countries (PICs) with Australia, New Zealand, and emerging Asia has increased over the last two decades. PICs have become more exposed to the region's business cycles, and spillovers from regional economies are more important for PICs than from advanced economies outside the region. While strong linkages with Asia would help in the event of a global downturn, PICs remain particularly vulnerable to global commodity price shocks. In this paper, we use a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) for each PIC to gauge the impact of global and regional growth spillovers. The analysis reveals that the impact on PICs' growth from an adverse oil shock would be substantial, and in some cases even larger than from a negative global demand shock. We also assess the spillovers to the financial sector from the deterioration of the global outlook. PICs should continue to rebuild policy buffers and implement growth-oriented structural reforms to ensure sustained and inclusive growth.

International Policy Spillovers at the Zero Lower Bound

In this paper, we consider how monetary policy in a large, foreign economy affects optimal monetary policy in a small open economy (`home') in response to a large global demand shock that pushes both economies to the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. We show that the inability of foreign monetary policy to stabilise the foreign economy at the ZLB creates a spillover that affects how well the home policymaker is able to stabilise its own economy. We show that more stimulatory foreign policy worsens the home policymaker's trade-off between stabilising inflation and the output gap when home and foreign goods are close substitutes. This reflects the fact that looser foreign policy leads to a relatively more appreciated home real exchange rate, which induces large expenditure switching away from home goods when goods are highly substitutable--just at a time (at the ZLB) when home policy is trying to boost demand for home goods. When goods are not close substitutes, the home policymaker's ability to stabilise the economy benefits from more stimulatory foreign policy.

Global and Regional Spillovers to Pacific Island Countries

Regional integration of Pacific Island countries (PICs) with Australia, New Zealand, and emerging Asia has increased over the last two decades. PICs have become more exposed to the region’s business cycles, and spillovers from regional economies are more important for PICs than from advanced economies outside the region. While strong linkages with Asia would help in the event of a global downturn, PICs remain particularly vulnerable to global commodity price shocks. In this paper, we use a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) for each PIC to gauge the impact of global and regional growth spillovers. The analysis reveals that the impact on PICs’ growth from an adverse oil shock would be substantial, and in some cases even larger than from a negative global demand shock. We also assess the spillovers to the financial sector from the deterioration of the global outlook. PICs should continue to rebuild policy buffers and implement growth-oriented structural reforms to ensure sustained and inclusive growth.

International Policy Spillovers at the Zero Lower Bound

In this paper, we consider how monetary policy in a large, foreign economy affects optimal monetary policy in a small open economy (‘home’) in response to a large global demand shock that pushes both economies to the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. We show that the inability of foreign monetary policy to stabilise the foreign economy at the ZLB creates a spillover that affects how well the home policymaker is able to stabilise its own economy. We show that more stimulatory foreign policy worsens the home policymaker’s trade-off between stabilising inflation and the output gap when home and foreign goods are close substitutes. This reflects the fact that looser foreign policy leads to a relatively more appreciated home real exchange rate, which induces large expenditure switching away from home goods when goods are highly substitutable – just at a time (at the ZLB) when home policy is trying to boost demand for home goods. When goods are not close substitutes the home policymaker’s ability to stabilise the economy benefits from more stimulatory foreign policy.

The Role of Oil Prices in the Euro Area Economy Since the 1970s

This paper explores the role of oil prices in the euro area economy since the 1970s by applying a VAR framework with time varying parameters and stochastic volatility in which oil supply and global demand shocks are identified. Our results show that both types of shock contributed substantially to the oil price surges during historical oil crises and likewise to those over the past decade. Counterfactual histories of the price and activity variables, moreover, reveal much larger adverse contributions of both shocks to HICP inflation and GDP in the first half of the sample than in the second, which suggests that changes related to these shocks have contributed to the Great Moderation. Impulse responses, moreover, show that a decline in the pass through of the two shocks has added to the moderating contribution over time, while variance decompositions indicate no change in the relative importance of the two shocks over time.

Relationships between oil price shocks and stock market: an empirical analysis from Greater China

Although a lot of empirical research has studied the relationship between changes in oil price and economic activity, it is surprising that little research has been conducted on the relationship between oil price shocks and the Greater China region (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan). Therefore, the main goal of this article is to apply detailed monthly data from 1997/7 to 2008/9 to fill this gap. Compared to the effect of US stock market returns described by Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009), we found that the impact of oil price shocks on stock prices in Greater China has been mixed. First, the impact of oil price shocks on Taiwan's stock market is very similar to that on the US stock market. Additionally, all three shocks have had significantly positive impacts on Hong Kong's stocks, partially in contrast to the effects on the US stock market. However, in contrast to the effect in the US stock market, we found that only global oil supply shock has a significantly positive impact on China's stock returns, but global oil demand shock and the oil specific demand shock have no significant impacts. The reason for the lack of significant impacts is that the positive expectation effect of China's fast economic growth may be just offset by the negative effect of a precautionary demand-driven effect. This result is also consistent with the previous empirical findings that the segmented and integrated China stock market is mixed, and it implies that the China stock market is ‘partially integrated’ with the other stock markets and oil price shocks.

Revisiting the Inflationary Effects of Oil Prices

This paper uses a structural vector autoregression model to investigate the inflationary effects of oil prices. Rather than simply infer the oil price changes as oil supply shocks, we identify three different shocks in the crude oil market: the oil supply shock, the global aggregate demand shock, and the oil-market specific demand shock. We then use impulse response functions to compute the conditional oil price pass-through ratios. It is found that the largest oil price pass-through is caused by oil supply shocks. However, evidence from historical decompositions suggests that the oil price movements have been driven by shocks from strong global aggregate demand and oil demand while only minor contributions come from oil supply shocks. Disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market helps to uncover the fact that a recent decline in unconditional oil price pass-through may come from the low conditional passthrough caused by global demand shocks.

Oil shocks and external balances

We provide estimates of the effects of demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil market on several measures of oil exporters' and oil importers' external balances, including the oil trade balance, the non-oil trade balance, the current account, capital gains, and changes in net foreign assets (NFA). First, we show that the effect of oil demand and supply shocks on the merchandise trade balance and the current account, which depending on the source of the shock can be large, depends critically on the response of the non-oil trade balance. Our results provide evidence of an intermediate degree of international financial integration. Second, we document the presence of large and systematic valuation effects in response to these shocks. Valuation effects overall tend to cushion the effect of oil demand and supply shocks on the NFA positions of oil exporters and oil importers. Third, we quantify the overall importance of global business cycle demand shocks as well as oil-market specific demand and supply shocks for external balances.