N. M. L. Nathan objects to a certain moral and political principle, and to my claim-with which Thomas Nagel may agree-that it is the fundamental principle of egalitarianism, rightly called the Principle of Equality, and to a claim about how its end is to be pursued.1 His clear and concise objections, to my mind, are not overwhelming. (a) The principle, in brief, is that we are to take effective means to making well-off those who are badly-off. It is noted by Nathan that as it was stated in my paper,2 it does not specify any policy of redistribution affecting only those who are badly-off to different degrees, a policy most relevant to the unlikely circumstance where there is no possibility of improving the lot of any of them by transferring means to well-being from the well-off. Nothing specified, for example, about taking from the poor and giving to the poorer. It is clear enough that such a policy might be specified, in order to cover all conceivable contingencies, in a full account of the moral and political philosophy of which the Principle of Equality is the foundation. There is no objection to the principle here, and Nathan does not claim that there iS.3 (b) The principle, as he notes, does not entail that inequalities in wellbeing are to be reduced if this does not improve the lot of the badly-off. That is, the well-off are not to be dragged down to no purpose. I take this to be a recommendation of the principle, although a slight one, since the antecedent of the conditional is rarely satisfied. Nathan too, I take it, regards it as a recommendation. (c) He notes that if the lot of the badly-off can be improved only by raising further the well-being of the well-off, thereby producing a greater relative inequality in well-being, this policy is in accord with the principle. Indeed it is, and no objection. Again, the antecedent of the conditional is rarely satisfied. (d) My paper gave four reasons for the name of the principle and for its being the foundation of egalitarianism as a moral and political position, the strongest reason being that very often the means to securing its end will be the pursuit of equalities in means to well-being. 'Such campaigns or practices in many contexts are the most effective ones, partly because most realistic. One man, one vote is an example. Others, involving material goods, make the correct assumption that a given group of people are in the