Since 1978, the Chinese central government has undertaken a series of market-oriented policy reforms which has led to responsibility for urban development shifting from central government to the local level, i.e., the provincial, prefectural city and district governments. As a result, local district governments in China’s larger cities have become key players driving economic development through an intensive process of entrepreneurial urbanization (where markets drive urban policy). These urban projects are best characterized as property-led, encouraged by neoliberal policies such as government support for land-based urban growth coalitions and property speculation. Based on local government planning and infrastructure development, this process has led to several newly built districts or towns. However, they have become ghost cities due to their lack of inhabitants and empty apartment units (apartment units are often purchased as part of an investment portfolio rather than as primary residences). This paper will unpack economic mechanisms and government motivations behind three iterations of ghost cities, to explore how local governments interact with central government as well as with property developers to expand urbanization. We examine three cases, the distinct urban contexts of Shanghai Thames town, Ordos, and Kunming (reflecting suburban tourism; debt-financed urbanism; and pro-growth strategic urbanism respectively) – to examine the variations across ghost cities in China (both in terms of neoliberal mechanisms and its outcomes).