Gettier Problem Research Articles

Waves, Floods, Currents: The Politics and Poetics of Water in Social Movement Analysis

AbstractThe task of conceptualising social movements draws on a wealth of watery images, from protest waves and political currents, to imagining mobilisations as tides, ripples, cascades or high‐pressure hydraulics. Called upon to analyse complex processes, these waters have a life of their own, carrying analytical implications while extending a relationship to water that is never only symbolic and is material, embodied and historical. This article explores the ways water is “enrolled” to understand movements, to advance three arguments: first, these use familiar water morphologies to naturalise particular, located understandings of political change and social form; second, they imply normative claims and ideological affinities regarding political struggle; third, this has implications for our relationship to water, echoing the abstract and alienating “modern water” of capitalist world‐ecology. The article considers how critical water knowledges and subjectivities, often sustained by social movement spaces, indicate possibilities of a being‐otherwise with water and its meanings.

Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of Gaṅgeśa

Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of Gaṅgeśa Stephen Phillips (bio) More or less happy with the reviews, I would like mainly, in response, to identify advances made in the study of Gaṅgeśa. Anand Vaidya articulates a clearer overview of Gaṅgeśa's theory of knowledge; Eberhard Guhe shows a better way to render the notion of vyāpti, "pervasion," which is central in the theory of inference as a knowledge source; and Michael Williams, too, shows need for improvement on that score as well as for elaboration of matters taken up by classical commentators that are given short shrift in my running comments. For example, whereas long discussions are provoked by Gaṅgeśa's definition of "knowledge," pramā, major points in the purvapakṣa in the section on proving the existence of an īśvara, a "Lord," seem, as Williams says, "threadbare." Vaidya, following Burge (2003), introduces a distinction between entitlement and justification: entitlement is the kind of unreflective epistemic warrant delivered by Gaṅgeśa's pramāṇa, "knowledge sources," working automatically in our everyday lives, whereas justification requires self-conscious certification, prāmāṇya-jñapti. Thereby splitting the horns of a dilemma posed by internalist accounts of knowledge in opposition to externalist ones, Burge and Vaidya are able to incorporate the most [End Page 519] attractive features of each approach. The entitlement/justification distinction cashes out, I may add, to Vaidya's elucidation, Nyāya's deeply held doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇya, "certification by another," against the view of "intrinsic certification," svataḥ-prāmāṇya, of Prabhākara and others. As Williams notes, Prābhākara positions, for which Gaṅgeśa sometimes shows sympathy, may have led him to presume that an anubhava—"awareness" or "presentational experience" in my translation, "fresh news" in Matilal's snappy rendering—is an episode of knowledge, pramā, "unless one knows otherwise," bādhakam vinā. On reflection, one sees that such a presentation (it could be perceptual, inferential, analogical, or testimonial) has been produced by a pramāṇa, or, in abnormal cases, not, and so by a "pramāṇa-pretender," a pramāṇaābhāsa, as in seeing a mirage. Again, an anubhava is not just any old cognition or "thought" (pace Das 2021, p. 162); it is defined as nonrecollective. Unlike a deliverance of a genuine pramāṇa, some instances may, on examination, prove to be a-pramā, "non-knowledge," but are, nevertheless, at the animal level, sufficient to provoke and guide action that would not be unhesitating were there doubt in any way. A thirsty Maya, in Vaidya's example, would naturally move in the direction of the water she "sees." But she would hesitate were she to learn from her friend about the unreliability of water-perception in the current circumstances. At the reflective level, where she is unsure whether the anubhava she apperceives is pramā or apramā, her action, including speech (implying assertability), is altered. So far so good in Vaidya's reconstruction. But Gaṅgeśa does not himself pronounce on the question of whether, after learning about the defeater, Maya would still be entitled to her perceptual belief that there is water in the distance. In the volumes under review, I assumed that she would not be "justified" and indeed that she would no longer have the belief (if we may speak about "beliefs"). The defeater grasped at the reflective level would mean not only that she could not certify the perceptual deliverance but also that there would be no knowledge. Clearly, she can't certify it, and thus, as Vaidya reasons, loses the right to assert. But maybe he's correct that, according to Gaṅgeśa's sensibilities, she does not lose the perceptual knowledge. She would remain entitled to her belief. Personally, I think this is wrong, but Vaidya's understanding does have the merit of explaining why some later Naiyāyikas apparently took absurd positions on epistemic luck (Bhattacharya 1996, p. ix). I think that Maya would lose her entitlement, too, but what if, after being informed of the unreliability of water-perception...

Luck and Reasons

Abstract In this paper, I will present a problem for reductive accounts of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. By “reductive” I mean accounts that try to analyze epistemic luck in non-epistemic terms. I will begin by briefly considering Jennifer Lackey's (2006) criticism of Duncan Pritchard's (2005) safety-based account of epistemic luck. I will further develop her objection to Pritchard by drawing on the defeasible-reasoning tradition. I will then show that her objection to safety-based accounts is an instance of a more general problem with reductive accounts of epistemic luck. In short, they face a dilemma: they can either fail to vindicate the intuitive verdicts about cases or they can illicitly appeal to the epistemic vocabulary they are trying to reduce. The upshot is that we can only understand epistemic luck in terms of the assessment of the subject's reasons and we can't give a reductive account of that.

First-Class and Coach-Class Knowledge

AbstractI will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories.

Is lucky belief justified?

ABSTRACT The main lesson from Gettier cases is that while one cannot know a proposition by luck, one can hold a lucky true belief justifiedly. Possibly because the latter is taken for granted, the relationship between epistemic justification and epistemic luck has been less discussed. The paper investigates whether luck can undermine doxastic justification, and if so, how and to what extent. It is argued that, as in the case of knowledge, beliefs can fall short of justification due to luck. Moreover, it is argued that justification-undermining luck is a problem for both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. Accordingly, it is shown that epistemic luck is a more widespread phenomenon than many in epistemology commonly assume.

JTB Epistemology and the Gettier Problem in the Framework of Topological Epistemic Logic

JTB Epistemology and the Gettier Problem in the Framework of Topological Epistemic Logic

Some more observation on Phan Van Hum's viewpoints of literary study

Phan Van Hum (1902-1946) is considered one of the leading scholars in the South in the first half of the twentieth century. He is involved in many academic fields, such as philosophy, sociology, economics, psychology, medicine, religion, etc. in which the most prominent is literature, including composition, research, and criticism. In composing, he has the famous work “Ngồi tù Khám Lớn [Jailed in Khám Lớn]. In terms of research and criticism, he has published the works such as “Nỗi lòng Đồ Chiểu” [Sentiments of Đồ Chiểu], “Dở chồng báo cũ” [Open stack of old newspapers], and “Luận Tùng” [Discussion series]. In addition, he also has many articles published in newspapers/magazines in the period before 1945. From the overall observation, we realize that for literary activities, Phan Van Hum's works have a profound spirit of “humanity sake” and at the same time show a very dialectical perspective in understanding and interpreting issues. His works, whether they are compositions, researches or criticisms, have a combination of scientific knowledge as a fulcrum for perception and criticism. In addition, he is also very conscious in applying and disseminating knowledge of Western research methodology and criticism to scholars doing research in Vietnam. In our opinions, these things are of great value in the literary and academic context in Vietnam at that time. By the methods of systematic and interdisciplinary research, the article clarifies the characteristics and values of Phan Van Hum's literary activities for Vietnam’s literature in the first half of the twentieth century.

Concept Revision, Concept Application and the Role of Intuitions in Gettier Cases

Abstract The aim of the paper is to determine the role of intuitions in Gettier cases. Critics of the Method of Cases argue that arguments developed within this method contain a premise that is justified by its intuitiveness; they also argue that intuitions are unreliable sources of evidence. By contrast, Max Deutsch argues that this critique is unsound since intuitions do not serve as evidence for premises. In Gettier cases, an intuitive premise is justified by other arguments called G-Grounds. I propose a different view on the role of intuition in Gettier cases. I introduce a distinction between concept-revision arguments and concept-application arguments. On the basis of this distinction and Craig's and Spicer's distinction between intuitions of intension and intuitions of extension, I show that (1) intuitions of extension do not serve as evidence for any G-Grounds; (2) intuitions of intension do play an evidential role for all G-Grounds, but (3) in the case of G-Grounds which are used as concept-application arguments, they are a poor source of evidence, while (4) in the case of G-Grounds used as concept-revision arguments, they could be a reliable source of evidence if they are intuitions of intension of a speaker immersed in philosophical discourse.

The Basis of Formalism and Its Limitations

Many opinions have been discussed about the place of literature in society so far. The overwhelming majority is of the opinion that literature is a mirror of society. On the other hand, Formalism, as a literary theory, argues that the purpose of literature is literariness. Therefore, it is accepted as a rebellion against the understanding of literature dating back to the 1900s. Instead, it is suggested that a literary work should be studied as text-oriented. Furthermore, Formalists argue that the language of the work should be examined in terms of its literary elements, that is intrinsic, rather than extrinsic. That is the reason why they are criticized by other literary critics focusing on biographical, sociological, psychological, religious or historical issues. Their approach draws on those of Ferdinand de Saussure. Combining the views of many theorists, they make text-oriented literary studies. Formalism is often confused with official or legal correspondence. The reason why formalist criticism is associated with official and legal correspondence is linguistics. However, etymologically, Formalism is a word that is not related to formality but form. Formalism is considered a rebellion against the literary understanding of the period in which it was born. Besides, Formalism has different dimensions. Formalism is a criticism applied with varying techniques in both poetry and prose. This study seeks to answer such questions as what formalist criticism is, how it is applied to poetry and prose, and criticism made for and against it. At the end of the study, one is expected to have a reader-level knowledge of Formalist criticism.

Justified belief, knowledge, and the topology of evidence

We propose a new topological semantics for evidence, evidence-based justifications, belief, and knowledge. Resting on the assumption that an agent’s rational belief is based on the available evidence, we try to unveil the concrete relationship between an agent’s evidence, belief, and knowledge via a rich formal framework afforded by topologically interpreted modal logics. We prove soundness, completeness, decidability, and the finite model property for the associated logics, and apply this setting to analyze key epistemological issues such as “no false lemma” Gettier examples, misleading defeaters, undefeated justification versus undefeated belief, as well as the defeasibility theories of knowledge.

On virtue epistemology in anglophone philosophy

Virtue epistemology is one of the most popular approaches to epistemological research in Anglophone philosophy. However, it is little known in Ukraine. The article aims to familiarize its readers with the making of virtue epistemology, presenting parallels with virtue ethics. The au- thor makes an attempt to determine the place that virtue epistemology holds in modern philo- sophical discourse. The article provides a brief overview of the main research topics, the biggest controversies within the field, and the systematisation of classification types within the field. The author considers responsibilist and reliabilist approaches to the definition of intellectual virtue. Furthermore, she demonstrates the importance of the Gettier problem for the formation and development of virtue epistemology theories. The article serves as a preliminary sketch of the current state of the Anglophone epistemo- logical discussion presenting research in the field of virtue epistemology from its appearance to the present day. The overview nature of the article is used to test proposed translations of modern epistemological terminology in Ukrainian. The primary goal of the article is to introduce virtue epistemology to the Ukrainian philosophical discourse.

Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief

Abstract Knowledge is factually grounded belief. This account uses the same ingredients as the traditional analysis—belief, truth, and justification—but posits a different relation between them. While the traditional analysis begins with true belief and improves it by simply adding justification, this account begins with belief, improves it by grounding it, and then improves it further by grounding it in the facts. In other words, for a belief to be knowledge, it's not enough that it be true and justified; for a belief to be knowledge, it must be justified by the facts. This account solves the Gettier problem. Gettierized beliefs fall short of knowledge because, albeit true and justified, they are not grounded in the facts. This account also elucidates why knowledge attributions are sensitive to epistemic standards. It's because whether we take a belief to be grounded in the facts is sensitive to epistemic standards.

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato’s dialogues, and as described in Aristotle’s logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos’ method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one’s own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one’s set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as ‘monster-barring’—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation.

The Problems of Viewing Performance: Epistemology and Other Minds by Michael Y. Bennett

Reviewed by: The Problems of Viewing Performance: Epistemology and Other Minds by Michael Y. Bennett Brice Ezell The Problems of Viewing Performance: Epistemology and Other Minds. By Michael Y. Bennett. Routledge, 2021. Cloth: $160.00, eBook: $48.95. 150 pages. Michael Y. Bennett occupies a near-solitary place in what he rightly calls the "philosophical turn in theatre and performance studies in the new millennium" (3). This "turn" has to do with the philosophical tradition in which Bennett anchors his work: analytic philosophy. There are now numerous studies of other philosophical entanglements with drama and theatre that feature philosophers dating from the ancient tradition (Plato, in Martin Puchner's The Drama of Ideas) all the way up to twentieth-century thinkers like Hannah Arendt (in Minou Arjomand's Staged). But although analytic philosophy has been the dominant academic mode of philosophy in the United States and Great Britain for the bulk of the twentieth century and up to the present, it has received little engagement from the world of drama and theatre studies. In a 2018 special issue of Anglia on drama, theatre, and philosophy, Laura Cull Ó Maoilearca goes so far as to argue against the legitimacy of an analytic approach to theatre. A recent uptick in literary interest in the analytic tradition, particularly in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has not, it seems, encouraged drama and theatre scholars to look in that direction. Except, that is, for Bennett. His latest monograph, The Problems of Viewing Performance: Epistemology and Other Minds, follows and builds upon his Analytic Philosophy and the World of the Play (2017). Where the latter offers a broad analytic approach to the events of a theatrical production, this new book applies a specific analytic subfield, epistemology, to a core theatrical "problem"—namely, the question of whether the experience of being in an audience is shared. As he does in World of the Play (where, for example, he argues that the events of a play occur in the past subjunctive rather than the present), Bennett advances some unorthodox positions. Chief among these is his claim that "viewing performance is not a shared experience," but is instead an "intersubjective" experience "often modified by other viewers" (3). To elucidate his position, Bennett brings together theatrical concerns with numerous philosophers and examples from analytic epistemology that will be familiar to philosophy undergraduates, such as Edmund Gettier's famous "Gettier cases." For many in theatre and performance studies without traditional philosophical training, however, this philosophy can be a useful new resource. The Problems of Viewing Performance initiates an intriguing conversation. [End Page 93] He is perhaps too quick to dismiss a good deal of scholarship on audience studies when he says that the "performer-audience model of theatrical production and reception is based on a largely unproblematized and simple conceptual structure of an audience at the theatre" (15); the aforementioned Staged is just one recent example of many monographs that theorize the nature of a theatrical audience. But Bennett wisely outlines the myriad ways that the questions raised by analytic epistemology bear upon our notions of audience, examined or unexamined. These questions include: "What is the nature of our own mind?" "What is the relationship between my mind and the minds of others?" The Problems of Viewing Performance utilizes a bipartite structure. These halves are neatly organized, as is the volume itself. Bennett writes clearly and precisely and is careful to define terms. Part I, spanning chapters 1–3, focuses on Bennett's analytic epistemological approach to the theatre, in which he troubles the commonsense notion that theatrical audiences have a "shared" experience. Part II, chapters 4-8, surveys a wide range of plays, including two medieval vernacular plays, Shakespeare's Hamlet, and some well-known works by contemporary playwrights such as Tony Kushner and Maria Irene Fornés. The topics explored in these stand-alone chapters frequently call back to The Problems of Viewing Performance's theoretical first half, yet at times the book drifts. The argument presented in chapter 5 about the medieval plays Le Jeu de Saint Nicolas and The Castle of Perseverance highlights the traditionally drawn boundaries between stage and audience, which naturally impact how audiences gather knowledge...

Reassessing Lucky Understanding

AbstractKnowledge is widely regarded as being incompatible with epistemic luck, but according to several philosophers, the same does not hold for understanding. This paper examines to what extent understanding is vulnerable to epistemic luck. After discussing the weaknesses of some of the cases that have been offered to support the conclusion that understanding tolerates environmental epistemic luck, I turn to a more recent one offered in favour of the opposite conclusion. I argue that this case does not manage to establish that understanding is vulnerable to environmental luck; this even if the fact that understanding comes in degrees is taken into account. Finally, I examine the vulnerability of understanding to intervening luck – the type of luck present in classical Gettier cases – and conclude that when such luck is present, one's understanding is necessarily sub-optimal; a conclusion that does not hold, according to what I argue, when it comes to environmental luck.

John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences by Tony Cheng

Reviewed by: John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences by Tony Cheng Benjamin Murphy CHENG, Tony. John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences. New York: Bloomsbury, 2021. x + 222 pp. Cloth, $115.00; paper, $39.95; eBook, $103.50 Tony Cheng's book is intended not as an introduction but as a critical reflection on John McDowell's work. Oxford Kantianism is a movement that begins with Strawson's reading of Kant. Strawson endorsed the use of transcendental arguments but without subscribing to transcendental idealism. McDowell and Cheng both follow Strawson's lead, but Cheng attaches more importance to findings of empirical psychology than McDowell does. In the first two chapters, Cheng defends McDowell's basic insight that the world and the minded-subject are constitutively interdependent. We cannot, with Descartes, take the mind to be real and wonder whether the world exists, but it is also an error to try to make sense of a mindless world. As humans we, like animals, have natural drives, but as we acquire language and thus rationality we gain a kind of freedom that other animals do not have. This new freedom is not supernatural—it is second nature, a fulfillment of a potential of our animal life. In chapter 3, Cheng examines perception and knowledge, arguing for strong externalism—mental states are both internal and external, but cannot be analyzed into a separate internal and external part. There is therefore no inner realm about which we cannot be mistaken: We must live with the possibility of bad epistemic luck. In chapter 4, he examines how McDowell charts a middle course between Kripke and Davidson. Davidson is right to say—in opposition to Kripke—that language is not essentially a matter of following rules, but Davidson draws the false conclusion that there could be a language without customs. McDowell's insight—frequently overlooked by analytical philosophers—is that the potential for thought can be actualized only when the thinker is initiated into a tradition. In chapter 5, Cheng examines McDowell's position on personhood and agency. Animals can be said to act for reasons, as when a dog flees from danger, but they lack the human capacity to reflect on those reasons. I might decide that although there is danger, I will not flee, and so I can be said to have beliefs about danger. Herbert Dreyfus misunderstands what McDowell says about the capacity to step back and reflect. Dreyfus thinks of reflection as a barrier to action. But McDowell does not mean that action always follows from reflection. I may act, and then reflect on the reason for my action. In chapter 6, Cheng presents what he describes as the core of the book, a discussion of McDowell's account of subjectivity. McDowell offers a transcendental argument that establishes that experience has no phenomenal content that is not intentional—otherwise rational cognition would be impossible. But McDowell is a disjunctivist, and Tim Crane argues that disjunctivism is incompatible with the idea that all experience has intentional content. As a disjunctivist, McDowell holds that veridical perception involves a relation to an external object and hallucinations do not—these are two different kinds of mental state. Cheng points out that since McDowell is an externalist about mental states, he can treat the [End Page 811] difference between the presence or absence of an external object as an intentional difference, so from McDowell's perspective, disjunctivism is compatible with the idea that there is no phenomenal content that is not intentional. It is in the final chapter that Cheng diverges somewhat from McDowell. McDowell once argued that thought and perception are propositional. However, he revised that idea after considering the following example. Two people see a red bird, and just one of them is capable of framing the thought "That bird is a cardinal." The less knowledgeable observer lacks the capacity to express this proposition, but both have the same perception. So McDowell now argues that perception is not propositional, but he maintains that it is conceptual. Making use of recent experimental data, Cheng argues that McDowell would do better to argue that perception has...

Families’ comfort with LGBTQ2s+ picturebooks: Embracing children’s critical knowledges

This article shares conversational research (Thomson et al., 2012) that we undertook with parents in one of children’s primary education settings: the home. We investigated the question: what are the comfort levels of families, with young children, as they encounter picturebooks featuring diverse gender and sexual identities? Over the past 10 years in Canada, including New Brunswick, these picturebooks have increased in production (Bouchey, 2021; Miller Oke, 2019) complexity (Sullivan & Urraro, 2017) and circulation. Yet some educators in the early years of school remain uncomfortable reading these texts with young children, their concerns, in part, related to imagined backlash from heteronormative families (Goldstein 2021) and deeply entrenched constructs of childhood innocence (Kintner-Duffy et al., 2012; Martino & Cumming-Potvin, 2011, 2016; Robinson, 2013). Scholarship and our research confirm that most children know and can communicate their sex and gender identities by two years of age (Pastel et al, 2019; Stevenson, 2019) and are able to engage critically with picturebooks featuring diverse gender and sexual identities as they get older. Through our conversations with mothers, we learned that all families were comfortable with each picturebook category presented: gender expression, gender identity, gender harassment, and family composition. Interpreting our conversations through Queer Theory (Butler, 1990, 1993), we also learned how particular picturebooks serve as entry points to family discussions about diverse gender and sexual identities and how important access to diverse picturebooks is to provide these opportunities. Specifically, each of the nine mothers shared picturebooks that supported their child/children/families with being and knowing related to gender variance, who you can love, and/ or what games, hobbies and clothes are acceptable.

Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-Closeness

The paper makes two points. First, any theory of knowledge must explain the difference between cases of knowledge from falsehood (provided there are any) and Gettier cases where the subject relies on reasoning from falsehood. Second, the closeness-to-the-truth approach to explaining the difference between knowledge-yielding and knowledge-suppressing falsehoods does not hold up to scrutiny.

Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem?

Abstract Knowledge intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge. Knowledge intellectualism has a Gettier problem, or so many of its critics allege. The essence of this problem is that knowledge-how is compatible with epistemic luck in a way that ordinary propositional knowledge is not. Hence, knowledge-how can allegedly be had in the absence of knowledge-that, a fact inconsistent with knowledge intellectualism. This paper develops two responses to this challenge to knowledge intellectualism. First, it is not clear that propositional knowledge is incompatible with the forms of epistemic luck with which knowledge-how is allegedly compatible. Second, existing cases intended to serve as counterexamples to knowledge intellectualism are flawed, and revised versions of these cases no longer elicit the judgments necessary to challenge knowledge intellectualism.

Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge

Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge