In January 1933, German president Paul von Hindenburg confronted the dilemma of whom to appoint as chancellor in the midst of the Great Depression, polarization of voters, civil unrest, rumors of a pending revolution or coup d'etat, and public distrust of the liberal democratic regime that arose out of the government collapse after World War I. His choice would determine the survival or demise of democracy in Germany. This case set explores why an economic crisis might prompt abandonment of a constitutional democracy, as well as how authoritarian behavior by participants in a democratic government can destabilize democracy. The main task for the students is to recommend a course of action for Hindenburg that might preserve the democratic republic. This requires an appreciation of the reasons for the fragility of the German government, including the economic crisis that it faced. Excerpt UVA-F-1966 Nov. 13, 2020 1933: Germany's Economic Crises (A) In January 1933, German president Paul von Hindenburg faced the most important decision of his career: whom to appoint as chancellor in the midst of a worsening economic crisis. The German Constitution of 1919 had established a parliamentary government. The head of state was the president, who retained broad powers to appoint a chancellor, who would oversee the formulation and implementation of government policies. However, the chancellor's power to rule depended on commanding a majority in parliament, called the Reichstag. Typically, the appointment decision was straightforward: whoever commanded a working majority in the Reichstag would become the chancellor. When no single party commanded a majority, the president had the power to appoint a chancellor even without a voting majority. Such was the situation that Hindenburg faced. Hindenburg's decision was complicated by the crushing Depression, deepening polarization of voters, the rise of radical parties, civil unrest prompted by political street gangs, jockeying among rival candidates, political instability resulting from the brief tenures of recent chancellors, and Hindenburg's own preferences. Overshadowing the crisis was growing distrust of liberal democracy that had sprung from Germany's defeat in World War I, the revolution of 1918 that ended Germany's monarchy, and the episode of hyperinflation 10 years before. Rumors circulated about civil war or coups d'etat from the radical Left or Right. The fate of democracy seemed to hang in the balance. Whom should Hindenburg appoint as chancellor? He had four alternatives: 1. Do nothing: retain the current chancellor, Kurt von Schleicher. The Catholic Center Party (hereafter, Center Party) had recently stormed out of Schleicher's coalition, eroding his support in the Reichstag to a minority. This would require dissolving parliament and calling for a new election. Schleicher privately proposed to Hindenburg that the president should indeed dissolve the Reichstag and then delay calling a new election, during which time the president and chancellor could rule by decree. This was plainly anti-democratic but would give Schleicher's government time to deal with the crisis. Schleicher had been in power for less than two months and had failed to win popular support. A conservative, he had in recent weeks sought unsuccessfully the support of the military, industrialists, and even social democrats and workers. . . .
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