ABSTRACT On 27 June 1941 Hungary entered the war against the Soviet Union, fielding a 90,000-man strong force (consisting of the ‘Carpathian Group’ and the ‘Rapid Corps’) that was attached to Army Group South. This study examines two issues related to the participation of Hungarian troops in 1941. First it establishes how the subordination to Germany determined the use of Hungarian formations. A close Hungarian-German military cooperation developed prior to Operation Barbarossa, especially during the campaign against Yugoslavia in April 1941. The Rapid Corps and the Carpathian Group were placed under German subordination in July-August 1941. It led to friction as Hungary, which in the interwar period had prepared for a war against small and medium-sized neighbouring powers, was pressured to conduct operations against the much more advanced Red Army. Satisfying German demands provoked constant controversy about the extent of the Hungarian involvement in the operations on the Eastern Front, also within the Hungarian military elite. Due to these differences of opinion, the pro-German general Henrik Werth was relieved as the Chief of the General Staff in September 1941, and Lieutenant General Ferenc Szombathelyi was appointed in his place. The study then examines the first months of the Hungarian occupation of Soviet territories. In the summer of 1941, a unique opportunity presented itself to establish an independent Hungarian occupation administration. The Hungarian government tried to use this opportunity to implement its anti-Semitic plans and to enforce its economic interests. However, the Carpathian Group, which from August 1941 was incorporated into the German military command structure, increasingly became the executor of German occupation policy.
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