Germany, in most academic works on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (cSr), is regarded as a stakeholder democracy (e.g., aguilera and Jackson 2003; O’Dwyer 2005; crane et al. 2004; crane et al. 2005; Schmidt 2006). allen et al. (2009, p. 1) attribute this notion to the German legal system which “ensures that firms are stakeholder oriented.” especially relevant in this context—and key to the perception of Germany as a stakeholder-oriented country—is the system of co-determination (mitbestimmung), which gives employees the possibility to participate in the organizational decision-making process at all levels. In large listed corporations with more than 2,000 employees, employee representatives are even granted half of the seats on the supervisory board by law. this model of capitalism, which integrates employee interests to a much higher degree than the anglo-Saxon model, has also been branded as “rhenish capitalism”, a term coined by French economist michel albert (1991). he compared this form of capitalism, which is prevalent in countries that border the river rhine (Switzerland, austria, Germany, France, and the netherlands), to the “neo-liberal anglo-american model” primarily represented by the united States (u.S.) and the united kingdom, where the position of workers is substantially weaker. these participation rights of workers go in line with the notion that German companies put less emphasis on maximizing shareholder value than american or British companies because German companies also have to consider the interests of stakeholders like employees whose interests might be diametric to—especially short-termed—profit maximization (turnbull 1994). this understanding has also been demonstrated by several studies (e.g., ascolese 2003; Barnett 2007; habisch et al. 2011). In this context, Denis and mcconnell (2003, p. 6) point out that “in many european countries shareholder wealth maximization has not been the only—or even necessarily the primary—goal of the board of directors.” Likewise, in a large empirical study, allen et al. (2009, p. 2) asked managers whether they though that a company “exists for the interest of all stakeholders” or if “[s]hareholder interest should be given the first priority”. eighty-three percent of the German managers that participated in the survey viewed the company as a legal entity serving all stakeholders’ interests, while 76 and 71 % of the american and British managers, respectively, spoke out for prioritizing shareholder value. these preliminary thoughts demonstrate that the supposed stakeholder orientation to be found in Germany is mostly based on legal statues, namely the system of codetermination. However, the finding by Allen et al. (2009) uwf DOI 10.1007/s00550-013-0268-1