Geographic Deregulation Research Articles

Finance and intergenerational mobility: Evidence from US banking reforms

We investigate the impact of US banking industry deregulation on intergenerational mobility. In order to do so, we use a quasi-natural experimental research design to investigate how a change in state level bank competition (following geographic deregulation) affects the intergenerational mobility of individuals born to (poorer) families at the lower end of the income distribution. We find that individuals born to poorer families who spend their first years as adults in an area with a more competitive banking system, experience higher mobility relative to counterparts located in areas characterised by lower levels of bank competition. Increased educational opportunities and entrepreneurship are important underlying factors driving the observed increases in intergenerational mobility.

Bank Geographic Deregulation, New Credit Accounts, and Consumer Credit

Bank Geographic Deregulation, New Credit Accounts, and Consumer Credit

Geographic deregulation and bank capital structure

The literature demonstrates numerous consequences of bank geographic deregulation, but neglects bank capital structure – critical to performance, resilience, and prudential regulation/supervision. We supply first-time evidence on geographic deregulation effects on bank capital. We also distinguish and test two novel mechanisms through which geographic deregulation may affect bank behavior. The competitive defense and competitive offense mechanisms differentiate deregulation effects in increasing external competitive pressures on banks versus expanding banks’ capacity to compete externally. We find statistically and economically significant evidence of geographic deregulation effects on two bank capital management tools – target capital ratios and speeds of adjustment to these targets – yielding higher targets and faster adjustment. Findings are robust to addressing identification concerns using dynamic panel methodology, a gravity-deregulation approach, and time-varying bank-specific instruments. The data also support both the competitive defense and competitive offense mechanisms, suggesting future research and policy applications of these mechanisms to banking and more generally.

Geographic deregulation and banks’ cost of equity capital

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on banks’ cost of equity (COE) using changes in interstate bank branching laws over the post–Riegle-Neal period (1994:Q4–2016:Q4). We find strong evidence that deregulation increases banks’ COE. This is driven primarily by active acquirers, rather than those subject to increased competition from these acquirers. We identify higher risk-taking as an important channel for these findings. The results support our new acquisitions–fragility view, rather than the traditional competition–fragility view. Results are robust to instrumental variables, accounting for secular trends, and alternative explanations.

Who wins and who loses from bank geographic deregulation? Analysis of financially constrained and unconstrained firms

A key issue in the finance-growth nexus literature is endogeneity – economic growth may drive finance as well as finance driving growth. Some research addresses endogeneity using relatively exogenous shocks from U.S. bank geographic deregulation, often documenting favorable economic effects. We connect deregulation shocks for the first time to individual firm growth in a model that differentiates sources of external financing – short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity. Our results suggest that deregulation increases firm growth overall and this growth is fueled by all three external funding sources. However, benefits accrue only to relatively financially unconstrained firms, while relatively constrained firms lose.

Competition and Banks’ Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from Relatively Exogenous Differences in Regulation

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on banks’ cost of equity (COE) using changes in interstate bank branching laws over the post–Riegle-Neal period (1994:Q4–2016:Q4). We find strong evidence that deregulation increases banks’ COE. This is driven primarily by active acquirers, rather than those subject to increased competition from these acquirers. We identify higher risk-taking as an important channel for these findings. The results support our new acquisitions–fragility view, rather than the traditional competition–fragility view. Results are robust to instrumental variables, accounting for secular trends, and alternative explanations.

Who Wins and Loses From Bank Deregulation? Analysis of Financially Constrained and Unconstrained Firms

A key issue in the finance-growth nexus literature is endogeneity – economic growth may drive finance as well as finance driving growth. Some research addresses endogeneity using relatively exogenous shocks from U.S. bank geographic deregulation, often documenting favorable economic effects. We connect deregulation shocks for the first time to individual firm growth in a model that differentiates sources of external financing – short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity. Our results suggest that deregulation increases firm growth overall and this growth is fueled by all three external funding sources. However, benefits accrue only to relatively financially unconstrained firms, while relatively constrained firms lose.

How Does Competition Affect Bank Capital Structure? Evidence From a Natural Experiment

Despite ample research demonstrating many consequences of bank geographic deregulation, the bank capital determinants literature has not directly tested the effects of this deregulation. This paper fills this important research gap. We find strong evidence that geographic deregulation significantly increases both bank target capital ratios and speeds of adjustment to these targets. We also identify a significant regime shift towards more active capital management. We test for causality in several ways, including a gravity-deregulation approach with time-varying bank-specific instruments. Findings are also robust to numerous additional checks. Our results suggest that deregulation policies may complement prudential policies, potentially improving financial stability.

Branching Deregulation and Merger Optimality

The U.S. banking industry has been characterized by intense merger activity in the absence of economies of scale and scope. We claim that the loosening of geographic constraints on U.S. banks is responsible for this consolidation process, irrespective of value-maximizing motives. We demonstrate this by putting forward a theoretical model of banking competition and studying banks’ strategic responses to geographic deregulation. We show that even in the absence of economies of scale and scope, bank mergers represent an optimal response. Also, we show that the consolidation process is characterized by merger waves and that some equilibrium mergers are not profitable per se -they yield losses- but become profitable as the waves of mergers unfold.

Call-pricing equity returns and default risks of entry mode with brand perception in retail banking

Our paper focuses on a pattern of bank interest margin determination with entry competition in which a bank with home brand identity extends its advantage to an imperfectly competitive target market. We show that the bank with brand perception advantage subsequently has a lower equity return with a lower default risk whereas the incumbent facing such a threat has the opposite results. We argue that strategy on bank branding can be recognized as a high market share and low return-risk entry strategy under the geographic deregulation of retail banking.

With whom to merge? A tale of the Spanish banking deregulation process

We propose a spatial competition model to study banks’ strategic responses to the asymmetric Spanish geographic deregulation process. We find that once the geographic deregulation process finishes, inter-regional mergers between savings banks are optimal whenever the economies of scale associated to merging activities are low. If there are large gains, then there will be mergers between savings and commercial banks.

Charter value, Tobin's Q and bank risk during the subprime financial crisis

Charter value is important in the banking industry because of its ability to reduce the moral hazard incentives that result from government-provided deposit insurance. Previous research suggests that geographic deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s increased competition and eroded charter values. Yet, a common proxy for charter value, Tobin's Q, increased significantly in the 1990s and beyond even as bank deregulation continued. We show that Tobin's Q is a poor cardinal measure of charter value though it still has merit as an ordinal measure. Our findings suggest that charter value has been declining through time, contributing to the increase in risk-taking that led to the subprime financial crisis.

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.

Changing Retail Banking Supply-Demand Mismatch

In this study, the author compares the supply-demand mismatch of retail banking services and the changing patterns in Illinois and New York from 1982 to 2007 amid fundamental banking transformation and geographical deregulation. The study uses measures of concentration like the Herfindahl-Herschman Index (HHI) and the E-Index. The study finds that the traditionally unit banking Illinois has narrowed the mismatch over the study period from 1982 to 2007, whereas the traditionally branch banking New York has expanded such mismatch. The study also finds that while the New York banking industry can be characterized by a more concentrated geographical distribution of bank deposits, the Illinois banking industry still has a dispersed geographical concentration of bank offices, though the Chicago MSA has reversed such a pattern.

Geographic deregulation and commercial bank performance in U.S. state banking markets

Abstract This paper examines the effects of geographical deregulation on commercial bank performance across states. We reach several general conclusions. First, the process of deregulation on an intrastate basis generally improves bank profitability and performance with higher returns and reduced riskiness. Deregulation of interstate banking produces mixed findings. For small banks, interstate banking deregulation leads to reduced riskiness. For medium-sized banks, it leads to increased riskiness. And for large banks, it leads to increased and decreased riskiness depending on the risk variable considered. Second, macroeconomic variables – the unemployment rate, real personal income per capita, and the growth rate of real personal income – and the average interest rate affect bank performance as much, or more, than the process of deregulation, especially for the small and medium-sized banks. The large banks, however, generally do not respond significantly to state-level macroeconomic variables or the average interest rate. Finally, while some analysts argue that deregulation toward full interstate banking and branching produced more efficient banks and a healthier banking system, we find mixed results on this issue.

The Competitive Dynamics of Geographic Deregulation in Banking: Implications for Productive Efficiency

Deregulation of geographic restrictions in banking over the past 20 years has intensified both potential and actual competition in the industry. The accumulating empirical evidence suggests that potential efficiency gains associated with consolidating banks are often not realized. We evaluate the impact of this increased competition on the productive efficiency of non‐merging banks confronted with new entry in their local markets and find that the incumbent banks respond by improving cost efficiency. Thus, studies evaluating the impact of bank mergers on the efficiency of the combining parties alone may be overlooking the most significant welfare‐enhancing aspect of merger activity.

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state-level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976-2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non-uniform effect on state-level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.

Does Distance between Target and Acquirer Matter for Bank Mergers?

Geographical deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s led to a wave of US bank mergers. A still unresolved issue is the role that distance between target and acquirer plays in the performance and efficiency of mergers. In theory, a nearby bank acquisition reduces monitoring costs while a distant acquisition achieves greater risk diversification. By analyzing the efficiency and performance of more than one thousand bank mergers between 1988 and 2002, we find that distance improved bank performance for mergers within a given BHC. In contrast, distance led to a decline in profitability and an increase in risk for mergers of banks from different BHCs. We argue that the BHC structure enables a firm to establish effective monitoring capabilities before consolidating, which allows the BHC to manage far-flung enterprises effectively.

The Determinants and Implications of Bank Lending Distribution Methods: Bilateral versus Syndicated Lending

This paper provides the first empirical study of the effects of demand (firm) and supply (bank) factors of bank lending on the use of lending distribution methods, i.e., bilateral and syndicated lending. The findings have three implications. First, on the demand side, credit quality and information asymmetry are economically important determinants of lending distribution methods, after controlling for firm and loan size. This is consistent with the notion that syndicated bank loan serves as an intermediate form of financing between bilateral loan and public bond. Second, on the supply side, inter-bank competition and geographic deregulation drives banks to be more likely to choose the type of loans in accordance with their lending expertise. Third, inter-bank competition and deregulation lowers the interest rates charged.

Geographic Deregulation of Banking and Economic Growth

State-level U.S. data for 1965 through 1994 are used to test for the effect of bank deregulation on economic growth. In particular, this study tests whether intrastate branch and interstate bank deregulation, measured by the activities of banks and bank holding companies, expedites growth in real per capita income through its effect on the size of banking markets. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that such deregulation enhances short-run economic growth.