Geoeconomic Strategy Research Articles

Теоретичний і статистичний аналіз міжнародного бізнесу та зовнішньоекономічної діяльності України

The research is aimed at the growing dependence of the national economy on external influences. The article raises the issue of creating a geoeconomic strategy for the development of the State as a full-fledged subject of world economic processes in order to increase multilateral cooperation and more sufficient participation in international and regional integration projects. In this regard, it becomes clear the need to carefully examine the features of conducting and managing international business, analyze foreign economic relations. International business can be defined as the commercial interaction of firms of different forms of ownership or their divisions located in different countries, the main purpose of which is to make a profit, taking advantage of international commercial operations. The development of international business and foreign economic activity of Ukraine with Asian countries are considered. The nature and prospects of development of foreign trade cooperation between Ukraine and several Asian countries are researched, its strategic priorities are substantiated and the place of the countries of the region in the geoeconomic strategy of the State is determined. At the present stage, economic relations between Ukraine and the countries of East Asia are being implemented through rather limited forms of cooperation that require greater diversification, symmetry and structural equilibrium. It is concluded that in the system of Ukraine's foreign economic priorities, cooperation with the countries of East Asia creates opportunities for diversification of foreign policy, intensification of cooperation with the definition of common goals and objectives of bilateral economic development. A strategic condition for further deepening of cooperation is mutual recognition at the official level of strategic partnership as an important element, which provides for the signing of additional bilateral agreements on additional conditions and principles of cooperation.

Modeling the development of the tourism industry in the smart age of globalization through transnational cooperation and capacity building

The relevance of the chosen topic is related to the growing interest of researchers in technologies and mechanisms of growth of new touristic opportunities in the smart era of society, features of its impact on national policies in order to achieve strategic socio-economic goals of the countries both for domestic territories and along the path of development of geoeconomic strategies in the global space. In addition the relevance of the research direction is enhanced by the fact that tourism is one of the sectors of the world economy that has suffered the most from restrictions on movement during the pandemic crisis. The European Commission has recently presented a series of proposals setting out the foundations of the EU economy and society suitable for the digital age, outlining the development of a genuine European data space and offering a European approach to new technologies. The new industrial strategy and the SME strategy (adopted on March 10, 2020) identify the path to digital transformation to empower industry and small and medium-sized enterprises. The latest strategic communication of the European Commission “Tourism and Transport for 2020 and beyond” emphasizes the role of digital transformation and sustainability. This involves investing in digital skills and promoting digital innovation, as well as linking the tourism business and businesses to existing data spaces, technology providers, and community actors at the local and regional levels. To determine the possibilities of further evelopment of the industry, ithe article proposes a factor model of the total revenue from tourism activities, taking into account regional changes in tourist flow, provide recommendations for the effective development of the industry with account of future trands of tourism industry and ecosystem development. These issues are equally pertinent both for tourism, given the advantages innovative, new technologies can bring to tourism destinations and for businesses, local communities and travellers. They can facilitate tourism management both at destination and business level, contributing to balanced and sustainable growth of tourism in post Pandemic time. New smart technologies can help businesses provide more personalised services and therefore enhance the tourism experience.

The Private Sector in Japan’s State-Led Liberal Strategy

The Private Sector in Japan’s State-Led Liberal Strategy Kristin Vekasi (bio) When Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election, it was immediately evident that Japan’s already difficult regional choices would become even more fraught. As China’s economic and political power has surged over the past three decades, Japan has had to make difficult choices about balancing between coordinating with a close neighbor and cooperating with its powerful security ally. Saori Katada’s book Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific is an important contribution to understanding Japan’s navigation of its geoeconomic situation. Many scholars emphasize deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance as key to Japan’s future stability and prosperity,1 or have found that Japan has deepened security ties in order to keep the United States in the region and hedge against China’s rise.2 Katada makes an important new contribution to this discussion, showing how Japan’s “state-led liberal strategy” has opened up new political space for the country to achieve its interests (introduction and chapter 1). She provides important nuance to our understanding of Japan’s geoeconomic strategy, particularly with evidence suggesting that it could be a “pivotal state” in the region. Japan’s maneuvers within the U.S.-China nexus are particularly evident in trade policy. Over the past decade, the two major attempts at regional integration have been the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, which excluded China, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which excludes the United States. Japan’s role in both of these efforts demonstrates the characteristics of the state-led liberal strategy: regional integration, promotion of rules and standards, and formal institution building. Katada argues that while Japan overall leans toward the United States, its state-led liberal strategy has also allowed Japan to influence the direction of Chinese regional policy by guiding the types of rules, standards, and institutions [End Page 139] that have started to characterize Asian regional economic partnerships. One of the strengths of the book is that it gives Japan more agency and credit for its regional policy and places its strategy in an interesting domestic political economy story about new and “disembedded” relationships between the Japanese government and business. As all good pieces of scholarship do, this book introduces important new avenues of research. The voices and roles of the private sector are somewhat muted in the text. In the chapter on trade strategy, for example, Katada argues that the state, rather than the economic interests of the private sector, are driving Japan’s regional free trade agreement (FTA) strategy—a point of departure from the more integrated and bilateral strategy of the country in the past. She offers two points of evidence that are worth further interrogation as they provide additional insight into Japan’s strategy: a low FTA utilization rate and a seeming lack of eagerness to swiftly negotiate an FTA with China, despite early desire to do so from the business community (chapter 5). FTAs often have low utilization rates, in part because many are “cut and paste” agreements rather than completely novel texts. They try to cover a broad swath of industries in the context of ongoing negotiations, even if those industries are not key in that specific bilateral economic relationship. A UN Conference on Trade and Development report found that European Union FTAs have comparatively high utilization rates, with the amount of actual trade covered ranging from 40% to an astounding 90%. However, this does not reflect the actual number of companies utilizing the agreement, which analysts hypothesize is likely low, with small and medium-sized firms not taking advantage of new trade opportunities.3 Similarly, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the smaller firms that make up the majority of the Southeast Asian economies rarely utilize FTAs.4 All of this is to say that the low utilization rates by Japanese firms of the freshly negotiated agreements does not necessarily indicate passivity or a lack of representation of their interests at the table. Most-favored-nation rates in Asia are already low, and so the benefits of newly negotiated trade agreements often take time to surface...

Repositioning Japan’s Narrative as the Economic Order Evolves

Repositioning Japan’s Narrative as the Economic Order Evolves Shihoko Goto (bio) The all-too-common narrative for Japan today is that the country’s economic heyday is over. Even though it remains the world’s third-largest economy in terms of GDP, the prospect of holding on to that position seems increasingly unlikely. Indeed, the question usually raised nowadays is when, not if, Japan’s global economic standing will falter, as other Asian countries such as India and Indonesia thrive. From an increasingly graying population to a persistently high debt-to-GDP ratio, the challenges facing Japan’s economic regeneration seem formidable at best and insurmountable at worst. Yet, at the same time, expectations for Japan to do more to ensure stability across Asia are on the rise, particularly as its longest-serving prime minister Shinzo Abe had ambitions for the country to take on a greater role in defining new rules of international economic engagement, rather than simply being a follower of rules. In Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Saori Katada argues that Japan’s best days are far from over and contends that the country has succeeded in redefining itself by overhauling some of the formulas that led to its initial postwar economic success in order to meet its strategic objectives in the 21st century. To that end, Japan has been repositioning itself as an economic power in a way that reflects the shifting political dynamics of the region. One of Katada’s core arguments is that the shift in the global order has made an important impact in re-establishing Japan’s own worldview and ambitions as an Asian power. Propelled by postwar reconstruction efforts and focused on economic regeneration while under the U.S. security umbrella, Japan achieved dazzling results with its model for economic development that other East Asian countries came to emulate from the 1960s to the early 1990s. This model, however, was actually the period in which Japan was effectively an emerging economy. One of the most striking arguments Katada makes is that Japan “shed its developmentalist shell” (p. 190) that depended on state support to be competitive during the height of its economic power. Not until the new millennium did it emerge as a country fully committed to promoting the liberal economic order that had initially allowed it to flourish, [End Page 143] precisely because of its protectionist policies to limit global competition. This metamorphosis from a de facto developing economy into a truly globalized, competitive economy also led to a clear divide between companies that could compete internationally without government intervention and those that struggled without state assistance. Katada makes the case that in their emergent stage Japanese businesses needed government support to thrive, but as they blossomed into multinational corporations, it was the Japanese government that then needed their support in order to pursue its strategic vision of economic foreign policy. In fact, the decoupling of the government-business relationship was seen not only on the domestic front but also overseas, including in strategy toward official development assistance. Katada also makes a clear case for the shift in Japan’s comprehensive economic strategy as a result of changes in the geoeconomic landscape of the Asia-Pacific, most notably the rise of China and the steady disengagement of the United States as a Pacific power. Certainly, Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement actually provided a hitherto unprecedented opportunity for Japan to take leadership in ensuring the adherence of established rules and an economic order that had been critical for its own rise. Yet Katada points out that lobbying efforts by Japanese businesses for Japan to remain fully committed to the TPP were notably absent. Instead, like the Obama administration, it was the Abe government that pushed for the deal to move forward to ensure Japan’s geoeconomic influence as much to secure future business opportunities. It is perhaps in articulating the particularly challenging situation in which Japan finds itself vis-à-vis China that the book shines most, given Katada’s nuanced approach to understanding the evolution of Sino-Japanese economic relations. For instance, in assessing the geoeconomic rivalry...

How Neomercantilist Japan Became a Leading Defender of Economic Openness

How Neomercantilist Japan Became a Leading Defender of Economic Openness William W. Grimes (bio) Saori Katada’s new book Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific provides the best guide to Japan’s contemporary foreign economic policy available today. While the book is written in a modest tone that belies its ambition and importance, there is much to learn here about Japan, and its role in Asia and the world, that is new and exciting. Japan’s New Regional Reality deserves to be read by both scholars and practitioners with an interest in the Asia-Pacific’s political economy. The book combines analysis of Japanese domestic political economy, the international environment, and the interactions between the two. Unlike most authors, Katada is equally comfortable with domestic and international politics as well as—perhaps more unusually—a full range of economic issues from trade and investment to finance and development assistance. Such thoroughness is what makes the story so compelling. The book is not an exercise in theory-building or methodologically driven political science; rather, it describes and analyzes in detail, and from multiple angles, a sea change in Japan’s political economy. Japan, in Katada’s telling, is a country whose role in the world economy and economic governance has been transformed by globalization and the rise of China. It is “not the same Japan that used to engage in trade conflicts with the United States twenty-odd years ago, and this new Japan influences the Asia-Pacific region in ways that are quite different from the past” (p. 1). It has turned away from the neomercantilism of the Japanese miracle and become a dedicated pillar of the liberal international order. The book analyzes both the reasons that the Japanese political economy has been transformed and the implications for Japan’s role in the world. Equally important, Katada takes seriously the idea that the Japanese state has acted strategically, and not just reacted to either U.S. pressures or domestic interest group politics. The shift of Japanese business preferences from neomercantilism to liberalism was partly driven by global liberalization pressures outside the [End Page 146] country in the 1980s and early 1990s. These included U.S. gaiatsu (external pressure) on Japan to lower trade barriers and reduce anti-competitive practices within Japan as well as the growing ambition and reach of global and regional trade rules. These pressures reduced the Japanese state’s ability to protect and nurture domestic companies. Equally important, however, was the rapid appreciation of the yen after the 1985 Plaza Accord, which created incentives for Japanese firms to procure offshore production at the same time that other East Asian economies in China, South Korea, and Southeast Asia were dismantling barriers to trade and investment in order to advance their own industrialization goals. As Katada puts it, Japanese businesses became “disembedded” (p. 5, and discussed in chapter 3) from the cozy political and economic networks that had long characterized the relatively closed domestic economy. In Katada’s telling, however, Japan is not merely a poster child for globalization and the triumph of market forces. Geoeconomics also looms large in this story. Three threads come together in chapter 3: growing regional economic integration, the loss of trust in U.S. benevolence, and the rise of China. First, the growth of regional production networks in East Asia meant that Japan’s outward economic engagement was no longer U.S.-centered. It also meant that Japanese companies became disembedded from their domestic supplier networks and stable labor-management systems. This shifted the purpose of Japanese foreign economic policy from appeasing U.S. demands toward nurturing complex value chains in which Japanese firms were often the key players. Second, with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Japanese policymakers became aware that their priorities in Asia differed significantly from those of the United States, making apparent the need for regional cooperation in which Japan could play a key role in providing leadership and public goods. Finally, the rise of China as an economic and political power has both enticed and frightened Japanese leaders. They wanted, and still want, to gain from growing Chinese prosperity and productive capacity while...

Geoeconomic Order in the Asia-Pacific

Geoeconomic Order in the Asia-Pacific T.J. Pempel (bio) The Asia-Pacific is experiencing tremendous uncertainty. Past patterns and long-standing norms have become weak predictors of current regional interactions. Today’s uncertainty contrasts with two earlier, more-defined regional periods.1 A rigid Cold War bipolarity structured security and economic relations in the early years following World War II until it slowly buckled after a series of events: the United States’ defeat in the Vietnam War, China’s limited embrace of markets, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Crucially, geoeconomic relationships rarely bridged the yawning geostrategic gorge of bipolarity. Friends traded with friends, not with potential adversaries. A second order elided the first, distinguished by reductions in the centrality of hard security conflicts and declining military budgets, on the one hand, and deepening economic interdependence with expanded regional institutionalism transcending ideological differences, on the other. The result was a regional order marked predominantly by peace and prosperity lasting from the late 1980s into the early 21st century. Continuities from this order remain; however, the last decade has witnessed numerous birth pangs suggesting the arrival of a third order dominated by a resurgence of geopolitics, nationalism, and heightened state-to-state tensions. Most prominent among the recent changes has been the acrimonious deterioration in relations between an ever-richer and more militarily assertive China and an economically wobbling and militarily drained United States. Predictions proliferate of a gladiatorial contest marked by xenophobic salvoes, economic decoupling, techno-nationalism, mutual provocations, and the menacing whirlpool of military conflict.2 Saori Katada’s new book Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific advances an overarching argument about [End Page 134] Japan’s geoeconomic efforts during the second and third of these orders. During the first and early second order, when the United States and Japan held the preponderance of regional economic power, Tokyo pursued what Katada labels its “old-style regional geoeconomic strategy” (p. 16). This strategy was a product of the country’s bilateral predisposition and domestic mercantilism. Since the late 1990s, as China added muscle and Japanese vigor flagged, the old strategy has been jettisoned in favor of a new, state-led, and liberal strategy anchored in “regionalism as its structure, formal rules and institution building as its mode of engagement, and the promotion of liberal global standards as the underlying values” (p. 20). Recent top-down government initiatives make this new strategy “state-led,” and while “liberal,” it is less about the ideological embrace of free-market fundamentalism than the advance of rules-based standards advancing competitive markets (p. 20). Not at all coincidentally, such standards are highly beneficial to Japan’s most sophisticated global companies. The book is compelling in its nuanced advance of this core argument, four elements of which, in my estimation, deserve to be highlighted here. First, the book’s emphasis on geoeconomics resonates with the overwhelming attention that most Asian governments devote to their national economies as integral components of national security. Leaders in these countries remain largely convinced that their continued legitimacy depends on delivering tangible material benefits to their citizens. Since the economies of most Asian states are deeply enmeshed in regional production networks and complex supply lines, none are eager to confront a Hobson’s choice between hard security and continued economic interdependence. Such a choice might be pressed on them should China and the United States advance toward existential competition with the demand that other regional actors choose sides. Second, the book is compelling in its treatment of the interactions between Japan’s domestic political economy and its efforts to respond to alterations in regional economics. The complicated weavings of embedded mercantilism that defined Japan’s domestic political economy until the mid-1990s unraveled due to the restructuring of government agencies, financial reforms, enhanced political intervention by policymakers on behalf of the economy’s least-competitive sectors, and globalized businesses that were no longer tethered to state largess or bank loans. These new domestic arrangements altered Japan’s responses to the changing regional environment. Although Katada is not explicit about causality, my reading is that both shifting regional conditions and a...

Continuity and change, China–Singapore relations under the framework of China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative

PurposeThe relations between China and Singapore were once exampled as good bilateral relations in the region: stable and promising. Albeit gradually increasing competition, bilateral economic cooperation remains to be a stabilizer. However, the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and even more complicated Sino-US relations add up more uncertainties to bilateral relations. This paper aims to examine the fragility of bilateral relations against the overall backgrounds of the dynamic regional balance of power while analyzing the economic cooperation as the stabilizer and reviewing political mutual trust between China and Singapore.Design/methodology/approachThis paper will apply historical and documentary review and qualitative analysis.FindingsLed by its pragmatic foreign policy, Singapore hedges against China, even it seeks to deeply engaging China in all dimensions of bilateral ties, including economic, cultural and political. The grand strategy of the BRI signals the era of “keeping low profile”, leaving us far away. It will inevitably change the regional landscape geo-strategically. The USA clearly defines China as a strategic competitor, which represent Sino-US relations will not go back to the past. The traditional counterbalance strategy applied by Singapore works more difficultly when China intends to be stronger politically in the region. Economically and politically, there are no reasons for Singapore not to show positive support for the BRI. However, the BRI essentially provides a warning message that Singapore should explore a more practical and realistic strategy for not being constrained by China's geo-economic strategy. Singapore's picking side and its increasing military budget, China's assertiveness and the changing Sino-US relations imply the looming fragilities to bilateral relations.Originality/valueThe relations between China and Singapore were once exampled as good bilateral relations in the region: stable and promising. However, China and Singapore relations also ran into bumps from time to time over the years. We usually believe it is because of the peculiarity of Singapore's China policy. However, we should not neglect the dynamic regional balance of power and the changing Sino-US relations after the BRI was proposed. To fill this research gap, this paper will review the factors of stabilizers and the factors that bring fragility to bilateral relations between China and Singapore. The paper also argues that it is time for Beijing to make reflections on whether Beijing proposed BRI too early and whether Beijing over addressed on the magnificence and ambitions of the BRI.

Future of US-China Relations: Conflict, Competition or Cooperation?

In contemporary times, the geo-political agenda and geo-economic strategy of the world is being dominated by the ongoing US-China hegemonic competition. Where the United States is trying to prolong the ‘unipolar moment’ and deter the rise of China; China is trying to establish itself as the hegemon in the Eastern hemisphere, an alternate to the US. The entirely opposite interests of the two Great Powers have initiated a hostile confrontational competition for domination. This paper seeks to determine the future nature of the US-China relations; will history repeat itself and a bloody war be fought to determine the leader of the pack? or another prolonged Cold War will be fought, which will end when one side significantly weakens and collapses? Both dominant paradigms of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, are used to analyze the future nature of the US-China relations.

Tension and Rivalry: The ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, Global Governance, and International Law

Abstract This article attempts to establish a context in which the controversies of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its practice can be better understood. It is argued that, earlier, the background to the birth of the BRI had effectively determined the initial perception of the initiative as a geopolitical move and that this perception has increasingly led to a view that the initiative is a Chinese geo-economic strategy. While there is no universally agreed meaning of the notion ‘geo-economics’, this notion, more often than not, conjures images of winners and losers in geopolitical manoeuvring. As such, China needs to convince the world that the BRI is indeed a ‘win-win’ scenario in international cooperation. To do so, China needs to engage much more closely with international law and talk less about China’s own model of global governance.

The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-economics and Indo-Pacific security competition

Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition.

GEOECONOMIC STRATEGIES IN THE MODERN GLOBAL ECONOMIC SPACE

In today's context, it is considered that with the reduction of the risk of military intervention, military security has come to the forefront and economic security has become a priority for the national interests of the country. As regional forces seek to expand markets, provide access to finance and the latest technologies, economic security has become a necessary component of regional forces' ability to spread their influence. The article is devoted to the study of national security and its relation to the functioning and formation of the geo-economic strategy in the conditions of globalization of the world, taking into account the national interests of countries. Each stage of the realization of the national interests of the country has its own assessment of its geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic status, security threats and main carriers of these threats, mechanism of realization of national interests, resources, used for the purposes of such realization. Each of the stages provide its own assessment of the main definitions and categories of security, the main directions of geo-economic policy. The complex of current global mechanisms, aimed at ensuring the economic security of states from external threats, is investigated. The importance of forming the protective instruments of Ukraine's foreign economic policy is considered. The emphasis is placed on economic security, which is the foundation and material foundation of national security. The special place of economic security in the structure of national security is due to the fact that almost no type of security can be sufficiently implemented without economic security.

Japan’s geo-economic strategy: the means

‘In foreign affairs, Japan is often thought of as a big country acting like a small one. Yet that is to miss the significance, range and effectiveness of Japan’s economic statecraft, in which the country not only acts its true size but also does so with much more autonomy and agency than it does in classic diplomacy. Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward shine a truly illuminating light on how Japan thinks and behaves as a geo-economic actor, whether through trade, investment, aid, rule-setting or, crucially, technology. This Adelphi book deserves to be widely read, for it adds greatly to our understanding of a much neglected and under-appreciated aspect of Japanese strategy.’ Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees; Chairman of the Japan Society of the UK; and author of Japan’s Far More Female Future (Oxford University Press, 2020) ‘Groundbreaking work and a penetrating analysis of the geo-economic challenges facing Japan, a frontline country in the age of US–China rivalry and economic statecraft.’ Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative Geo-economic strategy – deploying economic instruments to secure foreign-policy aims and to project power – has long been a key element of statecraft. In recent years it has acquired even greater salience, given China’s growing antagonism with the United States and the willingness of both Beijing and Washington to wield economic power in their confrontation. This trend has particular significance for Japan, due to its often tense political relationship with China, which remains its largest trading partner. While Japan’s post-war geo-economic performance often failed to match its status as one of the world’s largest economies, more recently Tokyo has demonstrated increased geo-economic agency and effectiveness. In this Adelphi book, Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward draw on multiple disciplines – including economics, political economy, foreign policy and security policy – and interviews with key policymakers to examine Japan’s geo-economic power in the context of great-power competition between the US and China. They examine Japan’s previous underperformance, how Tokyo’s understanding of geo-economics has evolved and, given constraints on its national power projection, what actions Japan might feasibly take to become a more effective geo-economic actor. Their conclusions will be of direct interest not only for all those concerned with Japanese grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific, but also for those middle powers seeking to navigate great-power competition in the coming decades.

Japan’s geo-economic evolution

‘In foreign affairs, Japan is often thought of as a big country acting like a small one. Yet that is to miss the significance, range and effectiveness of Japan’s economic statecraft, in which the country not only acts its true size but also does so with much more autonomy and agency than it does in classic diplomacy. Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward shine a truly illuminating light on how Japan thinks and behaves as a geo-economic actor, whether through trade, investment, aid, rule-setting or, crucially, technology. This Adelphi book deserves to be widely read, for it adds greatly to our understanding of a much neglected and under-appreciated aspect of Japanese strategy.’ Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees; Chairman of the Japan Society of the UK; and author of Japan’s Far More Female Future (Oxford University Press, 2020) ‘Groundbreaking work and a penetrating analysis of the geo-economic challenges facing Japan, a frontline country in the age of US–China rivalry and economic statecraft.’ Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative Geo-economic strategy – deploying economic instruments to secure foreign-policy aims and to project power – has long been a key element of statecraft. In recent years it has acquired even greater salience, given China’s growing antagonism with the United States and the willingness of both Beijing and Washington to wield economic power in their confrontation. This trend has particular significance for Japan, due to its often tense political relationship with China, which remains its largest trading partner. While Japan’s post-war geo-economic performance often failed to match its status as one of the world’s largest economies, more recently Tokyo has demonstrated increased geo-economic agency and effectiveness. In this Adelphi book, Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward draw on multiple disciplines – including economics, political economy, foreign policy and security policy – and interviews with key policymakers to examine Japan’s geo-economic power in the context of great-power competition between the US and China. They examine Japan’s previous underperformance, how Tokyo’s understanding of geo-economics has evolved and, given constraints on its national power projection, what actions Japan might feasibly take to become a more effective geo-economic actor. Their conclusions will be of direct interest not only for all those concerned with Japanese grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific, but also for those middle powers seeking to navigate great-power competition in the coming decades.

Japan’s geo-economic strategy: implementation

‘In foreign affairs, Japan is often thought of as a big country acting like a small one. Yet that is to miss the significance, range and effectiveness of Japan’s economic statecraft, in which the country not only acts its true size but also does so with much more autonomy and agency than it does in classic diplomacy. Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward shine a truly illuminating light on how Japan thinks and behaves as a geo-economic actor, whether through trade, investment, aid, rule-setting or, crucially, technology. This Adelphi book deserves to be widely read, for it adds greatly to our understanding of a much neglected and under-appreciated aspect of Japanese strategy.’ Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees; Chairman of the Japan Society of the UK; and author of Japan’s Far More Female Future (Oxford University Press, 2020) ‘Groundbreaking work and a penetrating analysis of the geo-economic challenges facing Japan, a frontline country in the age of US–China rivalry and economic statecraft.’ Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative Geo-economic strategy – deploying economic instruments to secure foreign-policy aims and to project power – has long been a key element of statecraft. In recent years it has acquired even greater salience, given China’s growing antagonism with the United States and the willingness of both Beijing and Washington to wield economic power in their confrontation. This trend has particular significance for Japan, due to its often tense political relationship with China, which remains its largest trading partner. While Japan’s post-war geo-economic performance often failed to match its status as one of the world’s largest economies, more recently Tokyo has demonstrated increased geo-economic agency and effectiveness. In this Adelphi book, Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward draw on multiple disciplines – including economics, political economy, foreign policy and security policy – and interviews with key policymakers to examine Japan’s geo-economic power in the context of great-power competition between the US and China. They examine Japan’s previous underperformance, how Tokyo’s understanding of geo-economics has evolved and, given constraints on its national power projection, what actions Japan might feasibly take to become a more effective geo-economic actor. Their conclusions will be of direct interest not only for all those concerned with Japanese grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific, but also for those middle powers seeking to navigate great-power competition in the coming decades.

Japan’s geo-economic effectiveness

‘In foreign affairs, Japan is often thought of as a big country acting like a small one. Yet that is to miss the significance, range and effectiveness of Japan’s economic statecraft, in which the country not only acts its true size but also does so with much more autonomy and agency than it does in classic diplomacy. Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward shine a truly illuminating light on how Japan thinks and behaves as a geo-economic actor, whether through trade, investment, aid, rule-setting or, crucially, technology. This Adelphi book deserves to be widely read, for it adds greatly to our understanding of a much neglected and under-appreciated aspect of Japanese strategy.’ Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees; Chairman of the Japan Society of the UK; and author of Japan’s Far More Female Future (Oxford University Press, 2020) ‘Groundbreaking work and a penetrating analysis of the geo-economic challenges facing Japan, a frontline country in the age of US–China rivalry and economic statecraft.’ Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative Geo-economic strategy – deploying economic instruments to secure foreign-policy aims and to project power – has long been a key element of statecraft. In recent years it has acquired even greater salience, given China’s growing antagonism with the United States and the willingness of both Beijing and Washington to wield economic power in their confrontation. This trend has particular significance for Japan, due to its often tense political relationship with China, which remains its largest trading partner. While Japan’s post-war geo-economic performance often failed to match its status as one of the world’s largest economies, more recently Tokyo has demonstrated increased geo-economic agency and effectiveness. In this Adelphi book, Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward draw on multiple disciplines – including economics, political economy, foreign policy and security policy – and interviews with key policymakers to examine Japan’s geo-economic power in the context of great-power competition between the US and China. They examine Japan’s previous underperformance, how Tokyo’s understanding of geo-economics has evolved and, given constraints on its national power projection, what actions Japan might feasibly take to become a more effective geo-economic actor. Their conclusions will be of direct interest not only for all those concerned with Japanese grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific, but also for those middle powers seeking to navigate great-power competition in the coming decades.

Introduction

‘In foreign affairs, Japan is often thought of as a big country acting like a small one. Yet that is to miss the significance, range and effectiveness of Japan’s economic statecraft, in which the country not only acts its true size but also does so with much more autonomy and agency than it does in classic diplomacy. Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward shine a truly illuminating light on how Japan thinks and behaves as a geo-economic actor, whether through trade, investment, aid, rule-setting or, crucially, technology. This Adelphi book deserves to be widely read, for it adds greatly to our understanding of a much neglected and under-appreciated aspect of Japanese strategy.’ Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees; Chairman of the Japan Society of the UK; and author of Japan’s Far More Female Future (Oxford University Press, 2020) ‘Groundbreaking work and a penetrating analysis of the geo-economic challenges facing Japan, a frontline country in the age of US–China rivalry and economic statecraft.’ Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative Geo-economic strategy – deploying economic instruments to secure foreign-policy aims and to project power – has long been a key element of statecraft. In recent years it has acquired even greater salience, given China’s growing antagonism with the United States and the willingness of both Beijing and Washington to wield economic power in their confrontation. This trend has particular significance for Japan, due to its often tense political relationship with China, which remains its largest trading partner. While Japan’s post-war geo-economic performance often failed to match its status as one of the world’s largest economies, more recently Tokyo has demonstrated increased geo-economic agency and effectiveness. In this Adelphi book, Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward draw on multiple disciplines – including economics, political economy, foreign policy and security policy – and interviews with key policymakers to examine Japan’s geo-economic power in the context of great-power competition between the US and China. They examine Japan’s previous underperformance, how Tokyo’s understanding of geo-economics has evolved and, given constraints on its national power projection, what actions Japan might feasibly take to become a more effective geo-economic actor. Their conclusions will be of direct interest not only for all those concerned with Japanese grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific, but also for those middle powers seeking to navigate great-power competition in the coming decades.

The Spatial Evolution of Geoeconomic Pattern among China and Neighboring Countries since the Reform and Opening-Up

The rise of China has had a profound impact on the world and regional political and economic pattern since the reform and opening-up. This paper studies the impact of China’s development on the evolution of the surrounding geo-pattern from the perspective of geoeconomics. Based on the sensitivity and vulnerability of asymmetric interdependence, trade and investment indicators are selected to construct a quantitative model to measure the relative economic dependence between China and neighboring countries. This paper analyzes the degree, types and trends of relative economic dependence and the relationship between economic interdependence and political relations, and investigates the surrounding geoeconomic cooperation. The results are shown as follows: (1) Since 2010, all neighboring countries have had relative economic dependence on China. China’s geoeconomic position in the surrounding area has radically transformed. (2) Since the reform and opening-up, the relative economic dependence of neighboring countries on China has been rising, from negative to positive and from low to high. After 2003, the types of relative economic dependence have gradually shifted from dual low and trade-compensative dependence to dual high and trade-oriented dependence. (3) Trade was the dominant factor in the relative economic dependence of most neighboring countries on China, and it was also the main factor contributing to China’s economic advantages over great powers in the neighborhood. The majority of neighboring countries’ investment dependence on China increased faster than their trade dependence, and the growth of their relative economic dependence will gradually turn to investment in the future. (4) The improvement of political relations between China and neighboring countries provides a foundation for the development of economic relations, and economic relations have the “inertia” of resisting political risks. The deepening of economic ties is conducive to friendly and stable political relations. (5) China’s peripheral geoeconomic strategy focuses on cooperation rather than competition. One of the goals of geoeconomics is the pursuit of joint economic benefits.

China’s Middle East investment policy

ABSTRACTChina’s greater Middle East geoeconomic strategy is centered on an external trade and industry policy. This trade and industry policy combines geopolicy and geoeconomic policy to export industrial capacity bases in what amounts to a geoindustrial policy and a parallel trade strategy. Practical coordination is under the umbrella of the central International Capacity Cooperation macro-policy. China’s provincial governments are then tasked with offshoring China’s industrial capacity to Middle East economies through specialized International Capacity Cooperation funds, which are then coordinated by sectoral industry associations: International Capacity Cooperation Industry Enterprise Alliances. The final industrial policy is then deployed by matching China’s provinces and prefectures to external geographies. This amounts to a State Outward Direct Investment Strategy. This paper uses primary sourced Chinese policy documents from central and provincial state administrative agencies to build a historical institutional record. We then employ a Polanyian analysis of the embeddedness of State functions in China’s external investment activities and industrial transfers, analyzing China’s external trade and industry policy in the Middle East in terms of state–market institutional interrelationality.

China on Stage: Assumptions and Strategies in South China Sea

This study attempts to better understand the geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic underpinnings behind the USA’s so-called “Pivot to Asia” by analyzing the dynamics behind the South China Sea dispute. The emergence of Asia as the power epicenter of the world is the defining paradigm shift of our time; and China’s meteoric economic rise was the determining factor behind this repositioning of geopolitical polarity. The study analyzes this dispute from the perspectives of the Containment Theory, Assumptions, Geo-Economic Strategies and Power. It also points out solutions to the conflict through international law and cooperation. Finally, emphasizes the importance of both, the geostrategic point of view and a geopolitical standpoint and has demonstrated that the US policy strategies towards Asia and the SCS are not helpful at all. Instead of focusing on containing China, the US should embrace China as a trading partner and become a neutral player in matters of the region including South China Sea.

THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONNECTION OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION WITH THE CHINESE PROJECT “ONE BELT AND ONE ROAD”: PROSPECTS AND RISKS

The article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of coordinating of the Eurasian economic Union and the Chinese project "One belt and one road" for the development of the Far East. The attention is focused on the complementarity of the two integration projects and their overall geoeconomic strategy for long- term development. The coordination of the Eurasian economic Union and the Chinese project "One belt and one road" was signed in 2015 in Moscow between the political leaders of Russia and China. It is an ambitious project in the field of development and deepening of economic cooperation in the Eurasian space. The Chinese factor is inevitable for the economic development of the Far East due to the proximity of borders and mutual influence. The most significant results that the Far East can get from the coordination of the Eurasian economic Union and the Chinese project "One belt and one road" are investments and improved transport and logistics infrastructure. The possible risks of the coordination of the Eurasian economic Union and the Chinese project "One belt and one road" are a hypothetical threat of Chinese expansion and the introduction of Chinese "soft power" in the Far East. The threat of expansion can be traced in the Chinese political theory of legalism. But China's leader's political views are more in line with Confucius's political and philosophical legacy. The implementation of the "soft power" resource in China's foreign policy strategy is already noticeable in the Far East. The best response of Russia to possible threats and challenges from China should be the active and consistent protection of national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Cooperation between Russia and China in the context of coordinating of the Eurasian economic Union and the Chinese project "One belt and one road" will bring significant benefits to the Far East and will become the main factor holding back from sliding to unfriendly competition between Russian and Chinese integration projects.