In this note I should like to suggest some arguments that might be advanced against an attitude towards the problems of ethics (and aesthetics) as that held by Logical Positivism, a school of thought to which I feel a strong affinity in all other points. Logical Positivists certainly do not doubt that the propositions of logic are genuine ones. It is, however, unquestionable that language does not always observe the rules of logic, and that there are languages that follow a kind of logic rather different from our own (e.g. Chinese). Together with the Good and the Beautiful, Truth is a value, a value being that which we think or feel concerns us. From what is one can never conclude what should be, so there is no possibility of proving conclusively even the necessity of logic. By an analysis of the common ground and intention of speaking we can, however, instead of a categorical one establish the conditional necessity of logic, springing from its positive definition. A definition, in the first place, is not a proposition but an agreement (very often a silent agreement, which has grown), i.e. a fact or an act. A definition can, of course, be the object of a proposition, it then is a definition stated. While true or false cannot be applied to any defini tion as such, these qualifications are obviously applicable to definition propositions. The way of establishing a definition-proposition is the same as that by which we can find the conditional necessity of logic. Truth may be defined as the quality of statements that consists in the unambiguous or univocal description given therein of the objects, facts, or relations examined, and logic may be said to be the univocal language (whichever be the tongue actually used). All language springs from reason. It helps our thinking, not to say it makes it possible. Language is the foremost means to facilitate the task