Geneva Protocol Research Articles

Undesirable but Unreturnable Migrants in the Netherlands

Undesirable migrants can include asylum-seekers believed to have committed crimes before arriving in the host State, immigrants who had their status revoked for having committed crimes in the host country, or immigrants who were not granted a status, or had their status revoked because they are considered to pose a current or future security concern. These undesirable migrants can be unreturnable because of different legal and practical reasons. This article describes the size and characteristics of this group and discusses which policy measures the Dutch Government takes to deal with this group, in particular in relation to access to permits, return, relocation, and prosecution. It concludes that the Dutch approach to bar Article 1F-excluded persons under the Geneva Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees from all residence permits is in certain circumstances at odds with European Union law.

Critiquing the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission's Interpretation of the Rules on Legitimate Military Objectives: Aerial Bombardment of the Hirgigo Electric Power Station

On 19 December 2005, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (the Commission), in a six-page decision, concluded, by majority vote, that ‘… in the circumstances prevailing on May 28, 2000, the Hirgigo power station was a military objective, as defined in Article 52, paragraph 2, of Geneva Protocol I and that Ethiopia’s aerial bombardment of it was not unlawful.’ The award is the only one in the Commission’s fifteen Awards where a decision was made by majority of votes; the rest were decided unanimously. The substance of the majority’s award and the process it followed to arrive at the conclusion, however, raises some important questions regarding the construal of the relevant provisions of Geneva Protocol I and the weighing and balancing of evidence that an international tribunal such as the Commission must employ. This publication will try to highlight some flaws in the award and discuss how the totality of the handling of the dispute by the majority of the Commission and suggest ways how the majority should have interpreted the relevant international humanitarian law instruments.

Should she be granted asylum? Examining the justifiability of the persecution criterion and nexus clause in asylum law

The current international asylum regime recognizes only persecuted persons as rightful asylum applicants. The Geneva Convention and Protocol enumerate specific grounds upon which persecution is recognized. Claimants who cannot demonstrate a real risk of persecution based on one of the recognized grounds are unlikely to be granted asylum. This paper aims to relate real-world practices to normative theories, asking whether the Convention’s restricted preference towards persecuted persons is normatively justified. I intend to show that the justifications of the persecution criterion also apply to grounds currently lacking recognition. My main concern will be persecution on the grounds of gender.The first section introduces the dominant standpoints in theories of asylum, which give different answers to the question of who should be granted asylum, based on different normative considerations. Humanitarian theories base their claims on the factual neediness of asylum-seekers, holding that whoever is in grave danger of harm or deprivation should be granted asylum. Political theories base their justifications on conceptions of legitimacy and membership, holding that whoever has been denied membership in their original state should be granted asylum. Under political theories, Matthew Price’s theory will be discussed, which provides a normative justification of the currently recognized persecution criterion. The second section provides a descriptive definition of persecution based on Kuosmanen (2014), and evaluates the normative relevance of the different elements of this definition based on the theories presented previously. The third section is devoted to the examination of the normative justifiability of the nexus clause’s exclusive list of the bases (grounds) upon which persons might be persecuted. The section argues that while the clause does not recognize that persecution might be based on gender, in fact many women experience harms based on gender that fulfil all the normatively relevant definitive conditions constituting persecution. The conclusion shows that although the current law’s preferences towards the persecuted are justifiable, the nexus clause’s limiting enumeration of grounds is not. This applies especially to the exclusion of gender as grounds for granting asylum.Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015

“Driven to Tears”: Britain, CS Tear Gas, and the Geneva Protocol, 1969–1975

ABSTRACTThis analysis considers a controversy over whether the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, covered CS “tear gas.” Widespread deployment of tear gases by American forces in Vietnam after 1964 attracted much international criticism as many believed the Protocol banned such agents and pressure gradually built on the British government to clarify its interpretative position. Its tabling a disarmament initiative to prohibit production and possession of biological weapons in July 1969 exacerbated the situation, provoking allegations of diverting attention from chemical weapons as a favour to America and the “Special Relationship.” Meanwhile, the outbreak of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland earlier the same year, where British forces also used CS, presented further difficulties. Britain rejected inclusion of CS under the Protocol in February 1970 but wrestled at great length over the decision and its consequences under the Harold Wilson and Edward Heath governments. Largely absent from historical accounts, this episode allows an examination of a complex, convoluted issue that had potentially wide-ranging ramifications for the interpretation of international relations and treaties. Similarly, re-creating confidential inter-departmental decision-making processes, particularly comparing scientific and legal interpretations, the processes of governmental bureaucracy and the role played by civil society demonstrates why an element with little immediate linkage to British overseas affairs proved such a conundrum.

Biology’s Misuse Potential

The Misuse of BiologyThe international community has laid down clear red lines about the misuse of biology. The two cornerstones of the rules of war are the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Geneva Protocol. Together, they prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of weapons. Signed in 1972 and 1925 respectively, the two treaties have incorporated a mix of legal, diplomatic and political elements into the structure of international norms that are increasingly difficult to dismantle, ignore or override.Scientific advances in biology and biomedicine are, however, significantly eroding technological barriers to acquiring and using weapons. This article describes recent trends in bioscience and analyses their security implications. Three emerging fields of research that have particularly high potential for misuse are then considered in more detail. Continued efforts are required in multilateral, national and scientific spheres to strengthen the red lines. Crucial areas to strengthen are (1) the international legal framework regulating weapons, (2) the BWC science and technology review procedure and (3) norms of transparency and public accountability.Trends in BioscienceThere are four frequently cited security-related trends in the sciences:11. The increasing pace of advances in bioscience. Rapid advances on multiple fronts within the life sciences pose challenges for tracking and assessing that progress in terms of what it means for weapons development. It is difficult to establish which areas to monitor, to anticipate what new combinations of advances will result from progress in multiple fields and to expand the types of expertise required to assess new developments.2. The increasing convergence of biology and biomedicine with chemistry, engineering, mathematics, computer science and information theory. These developments are, for instance, enabling both the synthesis of molecules and the synthesis of chemicals. Where components are significantly different from existing systems, or where inorganic materials mimic function and thereby have effect, the mechanisms of action of weapons might not be clearly biological or chemical - blurring the domains of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions.3. The increasing diffusion of capacity in biology and biomedicine around the world, particularly in emerging economies such as China and India. There are also increasing international collaborations, not only among researchers in scientifically developed countries and between researchers in developed and developing countries, but among regional networks and increasingly among scientists within developing countries.4. The increasing opening up of science with new tools like wikis, blogs and microblogs altering how information is gathered, handled, disseminated and accessed; and amateur communities, scientific outreach and educational toys increasing access to hardware for wet work in the life sciences. A large number of multinational suppliers now produce kits containing reagents, enzymes and step-by-step instructions to conduct many of the basic lab techniques life scientists use, including nucleic acid and protein expression, purification, detection and analysis. Commercial services are also available for tasks like sequencing, DNA and protein synthesis, microarray construction, mass spectrometry analysis and others. The availability of smaller, more automated and easier to use bioinstrumentation also facilitates the performance of lab research.Impact on Bioweapons PotentialThe trends in bioscience are making it easier to develop weapons. The most recent assessment by the global network of science academies concludes that technological barriers to acquiring and using bioweapons have been significantly eroded over the last five years. …

Neurotoxic Weapons and Syndromes.

The modern era of chemical and biological warfare began in World War I with the large-scale production and use of blistering and choking agents (chlorine, phosgene and mustard gases) in the battlefield. International treaties (the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention) banned biological and chemical weapons. However, several countries are probably still engaged in their development. Hence, there is risk of these weapons being used in the future. This chapter will focus on neurotoxic weapons (e.g. nerve agents, chemical and biological neurotoxins, psychostimulants), which act specifically or preeminently on the central nervous system and/or the neuromuscular junction. Deeply affecting the function of the nervous system, these agents either have incapacitating effects or cause clusters of casualties who manifest primary symptoms of encephalopathy, seizures, muscle paralysis and respiratory failure. The neurologist should be prepared both to notice patterns of symptoms and signs that are sufficiently consistent to raise the alarm of neurotoxic attacks and to define specific therapeutic interventions. Additionally, extensive knowledge on neurotoxic syndromes should stimulate scientific research to produce more effective antidotes and antibodies (which are still lacking for most neurotoxic weapons) for rapid administration in aerosolized forms in the case of terrorist or warfare scenarios.

A Path to a Comprehensive Prohibition of the Use of Chemical Weapons under International Law: From The Hague to Damascus

The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons under international law has a long history dating back to the 19th century. Until the late 20th century, most of the endeavors by the international community had resulted in partial measures, not amounting to a comprehensive and absolute ban on their use, with limitations inherent in the relevant instruments, with the reservations put to the prohibitions or with different interpretations given to them. The recent use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war has revived the discussion on this issue. It is partly because although at that time Syria was a Contracting Party to the Geneva Protocol, which does not prohibit their use in civil war, and was not a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which may prohibit their use in internal armed conflict, the Security Council in Resolution 2118 (2013) declared that the use of chemical weapons in Syria is a violation of international law. This prompts us to examine whether the use of chemical weapons, including in internal armed conflict, is prohibited under customary international law. Moreover, a couple of years earlier, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was amended to add to its list of crimes a use of chemical weapons in non-international armed conflict. With these facts in mind, this article examines the history of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons under international law, with particular reference to their use in internal armed conflict.

The Chemical Weapons Convention—disarmament, science and technology

2014 marks the centennial of the outbreak of World War I—the first war that saw the large-scale use of chemical weapons. Although poisons have been used in warfare for centuries, it was rapid advances in science and engineering and the rise of the modern chemical industry that made the mass production of toxic chemicals possible. The horrors of gas warfare led to the signing of the Geneva Protocol in 1925, which banned the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” in war, but did not ban the production and stockpiling of chemical agents. Large arsenals containing nerve agents such as Sarin and VX were acquired during the years of the Cold War; these agents surpass the lethality of traditional World War I agents more than a thousandfold. Tragically, chemical weapons were also used over much of the past century, most extensively during the Iran–Iraq War. These developments persuaded the international community that it was time to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons that would ultimately lead to a strong, universal norm against these types of armaments. This was a significant turning point that culminated in the adoption and signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and its entry into force in 1997 [1].

Protection Against Chemical Warfare Agents

AbstractChemical warfare agents are toxic chemicals controlled by the Chemical WeaponsConvention (CWC).Chemical warfare agents have been produced and used on a large scale. Tear gas grenadeswere used in 1914 by the French army at the outbreak of the First World War, but it was notuntil the German army used chlorine near Ypres in 1915 that the world entered the modernera of chemical warfare. The development and use of chemical warfare agent continuedfollowing the First World War despite the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, whichbanned the first use of chemical weapons.Concerns within the military troops and defense communities over possible terrorist use aswell as the requirements of a verifiable CWC, have driven the development and application ofanalytical methods for the detection and identification of chemical warfare agents.Analytical methods that are currently used for the detection and identification of chemicalwarfare agents are reviewed and classified by the number of dimensions of information theyprovide.Recent world events involving the possibility of use chemical warfare agents have increasedthe need to develop an environmentally friendly universal decontaminating solution thatpossesses non-corrosive and non-toxic properties for the rapid neutralization of lethalchemical warfare agents. Decontamination systems are important because they allow rapiddecomposition of the toxic compounds.

Origins of the norm against chemical weapons

The use of chemical weapons in Syria in August 2013 led to calls for a tough international response in order to uphold the norm against what is often portrayed as a particularly odious form of warfare. The condemnation of poison weapons has a long history and this article examines the origins of the international norm against their use. It focuses particularly on the proceedings of the first Hague Peace Conference and suggests that this represented the emergence of an important distinction between the customary norm against poison and poisoned arms, and a newly codified norm against the use of asphyxiating gas projectiles, which was primarily an attempt to limit the potential of new weapons technologies. However, psychological responses to the wide-scale use of chemical weapons in the First World War underscored a deep revulsion to this form of warfare and blurred the distinction between gas projectiles and poison. While the Hague Conventions ultimately failed to avert the use of chemical weapons, the formation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol reaffirmed the norm against the use of poison in war and represented both a legal and moral condemnation of chemical and biological weapons that continues to be enshrined in international law today.

The Purpose and Prescience of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

I was delighted to be asked to speak at the Royal Irish Academy. My thanks to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the School of History at University College Cork and the Japanese embassy, and to all of you in the audience for being here. As a physicist I feel so honoured and excited to be speaking at the home of Nobel Prize-winner Ernest Walton, who actually began the branch of nuclear physics I trained in, and of course Erwin Schrodinger, the great Austrian-Irish Nobel Prize-winning physicist—who may have left his cat in a box behind, which could be still alive today, but who would know? I want to address the purpose and the prescience of achievements in disarmament and non-proliferation. If we look back now nearly 100 years, in 1915, people caught up in the Second Battle of Ypres were subject to the horrific effects of the first overwhelming, massive use of chemical weapons. By 1918 the use of poison gases had become widespread, particularly on the Western Front. Approximately 100,000 tons of gas were used by the end of the war, resulting in over 1 million casualties from the use of gas in World War I and 100,000 deaths, with survivors left severely disabled and incapacitated for the rest of their lives. As a result of the horror felt at the carnage by the end of the First WorldWar, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany from ‘the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation’, and by 1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. Few issues are more appropriate subjects of humanitarian concern and international humanitarian law than the choice, possession, use and misuse of weapons. Indeed, concern over arms, their development, their possession, their use and their misuse goes right back to the roots of the foundation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

The exclusion of Roma claimants in Canadian refugee policy

ABSTRACT The arrival of thousands of European Roma seeking refugee status in Canada elicited a range of legislative and policy instruments that severely restrict their acceptance and create conditions antagonistic to further admissions. Interventions have included visa restrictions, actions by Immigration and Refugee Board, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act followed by the Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, and ministerial rhetoric about the illegitimacy of Roma as refugees. Other factors have involved interpretations of persecution in relation to the Geneva Convention and Protocol, and the implications of the conditions required for membership to the European Union. These political circumstances in large part determine Canadian acceptance rates for the Roma. Their systematic exclusion is reminiscent of the historical treatment of other groups due to institutional racism. In the new racism, however, refugee law and policy is racist in effect while evading the language of race.

Chemical and Biological Weapons in the ‘New Wars’

The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being 'tended to' in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons.

Turkey Must End Violent Response to Protests

The Turkish Medical Association (TTB) reported that 8121 people were officially admitted to hospitals resulting from police violence between 31 May and 26 June (1). This number includes 5 deaths, 61 life-threatening injuries, 104 head traumas, and 11 ophthalmic injuries, one of which led to loss of an eye due to shots of tear gas canisters from short range (1). Turkish police have used excessive amounts of tear gas (lachrymatory agents) in public (2) and confined spaces such as hospitals or infirmaries, according to international media reports and the TTB (1–4). Such use of asphyxiating gases in confined spaces is not only extremely dangerous for public health (5–8), but also strictly limited by international agreements, such as the Geneva Protocol (9), to which Turkey is a signatory. Security forces have used 130,000 tear-gas cartridges in 20 days, and Turkey is planning to buy 100,000 new cartridges (10). Doctors and nurses treating patients affected by tear gas and other police brutality, as well as the Istanbul Medical Chamber General Secretary, have been apprehended by police (11, 12), a clear violation of customary international and human rights law (13). More than 4000 academics around the world have already signed a petition to protest the police brutality (14). We call upon the Turkish government to obey international law in the treatment of protesters and those providing medical treatment to them, and to start a good-faith dialogue with the protest movement.

HOW MILITARY HOSPITALS GET READY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON VICTIMS

Summary The deliberate use of chemical weapons has emerged as a significant threat especially in last decades, mainly after the terrorist attack on 11 th September 2011, and the use of these agents in future wars and terror attacks still remains a realistic concern. Despite the existence of many conventions and aggreements like Chemical Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol against the use of chem-bio weapons, they have been used in many wars and conflicts. From this point of view, other than civilian state hospitals, military hospitals should be aware and get prepared to manage the victims injured due to chemical weapons. Military hospitals must be prepared to give support to health care system as well as military troops in treating and preventing casualties resulting from chemical weapons. Moreover, military hospitals are required to possess protective suits, masks, antidotes and other drugs. This article summarizes some important aspects which might be useful not only for military hospitals but also for civilian hospitals and public health organizations.

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award in Pakistan

A foreign arbitral award may be enforced against whom the award has been made in any on the three ways. A foreign arbitral award may be enforced: first, by filing a suit on the foreign award in the country in which the party has obtained and obtain judgment thereafter to enforce the foreign judgment against the judgment debtor; secondly, it may be enforced at common law as done in England; thirdly, under the provisions of Multilateral Conventions or Trade Treaties or Arbitration Service Agreements. The enforcement of foreign arbitral awards poses several difficulties and it is the successful enforcement of a foreign arbitral award only which brings to fruition the endeavors of a party in regard to it. Therefore, a foreign arbitral award as a mean of settlement of commercial disputes through arbitration depends upon its successful enforcement. It is clear that local laws of different countries make adequate provisions regarding the enforcement of arbitral award made in pursuance of arbitration agreement which are rendered within the country. As commerce and trade developed after the First World War, there was growing need felt for settlement of international commercial disputes and the Geneva Protocol on Arbitral Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 were concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations. Protocol means only a memorandum signed by negotiating parties which ultimately assumes the form of a Convention. The Geneva Convention of 1927 dealt with two aspects of arbitration. The first is in regard to the Recognition of Arbitral Clauses and the second is in regard to the execution of Foreign Arbitral awards. India ratified the Geneva Convention of 1927 in the year 1937. In consequence, India enacted the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act of 1937, which came into operation on the 4th day of March, 1937 and continued to be enforced in Pakistan till 2005. After the Geneva Convention of 1927, the major International Convention on Commercial Arbitration was adopted in June 10, 1958, at New York. It is a multilateral agreement on the Recognition and Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Pakistan being signatory to the New York Convention could not rectify it till 2005 when it brought in municipal legislation in the shape of Ordinance for the application of the Convention in the country under the concept of dualism. This Ordinance, which lapses after four months, is being re-promulgated till 2010.

Delegitimizing Aggression: First Steps and False Starts after the First World War

The interwar years marked the movement in international law towards the prohibition of aggressive war. Yet a notable feature of the 1920s and 1930s, despite suggestions to the contrary at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, was the absence of legal milestones marking the advance towards the criminalization of aggression. Lloyd George’s proposal to arraign the ex-Kaiser for starting the First World War came to nothing. Resolutions mentioning the ‘international crime’ of aggression, such as the draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol, were never ratified. And the Kellogg-Briand Pact, while renouncing war ‘as an instrument of national policy’, made no mention at all of aggression, much less individual responsibility for it. Not until the closing stages of the Second World War, with defeat of the Axis powers within sight, did politicians and jurists reconsider the problem of how to deal with enemy leaders, and contemplate the role that a charge of aggression might play in this process.

Environmental Histories of the Cold War (review)

Reviewed by: Environmental Histories of the Cold War Maja Fjaestad (bio) Environmental Histories of the Cold War. Edited by J. R. McNeill and Corinna Unger. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xii+362. $90. Not only do the cold war and the development of the environmental movement coincide in time, their histories are also deeply intertwined. Technologies of mass destruction have left deep physical traces, and the postwar development of sciences such as meteorology and atmospheric science have to be discussed in a cold war context. Scientists have played key roles in both developments, as strategic planners, technocratic experts, and peace activists. These connections, and more, are addressed in the new volume Environmental Histories of the Cold War. The volume is in itself an admirable initiative, as these aspects of the cold war are often neglected. Two main themes (not necessarily connected) are addressed: the impact of the cold war on the environment, as well as how the environment was used as a weapon. At the same time, the volume sketches the history and emergence of the environmental movement, and tells a story of environmentalism as a resistance movement behind the Iron Curtain. The thirteen contributions paint a picture of the environmental devastation that resulted from the arms race of the superpowers, showing how nuclear tests spread fear and destruction in areas considered unimportant enough to sacrifice, and revealing how nations in their hubris planned to change climate, geography, and weather in their interests. Paul Josephson describes—in an essay as well written as it is appalling—the environmental devastation in the USSR, uncovering how the environment was subordinated to the needs of industry and the military time and time again. The remarkable discussions about environmental, biological, and radiological warfare in America—the possibilities as well as horrors these technologies could offer—are discussed by Jacob Darwin Hamblin. The antagonism between the Geneva Protocol and the American use of herbicides in Vietnam is analyzed in an enlightening essay by David Zierler; the final ratification of the protocol was pushed by peace activists and scientists raging against President Nixon. China’s environmental movement has a story of its own, one pressed between the international cold war situation and the country’s own socialist logics. Here, Bao Maohong retells a story about vast consequences and reactions that came only when the costs of environmental effects were all too obvious. We all know how the cold war ended, with jubilant resistance movements, fallen walls, and new economic challenges for Eastern Europe. But was the end of the cold war a turning point for the environmental movement? Frank Uekötter argues in an interesting epilogue that it was—but only as a discursive turning point, at least so far. New ambitions for environmental [End Page 233] work now could be formulated in the ideological vacuum after the cold war, “making for a turning point in aspirations and hopes rather than in humanity’s ecologic footprint” (p. 351). Although obviously outside the scope of the volume, it would be interesting to draw some parallels to the story of the rise in awareness of climate change, but lack of effective policy responses, of the early 2000s. One minor point of criticism could be that the essays vary considerably in scope; some texts are narrow and locally situated, while others aim at re-telling broad stories at a transnational level. A more coherent overall question for the essays might have better served the purpose of the ambitious and interesting introduction by Corinna Unger and J. R. McNeill. Still, the initiative as well as the accomplishment must be praised: a comprehensive volume that combines two study fields in a fruitful as well as absorbing way, thereby breaking new ground. The perspectives presented are rich and varied, and they encompass experiences from outside the Western world. In addition, the volume constitutes an important contribution to neighboring fields such as the history of energy, military history, and diplomatic history. And, not least, environmental histories such as these can teach us something about how to build a more eco-friendly world today—in war or peace. Maja Fjaestad Maja Fjaestad is an assistant professor in the Division of History of...

Wind Words and Fury: Canada and the Geneva Protocol, 1925–26

Negotiation over the Geneva Protocol and its acceptance or rejection is placed in the context of Canadian domestic policy and its relationships both to the League of Nations, of which the Canadian government remained a strong support in principle, and the demands and expectations of its place within the British empire.

OPTING OUT OF THE IRON TRIANGLE

Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the US chemical industry went from lobbying against the Geneva Protocol and promoting increased funding for chemical warfare to refusing to produce binary chemical weapons and assisting with the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—even though the treaty included provisions that could be costly to industry. What happened in those thirty years to make the US chemical industry reverse its position on chemical weapons? This article argues these changes were largely caused by the chemical industry's desire to reform the negative public image it had acquired due to its involvement in the Agent Orange scandal and other high-profile incidents during the 1970s and 1980s. The chemical industry's assistance with CWC negotiations may be explained after an examination of the US public policy literature, which argues that industry will support apparently costly regulations if doing so helps it repair a damaged public image and ensures greater profits in the long run.