The article provides an overview of the memoir and scientific literature, which provides various opinions on the monetary reform of 1993, implemented in the form of the exchange of old, mainly Soviet money, for new Russian banknotes. Some authors do not consider this measure a reform at all, characterize it as a manifestation of the monetarist course of the government, as an unsuccessful initiative of the Central Bank in terms of design, organization and results, carried out in the mode of "shock therapy" without taking into account the general state of the national economy, as the desire of conservative forces to take revenge from liberal reformers. However, some other economists consider the 1993 exchange, in combination with the law of September 25, 1992 on the introduction of the Russian currency unit, as a full-fledged reform, as a natural step that allowed separating the monetary system of Russia from the former Soviet republics, ending the continued existence of a ruinous ruble zone for the country and strengthening the economic sovereignty of the state. At the same time, all researchers agree that the reform of 1993, which was also supposed to stop the progressive inflation and create prerequisites for the regulation of monetary circulation, did not have the expected effect. The exchange of banknotes was not supported by the subsequent rational actions of the state authorities, and this eventually led to the default of 1998.