General Equilibrium Setup Research Articles

Public Providers, Versus Private Providers, of Public Goods: A General Equilibrium Study of the Role of the State

This paper studies the difference between public production and public finance of public goods in a dynamic general equilibrium setup. By public finance, we mean that the public good is produced by private providers with the government financing their costs. When the model is calibrated to match fiscal data from the UK economy, the main result is that, ceteris paribus, a switch from public production to public finance can have substantial aggregate and distributional implications. Public providers cannot beat private providers in terms of aggregate efficiency. We finally design a transfer scheme that can make a switch to private provision welfare improving for all agents including public employees.

Counterparty Risk Externality: Centralized Versus Over-The-Counter Markets

The opacity of over-the-counter (OTC) markets – in which a large number of financial products including credit derivatives trade – appears to have played a central role in the ongoing financial crisis. We model such OTC markets for risk-sharing in a general equilibrium setup where agents have incentives to default and their financial positions are not mutually observable. We show that in this setting, there is excess leverage in that parties in OTC contracts take on short positions that lead to levels of default risk that are higher than Pareto-efficient ones. In particular, OTC markets feature a counterparty risk externality that we show can lead to ex-ante productive inefficiency. This externality is absent when trading is organized via a centralized clearing mechanism that provides transparency of trade positions, or centralized counterparty such as an exchange that observes all trades and sets prices.

The Economics of Labor Coercion

The majority of labor transactions throughout much of history and a significant fraction of such transactions in many developing countries today are “coercive,” in the sense that force or the threat of force plays a central role in convincing workers to accept employment or its terms. We propose a tractable principal-agent model of coercion, based on the idea that coercive activities by employers, or “guns,” affect the participation constraint of workers. We show that coercion and effort are complements, so that coercion increases effort. Nevertheless, coercion is always “inefficient,” in the sense of reducing utilitarian social welfare. Better outside options for workers reduce coercion, because of the complementarity between coercion and effort: workers with better outside option exert lower effort in equilibrium and thus are coerced less. Greater demand for labor increases coercion because it increases equilibrium effort. We investigate the interaction between outside options, market prices, and other economic variables by embedding the (coercive) principal-agent relationship in a general equilibrium setup, and study when and how labor scarcity encourages coercion. We show that general (market) equilibrium interactions working through prices lead to a positive relationship between labor scarcity and coercion along the lines of ideas suggested by Domar, while those working through outside options lead to a negative relationship similar to ideas advanced in neo-Malthusian historical analyses of the decline of feudalism. A third effect, which is present when investment in guns must be made before the realization of contracting opportunities, also leads to a negative relationship between labor scarcity and coercion. Our model also predicts that the slave trade makes slaves worse off, conditional on enslavement, and that coercion is more viable in industries that do not require relationship-specific investment by workers.

AN EQUILIBRIUM GUIDE TO DESIGNING AFFINE PRICING MODELS

The paper examines equilibrium models based on Epstein–Zin preferences in a framework in which exogenous state variables follow affine jump diffusion processes. A main insight is that the equilibrium asset prices can be computed using a standard machinery of affine asset pricing theory by imposing parametric restrictions on market prices of risk, determined inside the model by preference and model parameters. An appealing characteristic of the general equilibrium setup is that the state variables have an intuitive and testable interpretation as driving the consumption and dividend dynamics. We present a detailed example where large shocks (jumps) in consumption volatility translate into negative jumps in equilibrium prices of the assets as agents demand a higher premium to compensate for higher risks. This endogenous “leverage effect,” which is purely an equilibrium outcome in the economy, leads to significant premiums for out‐of‐the‐money put options. Our model is thus able to produce an equilibrium “volatility smirk,” which realistically mimics that observed for index options.

Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs

The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.

Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs

The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.

Learning By Investing: Embodied Technology and Business Cycles

In the last decade of the 20th century, the U.S. economy witnessed a persistent and substantial increase in private investment. The boom was sharply reversed in 2001, and a great deal of evidence suggests that the capital stock had become excessive. Standard equilibrium business cycle models have difficulties in predicting the investment boom and overshooting. An embodied technology model is constructed to replicate the pattern of investment boom and collapse. Unlike previous models of embodiment, the present model assumes that new technology increases the productivity of capital of all vintages, but only new capital can facilitate the adoption of the new technology. Further, although agents in this model know about the advent of a new technology, they have imperfect information about its magnitude. Agents learn the magnitude by investing in new capital. I present a sufficient condition for having a persistent investment boom and overshooting. I also solve the model numerically in a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) setup. The model presented in this paper extends the standard DGE business cycle models in two ways: First, it presents a strong internal propagation mechanism with respect to technology shocks; second, it generates endogenous recessions without invoking technological regress. The model also offers a possible explanation on why consumption growth was strong during the last recession.

The Japanese saving rate between 1960 and 2000: productivity, policy changes, and demographics

In this paper, we use an overlapping generations model to study the factors generating the saving rate in Japan between 1960–2000. The model economy allows for observed aging of the population, total factor productivity (TFP), and fiscal policy to affect the national saving rate. Our calibrated general equilibrium setup generates saving rates that are reasonably similar to the data during this period. Our counterfactual experiments indicate that observed TFP growth rates are the main reason for both the secular decline and the two humps in the saving rate during 1960–2000.

Learning by Investing: Embodied Technology and Business Cycles

In the last decade of the 20th century, the U.S. economy witnessed a persistent and substantial increase in private investment. The boom was sharply reversed in 2001, and a great deal of evidence suggests that the capital stock had become excessive. Standard equilibrium business cycle models have difficulties in predicting the investment boom and overshooting. An embodied technology model is constructed to replicate the pattern of investment boom and collapse. Unlike previous models of embodiment, the present model assumes that new technology increases the productivity of capital of all vintages, but only new capital can facilitate the adoption of the new technology. Further, although agents in this model know about the advent of a new technology, they have imperfect information about its magnitude. Agents learn the magnitude by investing in new capital. I present a sufficient condition for having a persistent investment boom and overshooting. I also solve the model numerically in a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) setup. The model presented in this paper extends the standard DGE business cycle models in two ways: First, it presents a strong internal propagation mechanism with respect to technology shocks; second, it generates endogenous recessions without invoking technological regress. The model also offers a possible explanation on why consumption growth was strong during the last recession.

Endogenous longevity, biological deterioration and economic growth

The identification of the types of bidirectional interactions that take place between longevity and economic growth in the long-run is carried out by means of the integration of human capital accumulation, innovation in medical technology, a health goods sector, and individual decisions on health and longevity in a dynamic general equilibrium set-up. In this context, in which individual agents decide not only on their “quality” of life but also on its “quantity”, the mere process of biological deterioration, that is to say, the continuous loss of health goods effectiveness in maintaining a given level of health as individuals age, provides the reason for an additional, and new, engine of growth.

The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic Stabilization

Market innovations following the financial reforms of the early 1980s relaxed collateral constraints on household borrowing. The present paper examines the contribution of this development to the macroeconomic stabilization that occurred shortly thereafter. The model combines collateral constraints on households with heterogeneity of thrift in a calibrated general equilibrium setup. We use this tool to characterize the business cycle implications of lowering required down payments and rates of amortization for durable goods purchases as in the early 1980s. The model predicts that this relaxation of collateral constraints can explain a large fraction of the actual volatility decline in hours worked, output, household debt, and household durable goods purchases.

Energy Market Liberalisation in the FSU - Simulations with the GTAP Model

This work considers effects of energy market liberalisation in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Our analysis is based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model called the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). This specialised model makes it possible to evaluate effects in a general equilibrium set-up. Energy market reforms are widely discussed in the literature, but the use of CGE models has been limited. In the main part of the paper, we perform two experiments. The first is a benchmark liberalisation experiment in which all government taxes and subsidies are removed. The second is an attempt to simulate an increase in the export capacity of energy commodities into the European markets. In general, we find that liberalisation of FSU energy markets would increase welfare in the EU countries, while in the FSU welfare would decrease. This result is mainly due to the terms of trade effect, as export prices of FSU countries decrease.

Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility

This paper explores risk-sharing and equilibrium in a general equilibrium set-up wherein agents are non-additive expected utility maximizers. We show that when agents have the same convex capacity, the set of Pareto-optima is independent of it and identical to the set of optima of an economy in which agents are expected utility maximizers and have the same probability. Hence, optimal allocations are comonotone. This enables us to study the equilibrium set. When agents have different capacities, the matters are much more complex (as in the vNM case). We give a general characterization and show how it simplifies when Pareto-optima are comonotone. We use this result to characterize Pareto-optima when agents have capacities that are the convex transform of some probability distribution. Comonotonicity of Pareto-optima is also shown to be true in the two-state case if the intersection of the core of agents' capacities is non-empty; Pareto-optima may then be fully characterized in the two-agent, two-state case. This comonotonicity result does not generalize to more than two states as we show with a counter-example. Finally, if there is no-aggregate risk, we show that non-empty core intersection is enough to guarantee that optimal allocations are full-insurance allocation. This result does not require convexity of preferences.

Optimal Saving under Poisson Uncertainty

This paper studies optimal saving and investment behaviour of a household that can either invest in a riskless or a risky saving technology when risk results from a Poisson process. The focus is on behaviour of households in a general equilibrium setup. Poisson processes are introduced since they allow us to understand and model endogenous cycles jointly with long-run growth. It turns out that a very simple, intuitive and tractable characterization of equilibrium is possible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, O33, O41.

Internal finance and capital accumulation in a dynamic general equilibrium model with credit constraints

SummaryThis paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium setup with overlapping generations to provide a better understanding of the causes and consequences of credit constraints resulting from asymmetric information and moral hazard. These constraints imply that the entrepreneur’s access to credit is limited by the amount of internal funds available. In a general equilibrium setup, internal funds and the interest rate are endogenous. It is shown that credit constraints have large effects either by redistributing wealth or by changing the equilibrium capital stock, or both. Insofar as the interest rate elasticity of savings is close to zero, the effects on income distribution are likely to be much more important than the effects on output and investment. Even though Pareto improving policies do exist, they seem extremely difficult to implement in practice. Even in our simple setup with no borrower heterogeneity, simple transfers from unconstrained households to finance-constrained entrepreneurs may well fail to lead to Pareto superior outcomes and to eliminate the inefficiencies generated by capital market imperfections, even though they would have a positive impact on aggregate investment and output.

Equilibrium interest-rate determination under adjustment costs

In the equilibrium of an economy without adjustment costs, interest rates have contemporaneous negative correlation with capital. That correlation is perfect if the marginal product is linear in the capital stock. This result, that can be seen in a rational-expectations, general-equilibrium setup in Novales (1990), is clearly behind the consideration of adjustment costs of capital in the derivation of investment functions in Sargent (1979) or Abel and Blanchard (1983). In this paper we analyze the role of adjustment costs in determining how the equilibrium values of interest rates influence the capital-accumulation process. Being a nonlinear rational-expectations model, a backward solution method is used to show how the proposed model is able to replicate the cross-correlation function between interest rates and investment that can be observed in actual data.