Gaulle's Policy Research Articles

Plan Calcul: France's National Information Technology Ambition and Instrument of National Independence

The history of Plan Calcul―France's first information technology program, launched by de Gaulle's government in 1966―has been well described in the literature; however, few studies investigate the arsenal system of the program in depth. Drawing from Plan Calcul's archives, this article is the first to demonstrate that, in the context of de Gaulle's Cold War foreign policy, the French government, initially aiming to avoid an arsenal system, still became the program's funding supplier, entrepreneur, and client. Plan Calcul aimed to establish an industrial-type operation but was ultimately reduced to a state information technology arsenal program.

The de Gaulle Problem

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.

Commentary on Globalizing de Gaulle

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.

Reply to the Commentaries

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.

Commentary on Globalizing de Gaulle

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.

Charles de Gaulle and Europe: The New Revisionism

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.

France's Renewed Commitment to Commercial Diplomacy in the 1960s

AbstractThe political and strategic aspects of General de Gaulle's policies, hisgrandeurrhetoric and his hostility to European integration have between them taken up the attention of historians. It has therefore been overlooked that the 1960s were a period of unprecedented mobilisation by the French state in the promotion of French exports. This policy is not only due to the history of commercial diplomacy. The senior civil servants in charge of this process were interested not only in selling but also in creating a fundamental change to the perception of France by those abroad. It was a keen fight, involving not only official and semi-official bodies, but also private enterprise, who together furthered the neo-corporatist programme of the French state.

France and the United States: Waiting for Regime Change

Three years ago, in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman defined France as America's ‘enemy’.1 In the past year or so, the perception of the rela...

De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence

In The Choice for Europe Andrew Moravcsik develops a “commercial” interpretation of Charles de Gaulle's European policies. Moravcsik claims that his revisionist analysis succeeds because he, as opposed to almost all other students of European Community policymaking, has relied not on “soft” sources but on hard primary sources. An investigation of his claim shows that it cannot be substantiated. Both the quality of his sources and his handling of them are poor. His commercial interpretation of de Gaulle's policy is based on a serious misreading of the two sources on which his argument depends. Finally, his restatement in 2000 of his original argument a restatement intended to overcome the problem that, as his critics pointed out, he failed to produce any direct supporting evidence leads only to further problems.

A Test Case of Moravcsik's “Liberal Intergovernmentalist” Approach to European Integration

The responses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur.John Keeler brings up another crucial question: Was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the

A Comment on the Article by Andrew Moravcsik

The responses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: Was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the

A Response to Andrew Moravcsik

The responses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle'bs vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: Was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the

Comment on Moravcsik

The responses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: Was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues thatde Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the

De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and Europe

The responses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: Was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the

Reconstructing De Gaulle

The responses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: Was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the

De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 1)

The thousands of books and articles on President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration all accord primary explanatory importance to his distinctive geopolitical ideology. These analyses place secondary significance, if any at all, on commercial considerations. This two-part article seeks to revise that historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration taken by France during de Gaulle's presidency: to remain in the Common Market and promote the Common Agricultural Policy, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the European Economic Community, and to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965–1966. The first two decisions are discussed here, and the other two are covered in Part 2. For each case, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence confirms that the interests pursued by de Gaulle were more commercial than geopolitical.

De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 2)

The concluding segment of this two-part article explores two key episodes in French foreign policy under President Charles de Gaulle: (1) France's veto of British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), and (2) de Gaulle's decisions to provoke and then resolve the “empty chair” crisis of 1965–1966. These two cases, like the two examined in Part 1 of this article, demonstrate the fundamental importance of economic considerations in de Gaulle's policy toward the EEC. De Gaulle was a democratic politician first and a geopolitical visionary second. His experience tells us a great deal about the limits imposed by modern democratic politics on any leader who might hope to make statecraft serve an idiosyncratic political vision. The article concludes with an analysis of possible counterarguments and a discussion of the proper use of historical evidence.

De Gaulle's First Veto: France, the Rueff Plan and the Free Trade Area

Within one week of his election to the presidency of the Fifth Republic de Gaulle had taken a number of decisions which were to lay the basis for the foreign and economic policies pursued throughout his tenure of office. Contrary to all expectations de Gaulle confirmed his support for the European Economic Community, against the initial advice of his ministers he devalued the franc, and at variance with his partners in the EEC he vetoed Britain's plans to set up a free trade area in Europe. This article examines the reasons for de Gaulle's critical policy choices.

France since the Popular Front: Government and People, 1936-1986.

France in the 1930s La Republique des Deputes - politics in the 1930s the Popular Front - legend and legacy the road to Compiegne - diplomacy and war, 1936-1940 the occupation resistance and liberation retribution and the new Jerusalem - the CNR charter the constitution of the Fourth Republic the pattern of politics, 1946-1954 economic growth and social change, 1947-1973 France overseas, 1944-1954 Janus and Cassandra - the Mendes-France ministry and what followed, 1954 - 1955 impasse, 1956-1958 La Republique des Dupes La Republique des Citoyens de Gaulle's foreign policy challenge and response, 1968-1974 reform and recession - the Giscardian era, 1974-1981 Keynesianism in one country - the Socialist experiment. Appendices: 1-figures 2-tables 3-French governments, 1936-1986 4-the arts and the public in the 1930s. Notes. Select bibliography. Index.

The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy

Part I. Ideological roots and purposes of de Gaulle's foreign policy: 1. The personal equation: psychology, socialisation and culture 2. The philosophical roots of Gaullism 3. The dynamics of Gaullist ideology: de Gaulle's theory of leadership and political action 4. National consciousness and the role of France in world politics: the Gaullist perspective 5. Foreign policy leadership and national integration: a framework for analysis Part II. The grand design and foreign policy praxis: a case study in Atlantic relationships and the domestic impact of Gaullist policy 6. Structure and development of the grand design 7. Raising the Atlantic question, 1958-62 8. Atlantic divergences: the phase of reactive assertion, 1963-6 9. Convergence and reconciliation, 1966-9 10. The impact of Gaullist policy on political change in France: consensus-building and the routinisation of authority.