In the last decade, the subject of sale, purchase or transit of natural gas between the countries in Europe has gained, in addition to the economic dimension, a much broader, and for some countries even more significant, geopolitical dimension. This is most evident based on the attitude of the United States and some European countries towards the projects for the construction of the Nord Stream 2, Turkish Stream and South Stream gas pipelines. By displaying a negative attitude towards these gas pipelines, the United States (with the support of some European countries) has formally emerged as a “protector of the energy interests of European countries” from Russian influence, i.e. Russian gas. Essentially, the United States is trying to slow down, reduce and suspend gas supplies from the Russian Federation (RF) to European countries, especially the most powerful ones (Germany, for example), and disguised by the need to “diversify gas supplies to European countries”, thus reduce Russia’s presence in Europe and quality of interstate relations. At the same time, the United States is trying to offer and sell its liquefied natural gas to European countries as an alternative to Russian gas, and to “fill in” the empty geopolitical space. The Russian Federation, on its behalf, instructed by the experiences from several “gas crises” with Ukraine, but also in accordance with its geopolitical interests, seeks (and has almost succeeded in doing so) to ensure the transport and sale of its gas by building new gas pipelines to Europe and improve relations with European countries. Other European countries, which need Russian gas, are trying to ensure energy security by participating in the construction of the gas pipeline, or by supporting the realization of that project. The fate of the gas pipeline and thus the possibility of gas distribution to individual states becomes a subject of interest (and conflict) of the great powers and their geopolitical interests.