Garbage Collection Service Research Articles

The Impact of Compulsory Competitive Tendering on Refuse Collection Services

Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) of blue-collar services such as refuse collection and street cleaning was introduced in the UK by the Local Government Act 1988. This law, imposed by central government, obliged elected local authorities to expose specific services to competitive tendering at fixed intervals and subject to national guidelines. Whilst the issue of competitive tendering of public services has generated a substantial literature over recent years (see Domberger and Rimmer (1994) for a review), there have been relatively few studies of compulsory competitive tendering.2 This paper uses a dataset on refuse collection costs and services for the 365 English local authorities over the period 1984-94. It follows on from Szymanski and Wilkins (1993) who analysed the same database using data up until 1988

A multiobjective model for the dynamic location of landfills

Abstract The passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 and its subsequent renewals triggered controversies over where potentially hazardous garbage should be deposited. Such controversies originated from decade-long conflicts between the government agency seeking cost savings and the general public seeking safe environments. The controversies will go on without a settlement, unless more systematic and realistic decision-aid tools for locating landfills are developed which consider a multitude of dynamic factors affecting the location decision and then make trade-offs among them. These factors may include garbage collection services for regional communities, the explicit and hidden costs of developing landfills, transporting and disposing garbage, long-term health and safety hazards for neighboring residents and ecosystems, negative impacts on the regional economy, equity concerns and so forth. As an effective decision-aid tool that can incorporate these conflicting factors, we develop a dynamic (multiperiod), multiobjective mixed integer programming model. The model is tested in a hypothetical case resembling a real world scenario and the results are interpreted to provide insights into the multiobjective and dynamic nature of the model. Efficient alternatives are generated, using the weighting method, and reduced using a filtering method.

Seasonal abundance of dengue vectors in relation to rainfall and prevalence of breeding containers in Fiji, 1981.

was carried out as regularly as possible in several cities of Viti Levu, the main land of Fiji in 1981. Larval indices of both the two vector species were apparently precipitation dependent, and it was due to abundant available breeding containers. Seasonal fluctuation of those indices was more drastic in Ae. pseudoscutellaris than in Ae. aegypti. More breeding containers were found in rural area than in urban area. Performance of regular garbage collection service in urban area could reduce breeding containers for the species effectively. The variety and the density of potential containers were different in rural and urban areas. These differences were also found among industrial, commercial and residen­tial blocks in a city, and were considered to affect species composition of the vectors.

THE ROLE OF ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN AUDIT PREPARATION

At the heart of current political controversy is the contracting out of services from the public to the private sector. The refuse collection service was an early example of this, following the return of a Conservative Government to Britain in 1979. The history of the refuse collection service is outlined and the problems and opportunities auditors may encounter in their dealings with this service are described. Overcoming resistance to change is suggested as a major factor encountered.

アレキサンドリア市廃棄物収集事業のための市民協力推進プログラム

アレキサンドリア市廃棄物収集事業のための市民協力推進プログラム

Tax Reduction without Sacrifice: Private-Sector Production of Public Services

This article investigates an alternative which permits tax reduction without significant effects on the output of public services: private-sector production of public services. Empirical evidence on a wide variety of services is examined: refuse collection, fire protection, debt collection, health care and hospital services, claims processing, ship repair, and the operation of utilities and airline services. The evidence indicates that the economies achievable are real and not hypothetical; the private-sector provision of public services offers an excellent opportunity for tax reduction without sacrificing services.

Empirical Study of the Households's Production of Refuse Within the Framework of a New Consumer Theory

The paper focuses on linking refuse (combustible solid waste) from household consumption activities to consumer behaviour and to the municipal delivery of refuse collection services. The theoretical framework used in conceptualizing the refuse disposal process and its relationship to household consumption behaviour is based on Lancaster-Muth-Becker's new approach to consumer theory. Within the framework, a household behaviour with respect to consumption activities and associated refuse is described as a utility maximization problem. The objective is a utility function over the characteristic space, where the major characteristic yielded by household's refuse disposal activity is assumed to be the cleanliness of private space. Constraints include: three sets of technological relations linking goods purchased, refuse disposed, and the characteristics produced through a collection of consumption activities, residential environment of household, and the type of municipal collection services; a budget constraint which incorporates the alternative municipal financing of service, general revenue financing and pricing of refuse; and the public production of collection service which is a function of the total amount of refuse and of tax to be collected.Data required for the estimation of technological relations were secured through survey questionaires with the random sample of 1000 households, conducted in the eight municipalities of the Tokyo Metropolitan Region during Nov. 25-Dec. 1 of 1979. These eight municipalities employ different collection services in terms of frequency of service (twice a week and thrice a week) and of site of collection (backyard and curbside). Data on residential environments of surveyee were obtained through observations of sites, pictures, and maps.Due to the difficulty of integrating the residential environmental quality into a few indices, we categorized via the use of “Hayashi's Quantification Theory” the residential environments of surveyee into five homogeneous environments. In each categorized environment, linear stochastic forms of technological relations were estimated using ordinary least squares procedures. The empirical results were utilized to evaluate the alternative municipal policies concerning the financing of collection service. The results show that the pricing scheme is preferred to customary method of general revenue financing. For the former exerts not only an income effect but also a substitution effect upon households' refuse production, while the latter exerts only an income effect.

The Provision of Municipal Sanitation Services by Private Firms: An Empirical Analysis of the Efficiency of Alternative Market Structures and Regulatory Arrangements

CONCERN about productivity in local government is encouraging city officials to look closely at private market alternatives to the direct provision of municipal services by local government. One important issue concerns the question of which are the most efficient market structures and regulatory arrangements for the provision of such services. There is presently little hard evidence available to guide city officials.1 The present study seeks to remedy this deficiency by empirically analyzing the alternative market structures and regulatory arrangements used in 77 cities in the United States for the provision of residential refuse collection service by private firms. Refuse collection services constitute an important municipal expenditure. In the fiscal year I975-76 all municipal governments in the

Homicide and Robbery in New York City: An Economic Model

Previous articleNext article No AccessHomicide and Robbery in New York City: An Economic ModelDonald Mathieson and Peter PassellDonald Mathieson Search for more articles by this author and Peter Passell Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 5, Number 1Jan., 1976 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467545 Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 19Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1976 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Bijoy Rakshit, Yadawananda Neog Does higher educational attainment imply less crime? Evidence from the Indian states, Journal of Economic Studies 48, no.11 (Jun 2020): 133–165.https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-05-2019-0218Surender Kumar, Sudesh Kumar Does modernization improve performance: evidence from Indian police, European Journal of Law and Economics 39, no.11 (May 2013): 57–77.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9392-1Bernardino Benito, José Solana, María-Rocío Moreno Explaining efficiency in municipal services providers, Journal of Productivity Analysis 42, no.33 (Jun 2013): 225–239.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-013-0358-7Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Isabel-María García-Sánchez, José-Manuel Prado-Lorenzo Effect of modes of public services delivery on the efficiency of local governments: A two-stage approach, Utilities Policy 26 (Sep 2013): 23–35.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2013.04.005Isabel-María García-Sánchez, Luis Rodríguez-Domínguez, Javier Parra-Domínguez Yearly evolution of police efficiency in Spain and explanatory factors, Central European Journal of Operations Research 21, no.11 (May 2011): 31–62.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-011-0207-6Jun Yan Empirical Research on Long-run Equilibrium Between Social Harmony and Social Security Incidents, Procedia Engineering 45 (Jan 2012): 235–239.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2012.08.150Bernardino Benito-López, María del Rocio Moreno-Enguix, José Solana-Ibañez Determinants of efficiency in the provision of municipal street-cleaning and refuse collection services, Waste Management 31, no.66 (Jun 2011): 1099–1108.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2011.01.019Regina Madalozzo, Giovanna Maia Furtado, Um estudo sobre a vitimização para a cidade de São Paulo, Revista de Economia Política 31, no.11 (Mar 2011): 160–180.https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31572011000100008Bernardino Benito, Francisco Bastida, José A. García Explaining differences in efficiency: an application to Spanish municipalities, Applied Economics 42, no.44 (Feb 2010): 515–528.https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840701675560Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza What causes violent crime?, European Economic Review 46, no.77 (Jul 2002): 1323–1357.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00096-4 Edward L. Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote Why Is There More Crime in Cities? Glaeser & Sacerdote, Journal of Political Economy 107, no.S6S6 (Jul 2015): S225–S258.https://doi.org/10.1086/250109 REFERENCES, (Mar 2015): 249–260.https://doi.org/10.1108/S0573-8555(1994)0000227010David L. Sollars, Bruce L. Benson, David W. Rasmussen Drug Enforcement and the Deterrence of Property Crime Among Local Jurisdictions, Public Finance Quarterly 22, no.11 (Aug 2016): 22–45.https://doi.org/10.1177/109114219402200102GORDON P. WHITAKER, CHARLES DAVID PHILLIPS, PETER J. HAAS, ROBERT E. WORDEN Aggressive Policing and the Deterrence of Crime, Law & Policy 7, no.33 (Jul 1985): 395–416.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.1985.tb00359.xE. Segelhorst, M. Brady A theoretical analysis of the effect of fear on the location decisions of urban — suburban residents, Journal of Urban Economics 15, no.22 (Mar 1984): 157–171.https://doi.org/10.1016/0094-1190(84)90012-3JAMES NATHAN COLE, THOMAS R. DAVIES, RICHARD HENRY ANSON Do Council Members Make a Difference in the Law and Order Investment?, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 7, no.1-21-2 (Sep 2011): 109–117.https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.1983.9688767HOPE CORMAN CRIMINAL DETERRENCE IN NEW YORK: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COURT ACTIVITIES AND CRIME, Economic Inquiry 19, no.33 (Jul 1981): 476–487.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1981.tb00330.x Llad Phillips The Criminal Justice System: Its Technology and Inefficiencies, The Journal of Legal Studies 10, no.22 (Oct 2015): 363–380.https://doi.org/10.1086/467686Deryck Beyleveld Deterrence Research as a Basis for Deterrence Policies, The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 18, no.33 (Nov 1979): 135–149.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2311.1979.tb00388.x

Cost Functions of an Urban Government Service: Refuse Collection

ENVIIRONMENTAL health services, especially refuse collection and sewage disposal, though relatively small in terms of outlays compared to other urban government services, have played a major role in the rapid urbanization of society. They have helped to eliminate the frightful dangers to health that can threaten densely populated communities and decimate their populations. Economists who are concerned with planning the provision and financing of urban government services might find the analysis of refuse collection useful from a methodological point of view. Their interests tend to focus on issues of scale economies, break-even points, the cost of differential service levels, the determination of user charges, etc. In addition, projections of service needs and costs occupy their attention. Inquiries into these matters require information on government service demand and cost functions which are unusually difficult to determine because of the economist's inability to find readily quantifiable output units and quality characteristics. However, as will be shown below, refuse collection cost analysis, in this respect, poses less difficulty than any other local government service, except perhaps water supply. In much of the world, refuse collection services are mainly provided by governments, although this need not be the only method.' Indubitably, these services do not constitute pure public goods; only to a limited extent do they fulfill either social or merit wants.2 Or, to put it differently, while pure public goods have very many major indirect or neighborhood effects, in the case of refuse collection such effects are relatively minor. Residential refuse collection (and disposal) service involves the regularly scheduled pickup, collection and disposition by a sanitary agency of solid waste materials resulting from the operation and maintenance of households; its main components are garbage, ashes and rubbish.3 It is useful to distinguish between residential refuse collection on the one hand and industrial refuse collection on the other. The two usually are carried out separately and the latter takes place virtually on a daily basis. Unlike residences, commercial and industrial establishments vary greatly in the amount of refuse they produce, and many large industrial firms provide their own collection and sometimes even disposal service. In the following pages, an ideal residential refuse collection cost model will be presented. Because of data difficulties and the marginal importance of some variables, this model will next be simplified and implemented in relation to a case study. Finally some conclusions are pre-