G20 Agenda Research Articles

Aligning climate policy with finance ministers' G20 agenda

There is no longer a choice between climate policy and no climate policy. G20 finance ministers have to play a key role in implementing smart climate policies like carbon pricing. Yet they remain reluctant to take advantage of the merits of carbon pricing for sound fiscal policy.

Россия в «Группе двадцати»: факторы успеха и задачи на будущее

Globalization and technological changes of the recent decade led to powerful transformations in the society, creating huge opportunities for economic and social development. Simultaneously these political, economic, social and technological shifts bring new challenges: enhanced mutual vulnerability of states; growing inequality; macroeconomic and financial instability; rise of terrorism; unbalanced growth of population and employment; waves of migration; increased rate of pandemic diseases diffusion; climate change and growing competition for resources. To prevent and manage the threats it is vital to ensure efficiency of the global governance system. Though lacking in legitimacy G20, set up in response to the global economic and financial crisis, has proved its efficiency in crafting and implementing consensus based decisions with a catalytic impact for global governance. Russia has a very strong track record in the G20 and it is vital to build on the success. The article reviews the G20 role in the global governance system and examines the factors of Russia’s success in the G20. Looking into the future, the author outlines G20 future agenda; proposes a strategy and a set of measures which would maximize G20 utility for Russia. Content analysis of the G20 documents, Russia’s national G20-related documents, interviews and statements is carried out to track whether Russia’ priorities in G20 have been achieved. Historical overview of G20 performance and Russia’s work in the G20 is undertaken to identify success factors. The G20 SWOT analysis is applied to reveal G20 strengths and opportunities and identify weaknesses and threats. Results of the SWOT analysis are used to develop a proposal for Russia’s strategy with regard to the G20. Drawing on the long-term forecasts, assessment of the G20 performance so far and its engagement with the other international organizations, the author makes an assertion that G20 agenda will deepen in the long-term, the demand for a cross-cutting approach to the new challenges will grow, alongside with the demand for the forum’s leadership in global governance. The article highlights decisions, recommendations and provisions spelt out in G20 key documents (including national growth strategy and employment plan) and G20 commitments on financial regulation, trade, infrastructure investment, energy and innovations which can contribute to development of a new model of the country growth and its integration into the world system. The author proposes a strategy which should maximize G20 effectiveness for Russia consolidating significant diplomatic, expertise and political assets Russia has already accrued in the G20 process, arguing that though such strategy will require organizational, financial and human resources mobilization, it will allow overcome existing and potential risks for promoting Russia’ priorities, such as declining share of the world GDP, geopolitical tensions, rise of new powers, aggravation of tensions between developed and developing countries and sliding level of consensus in the G20.

Models of «business twenty» governance: possibilities of optimization

Abstract: The article investigates the activities and structure of the «Group of Twenty» (G20) main outreach group - «Business Twenty» (B20). «Group of Twenty» is one of the leading international economic summitry institutions, which has enough capacity to infl uence on the development and implementation at the level of global community policies. B20 aims at facilitating the development of sustainable economic growth which, in turn, would contribute to job creation as well as representation and protection of the interests of the national business communities in dialogue with the G20. One of the main B20 objectives is to make an impact on the G20 agenda and fi nal commitments, with an emphasis on the consolidated interests of the global business community as the main participants of the outreach group are business associations, CEOs of global corporations, consulting organizations. The approach to the B20 organization differs, for the seven-year history of the G20-B20 dialogue the permanent format has not been worked out and there is no unifi ed, rolling from the Chairman to Chairman mechanism of representation of the business interests within the «Group of Twenty». Analysis of different «Business Twenty» organizational models allowed to sort out the main elements of the institution entrusted with executive functions: Chairman of «Business Twenty», «Troika», Chairs and Co-Chairs of Task Forces. The investigation suggests possible ways of their optimization in accordance with the criterion of effi ciency which is defi ned by the engagement of business community in the process of recommendations development, ensure of the maximum implementation of the business-community recommendations in the «Group of Twenty» fi nal documents, possibility of a subsequent implementation of the assumed by «Group of Twenty» obligations.

TTIP and the ‘finance exception’: Venue-shopping and the breakdown of financial regulatory coordination

This article asks why financial market regulatory coordination did not form a major part of the US and EU negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Given the highly interconnected nature of transatlantic financial services, common experiences of insufficient regulation exposed by the global financial crisis, the G20 commitments made by both blocs, and the awareness that uncoordinated re-regulation could threaten global financial stability, the United States and the EU arguably had every incentive to make financial services a central pillar of the TTIP. Yet financial services coordination is conspicuous by its absence. We argue that the breakdown in financial coordination was driven by the fact that US authorities moved more quickly and in ways less appreciated by major actors in the financial sector than their EU counterparts in implementing the G20 agenda. This has given rise to ‘venue-shopping’ on the part of the largest financial firms. Rather than try to tackle US regulatory agencies head-on, they hope to gain traction on the US regulatory process by influencing how European partners approach contentious issues. We conclude that where we used to worry that firms would shop the lightest regulatory environment, now there is concern that they will shop the most porous lobbying arena.

G20 and Development

In May 2014, Griffith University and the Lowy Institute for International Policy jointly organized the conference ‘G20 and Development’. This conference brought together academics, policymakers, representatives of the civil society and other development stakeholders to discuss the role of the G20 as a development actor. Four key themes were addressed: ( i) the G20 as a global steering committee: performance and challenges, ( ii) the G20 as a development actor: governance, agenda and accountability, ( iii) mainstreaming development in the G20 agenda and ( iv) G20’s contribution in other development policy areas. This article provides an overview of the discussion around these four themes. JEL Classification: F53, F55, O10

Global economic governance throught soft-law instruments

This paper analyses a new, world-wide political debate on the issues of global economic coordination and regulation, exemplified by the Group of Twenty (G20). Major contending issues include the institutional aspect, i.e. who should regulate the global economy, the structural aspect, i.e. how this global regulation should be structured and organized, and the implementational aspect, i.e. how globally-agreed principles and norms should be implemented within national boundaries of hard law. In the today's Westphalian world, from the legal and political points of view, soft law system may open opportunities for coordinated policies to be successfully implemented on the national level. Firstly, the paper makes an overview of the global governance concept, then it analyzes the G20 agenda and finally it presents the soft-law approach as probably the only feasible possibility to commence the process of creating a global economic policy and regulation.

Fault Lines and Issue Linkages at the G20: New Challenges for Global Economic Governance

AbstractThe G20 emerged at the center stage of global economic governance in 2008. At the time, it was designed to be an inclusive and effective intergovernmental body. However, we find evidence of a slowdown of the G20's development by tracing the evolution of the G20 agenda during the seven summits held to date. We argue that the principle reason for the lack of progress is that the expansion of the issues covered by this international organization created new dividing lines among G20 members and also made preexisting ones more salient. Rather than reaching increasingly shallow consensus on a wider a range of issues, state leaders should sharpen the G20 agenda, avoid politicization, and frame issues in ways that prevent the formation of opposition along national lines.

The Evolution of Green Growth Policy: An Unwelcome Intrusion on Global Environmental Governance?

I. IntroductionThe term 'green growth' was coined in 2009 by policy makers and practitioners of international organizations. The concept of growth was allegedly borrowed from the Green New Deal of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the term itself was first used during the 2005 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)'s Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific (the 5th Conference) after having been mentioned in early 2000 in the Economist and at the Davos Forum.1 Several years later, South Korea took the lead using the term, at the occasion of the Presidential speech on 15 August 2008 entitled 'Low-Carbon Green Growth'. However, similar language with a similar meaning to growth had started to be used much earlier by a number of environmental economists.2 In the 1970s, the controversial book entitled 'the Limit to Growth',3 once again widely evoked the debates over the concerns on growth and its environmental impact.The reasons for the rather abrupt resurgence and international endorsement of the notion of growth as a new narrative of economic growth since 2009 are manifold. First of all, this resurgence is partly attributed to the economic crisis. Countries were eager to seek new sources of growth during this difficult and critical juncture for the global economy. The core elements of growth, including employment, innovation, technology, and investment, appealed to many political leaders of developed countries. Secondly, it was a commonly held view that the results of sustainable development were rather unsatisfactory. Sustainable development has been criticized for remaining mere environmental rhetoric that addressed neither urgent environmental issues nor development.Against that backdrop, green and growth-two words that appear difficult to reconcile or even inherently conflicting-were combined to form the growth agenda, which was adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) during its 2009 Ministerial Council Meeting chaired by Han Seung-soo, the then Prime Minister of Korea. In many industrialized countries at that time, the adoption of growth as a national agenda contributed temporarily to more or less placating radical environmental activism that advocates an anti-global and anti-growth vision in favour of strict environmental protection.4 Green growth was expected to be a policy tool which demonstrates that caring for the environment and economic growth are compatible and even mutually reinforcing.In the more recent past, re-structuring of global environmental governance is witnessed in the international community, which is tuning its vision to growth while relying less on the ambivalent concept of sustainable development. Global growth governance represented by the Group of 20 (G20) has positively streamlined growth into the G20 agenda. A search for common denominators between the two areas of governance-economic growth on the one hand and the environment on the other hand-helps yield synergetic effects toward economic growth with the assurance of environmental improvements.Academic debates on growth itself are still at a rudimentary stage. At both normative and empirical levels, disagreements around the issue of growth at present can be broadly divided into the optimistic defenders and the sceptics. The former tend to highlight the possible synergies between and growth through innovation and investment, similarly with technological optimists advocating the incorporation of growth into the existing discourse.Sceptics, on the other hand, tend to stress the negative aspects of growth. They do so on the grounds that it lacks, first of all, a global vision-it is a theoretical retreat with no substantial policy implications. Thus it is merely an intrusion on the existing global environmental governance which has been built around the sustainable development notion. …

The EU at the G20 and the G20's Impact on the EU

This working paper analyses the relationship between the European Union and the G20, with an emphasis on how the two bodies have impacted and shaped each other’s agendas. Both entities mark, in very different ways, a changing world order in which states are cooperating ever more closely in order to tackle transnational challenges. However, the relationship between both entities deserves more attention. In this working paper, both the representation of the EU (and its Member States) at the G20 and the impact of G20 decisions on EU legislation are analysed. We argue that the relationship between both organizations is at the same time problematic and symbiotic. Symbiotic as the EU has influenced the functioning of the G20 while the G20 agenda has itself had an impact on EU legislation. It is problematic in the sense that the EU is arguably over-represented in the G20, and there is little in the EU’s treaties to guide the relationship between the EU and global processes such as the G20.

Civil Society Relationships with the G20: An Extension of the G8 Template or Distinctive Pattern of Engagement?

The central question that this work asks is whether the relationship between the G20 summit process and civil society is path dependent on the template built up with respect to the G8. Or, alternatively, does the G20–civil society relationship move towards a distinct autonomous pattern? Through the perspective of the G8 template it is the differences as much as the basic similarities that stand out with respect to the G20. Civil society recognised the significance of the G20 as a site both of delivery and resistance far quicker than they did with the G8—although the process of engagement did not take place as quickly as might have been expected given the scale of the impact of the global financial crisis. In terms of scope, there has not developed the sense of connection with the G20 agenda as occurred previously with the G8. In terms of form, there remains a more nuanced approach to the relationship between civil society and G20 than the two ends of the “Genoa” and “Gleneagles” spectrum established with the G8.

Improving Energy Market Regulation: Domestic and International Issues

Recent extreme energy price highs and volatility have brought worldwide attention to the regulation of commodity markets in the context of the broader global financial overhaul. As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. government now mandatescentralized clearing and margin and capital requirements. But commodity markets are globally integrated and international policy coordination is required for effective market regulation. Improved regulation and supervision of commodity markets has been highlighted in the G20 agenda. Essential details of the new global regulatory landscape still need to be fleshed out, particularly in five major areas: physical transparency; financial transparency; centralized clearing and standardized contracts; capital and margin requirements; and position limits. This paper presents energy policy options that achieve market efficiency by preventing market manipulation, manage systemic risk, and control excessive volatility.

Global financial system reform: the Dodd‐Frank Act and the G20 agenda

PurposeThe Dodd‐Frank Act of 2010 is the keystone policy response directed at reforming US financial system activities and oversight in the wake of the 2007‐2009 financial crisis. The USA also has financial system reform policy commitments in the international arena, including in particular by virtue of its membership in the G20. The purpose of this paper is to consider US policy initiatives related to a core dimension of financial system reform: risks posed by systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).Design/methodology/approachThe paper provides a deta‘iled comparison of SIFI policy initiatives and timetables under both the Dodd‐Frank Act and the G20 agenda, as reflected in the ongoing work plan of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and poses the question “Are US domestic and international financial system reform commitments in sync?”FindingsThe study finds that, fundamentally, the answer is “yes.” However, the comparison yields two caveats with potential policy implications. First, the two agendas differ in their relative emphasis on the coverage of both banks and nonbanks. The G20/FSB focus, at least over the near‐term, is bank‐centric compared with the Dodd‐Frank Act, which consistently addresses both bank and nonbank financial firms. Second, implementation of Dodd‐Frank Act provisions is subject to long‐established US law mandating that there be sufficient opportunity for public input into the rulemaking process, whereas the G20/FSB process has been less systematic and transparent on public consultation and feedback.Practical implicationsThese observations may be relevant to the current debate over the speed and scope of Dodd‐Frank Act implementation measures, and to the discussion about the future international competitiveness of US banks and nonbank financial firms.Originality/valueThis study is the first to present a detailed, comprehensive comparison of financial system reform initiatives and provisions in the Dodd‐Frank Act and the G20 agenda.

El G20 y la remodelación financiera más allá de 2009. Legitimación y retos del nuevo diseño institucional para el desarrollo

El artículo estudia el papel que el G20 tiene en el nuevo diseño institucional del Fondo Monetario Internacional y del Banco Mundial tras la crisis financiera 2008-2009. A partir de una breve revisión histórica relativa a la creación del Sistema Bretton Woods, así como de las funciones de ambas instituciones financieras, el documento da cuenta de los avances en la agenda del G20 en el diseño organizacional, y distingue algunos de los principales retos en tal ejercicio. La hipótesis de trabajo del autor se centra en que, si bien el G20 tiene una innegable representatividad mundial, su legitimación en el rediseño institucional del sistema financiero multilateral solamente puede darse a partir de una efectiva democratización de las instituciones y de sus objetivos; los cuales se basan en las recomendaciones de la Comisión para el Análisis del Desarrollo Económico y el Progreso Social, creada en la primavera de 2008 a iniciativa del gobierno francés.

The International Energy Agency in Global Energy Governance

Abstract The International Energy Agency (IEA) is the organization that, despite its constrained membership, is as close as the world currently comes to a global focal point on the key energy governance arenas. Although when the IEA was established in the 1970s it had the specific and limited purpose of enabling the world’s leading oil consumers to undertake collective action in response to oil supply shocks, it now finds itself at the center of many of the key developments in global energy governance. Its evolution and current challenges reflect the key themes of this special issue: the competition between state and market, the emergence of multipolarity, the particular growing importance of Asia and the rise of climate change on the agenda of key tasks needing governance. The article focuses on where the agency now fits in the larger global energy governance panoply. Policy Implications • The IEA’s highly successful partnership with the G8 will not easily extend to the G20, given the latter’s much more diverse membership and interests. Both the IEA and the G20 governments should look to the experience of the G8’s ‘tasking’ of the IEA for ideas about how to advance the G20 agenda on energy. • The IEA’s governing board should systematically assess the agency’s role as a linchpin in a variety of energy-related regimes and consider how to ensure that the IEA is adequately resourced so that it can fill these multiple roles. • The IEA’s affiliation with the OECD should be reassessed to facilitate the agency’s engagement with major emerging oil consumers, particularly India and China.

U.S. Domestic and International Financial Reform Policy: Are G20 Commitments and the Dodd-Frank Act in Sync?

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 is the keystone policy response directed at reforming U.S. financial system activities and oversight in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The United States also has financial system reform policy commitments in the international arena, including in particular by virtue of its membership in the G20. This analysis considers U.S. policy initiatives related to a core dimension of financial system reform: risks posed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). It provides a comparison of SIFI policy initiatives and timetables under both the Dodd-Frank Act and the G20 agenda, as reflected in the ongoing work plan of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and poses the question Are U.S. domestic and international financial system reform commitments in sync? While finding that, fundamentally, the answer is yes, the detailed comparison yields two caveats with potential policy implications. First, the two agendas differ in their relative emphasis on the coverage of both banks and nonbanks. The G20/FSB focus, at least over the near-term, is bank-centric compared with the Dodd-Frank Act, which consistently addresses both bank and nonbank financial firms. Second, implementation of Dodd-Frank Act provisions is subject to long-established U.S. law mandating that there be sufficient opportunity for public input into the rulemaking process, whereas the G20/FSB process has been less systematic and transparent on public consultation and feedback. The lesser emphasis on transparency and public input characterizing the G20/FSB policy development process may be attributable in part to the somewhat more rapid pace of the G20/FSB agenda relative to corresponding Dodd-Frank Act timelines. These observations may be relevant to the current debate over the speed and scope of Dodd-Frank Act implementation measures, and to the discussion about the future international competitiveness of U.S. banks and nonbank financial firms.

U.S. Domestic and International Financial Reform Policy: Are G20 Commitments and the Dodd-Frank Act in Sync?

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 is the keystone policy response directed at reforming U.S. financial system activities and oversight in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The United States also has financial system reform policy commitments in the international arena, including in particular by virtue of its membership in the G20. This analysis considers U.S. policy initiatives related to a core dimension of financial system reform: risks posed by systemically important financial institutions ('SIFIs'). It provides a comparison of SIFI policy initiatives and timetables under both the Dodd-Frank Act and the G20 agenda, as reflected in the ongoing work plan of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and poses the question 'Are U.S. domestic and international financial system reform commitments in sync?' While finding that, fundamentally, the answer is 'yes,' the detailed comparison yields two caveats with potential policy implications. First, the two agendas differ in their relative emphasis on the coverage of both banks and nonbanks. The G20/FSB focus, at least over the near-term, is bank-centric compared with the Dodd-Frank Act, which consistently addresses both bank and nonbank financial firms. Second, implementation of Dodd-Frank Act provisions is subject to long-established U.S. law mandating that there be sufficient opportunity for public input into the rulemaking process, whereas the G20/FSB process has been less systematic and transparent on public consultation and feedback. The lesser emphasis on transparency and public input characterizing the G20/FSB policy development process may be attributable in part to the somewhat more rapid pace of the G20/FSB agenda relative to corresponding Dodd-Frank Act timelines. These observations may be relevant to the current debate over the speed and scope of Dodd-Frank Act implementation measures, and to the discussion about the future international competitiveness of U.S. banks and nonbank financial firms.

G2 in G20: China, the United States and the World after the Global Financial Crisis

AbstractThe post‐global financial crisis world will be increasingly dominated by China and the United States. What the de facto G2 do, together, independently or in conflict, will increasingly define the global bounds of the possible. Both countries want to embed their bilateral diplomacy in the multilateralism of the G20. The problem for the emergent G2 in G20 global architecture is that economic relations between China and the US will be increasingly difficult to manage. The large economic imbalances between the two countries, in which China buys American debt and Americans buy Chinese goods, will endure. Before the crisis, the codependence these imbalances created was a source of stability in Sino–American relations. After the crisis, they will be a source of frustration and conflict, as the second half of 2009 showed. To manage economic relations between China and the US effectively, the G20 agenda will have to move from crisis management to strategic planning for the global economy. The G20 will also have to become more institutionalized, but in a way that resembles more a nonexecutive board of directors of a multinational firm than a management committee of C‐level executives.Policy Implications The world will be characterized by a de facto China–US G2 after the financial crisis. Despite new commitments from both countries, large‐scale China–US economic imbalances will persist. Dueling protectionism and economic nationalism are the biggest potential medium‐term threats to China–US relations. Nesting the de facto G2 in the de jure G20 is the best hope for managing China–US tensions. The G20 should be institutionalized as the board of directors for overseeing the Bretton Woods system, not as a replacement for it.