One of the informal slanders leveled at the international relations literature is the reproach that the profession experiences many heroic take-offs but few safe landings. Because it exhibits a similar imbalance between theoretical ambition and empirical evidence, International Norms and Decision Making by Gary Goertz must be evaluated against this backdrop. Goertz endeavors to ground regime theoryFwhich he equates with the theory of international normsFfirmly in decision-making analysis. His rigorous treatise on the sources of international collaboration is like a first step in a long-term research project. In the book Goertz attempts to reconcile different strands in international relations theory, ranging from constructivism to formal theory. Borrowing the concept of ‘‘punctuated equilibrium’’ from paleontology, he tries in particular to explain the evolution of international norms with a functionalist logic. This approach is daring given the devastating criticism that functionalist arguments have received during the past decades from such eminent theorists as John Harsanyi (1969) and Jon Elster (1982). Yet, Goertz shields his argument preemptively against the rationalist objection that his model does not possess solid microfoundations, which is the standard argument of what he calls the ‘‘expected utility theorists.’’ Specifically, Goertz contends that his model rises above this criticism because it possesses a superior predictive accuracy. To understand the gist of Goertz’s argument, we need to explore the idea of ‘‘punctuated equilibrium.’’ This concept stems from the path-breaking work of two maverick paleontologists: Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould (1972). They forcefully argued in the 1970s that evolution proceeds in a stop-and-go rather than a gradual fashion. Goertz adapts this insight, which is disputed even among paleontologists, to questions of international and comparative politics. Specifically, he contendsFin contrast to the incrementalist school of thought (Wildavsky 1975)Fthat in social systems, and thus also in international organization, extended periods of immobility tend to give way to sudden phases of significant change. This pattern of institutional development holds, for instance, for the European Union, in which protracted periods of institutional sclerosis follow short-lived integration breakthroughs (Schneider and Cederman 1994). Fortunately, in his analysis of what he calls ‘‘big bang’’ decisions, Goertz moves quickly from the purely metaphorical level and adopts fuzzy set logic to construct actual models of institutional change. (For more information about fuzzy set logic, see Cioffi-Revilla 1981.) Yet, even though he offers some interesting empirical illustrations of such questions as international sanctions, Goertz does not systematically examine the predictive power of his functionalist model compared with the alternative expected utility framework. A comparison of the models remains purely verbal. Indeed, Goertz repeatedly sidesteps any challenge from the expected utility
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Mar 23, 2009
H.M Al-Humaidi + 1
Open Access