Future Of Japan Research Articles

After fifty years: the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the context of Anglo-Japanese relations, 1902–52

The approach of the British government towards Japan in 1950–1 was more negative than that of the United States. The British attitude was influenced by several factors: the ignominy of the surrender of Singapore in 1942, resentment at American domination of the Occupation of Japan, apprehension concerning renewed Japanese competition affecting textiles, potteries and shipbuilding, and bitterness resulting from atrocities inflicted on the prisoners-of-war. For most of the century preceding the Pacific War Britain had been the principal power in Eastern Asia and British policy makers found it difficult to adjust to the reduced role Britain occupied in 1950. Labour cabinet ministers revealed some hostility towards Japan during diplomatic exchanges with John Foster Dulles in 1951. Herbert Morrison, the Foreign Secretary, and Hugh Gaitskell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were compelled to accept American decisions except on the limited issue of the Congo Basin treaties where Dulles made a concession to Britain. Significant differences in approach to the rival Chinese regimes also created problems in 1951. British forecasts concerning the future of Japan were negative: it was anticipated that, within a decade, Japan could become assertive, with the risk of reactionary right-wing groups emerging.

America attacks Japan: the invasion that never was

In 1945, the United States and its allies planned the greatest invasion in world history. This work examines what might have happened had that invasion taken place, as well as the lingering controversies over the decision that made all those plans obsolete. It is a story of millions of human lives - those that would fight and that the US military divisions declared expendable, the survivors who wanted to build a new, peaceful Japan and those that were in favour of national suicide. Using extensive original research and interviews, the author shows that history can be influenced by what almost happened as much as by what actually happened. For the Americans, the invasion planning was always linked to concerns about occupation. For the Japanese, the last great defense of the homeland was linked to disagreements over Japan's future.

Japan's Phoenix Economy

A HALF-CENTURY AGO, Japan picked itself up from the ashes of war and, within a few years, stunned the world with its economic achieve ments. In all likelihood, it will do the same again. True, some analysts see muddling through and stagnation as Japan's future. Others even fear the financial system is headed for outright meltdown. But the most likely outcome is that Japan will reform and revive. And if it does so, bringing its host of inefficient sectors up to world benchmarks, it can achieve sustained growth of three percent a year, perhaps more. Japan has already frittered away one decade, skeptics retort. Why should the next one be any different? Because no society puts itself through wrenching transformation until it has exhausted all other alternatives. And for years many of the best and brightest economists claimed that such alternatives existed: just spend more or print more money. As recently as the brief upturn of 1999-2000, many claimed these nostrums were already working; Japan's politicians and people preferred these consoling illusions. Only now have events persuaded the Japanese people that without reform the situation can only get worse. This new awareness was the force behind Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's election in 2001. The first step in solving a problem is admitting you have one. Japan does not have the feel of a failed state. On the contrary, this is still the same nation that created the economic miracle of the 1950S and 1960s. The problem is that the institutions and practices forged

Japan's Past, Japan's Future: One Historian's Odyssey. By Ienaga Saburō. Translated and introduced by Richard H. Minear. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. x, 203 pp. $75.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).

Japan's Past, Japan's Future: One Historian's Odyssey. By Ienaga Saburō. Translated and introduced by Richard H. Minear. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. x, 203 pp. $75.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).

わが国の未来と科学技術政策

わが国の未来と科学技術政策

Japan's past, Japan's future: one historian's odyssey

Chapter 1 Translator's Preface Chapter 2 Translator's Introduction Chapter 3 Recollections from Infancy Chapter 4 Education in the Period of Taisho Democracy and Its Effects on Me Chapter 5 Drawn to History: Recollections of Middle School Chapter 6 A Copernican Revolution in My Educational Life Chapter 7 Student Life after the Extinction of the Student Movement Chapter 8 My Life as a Scholar, Begun in the Era of the Dark Valley Chapter 9 My State of Mind in the Period Immediately after the Defeat Chapter 10 The Beginning of the Reverse Course and the Maturing of My Social Consciousness Chapter 11 To the Filing of the Textbook Lawsuits Chapter 12 The Textbook Trials and the Struggle at Tokyo University of Education

Japan's Past, Japan's Future: One Historian's "Odyssey"

Japan's Past, Japan's Future: One Historian's "Odyssey"

E.H. Norman, Canada and Japan's Postwar Constitution

T he creation of constitutional research commissions in both the upper and lower houses ofJapan's national Diet in 2000 marked a controlled resuscitation of both the historical enquiry and debate regarding the past and future ofJapan's national charter. Controversy regardingJapan's postwar constitution is nothing new. During the 1950s, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) established a similar constitutional review process. One of the aims of that initiative was to eliminate Article IX, the peace clause that theoretically forbids Japan to wage war or to maintain armed forces. Faced, however, with massive and growing popular resistance from a burgeoning peace movement in the 1950s, the LDP allowed this first attempt at constitutional revision to fade into oblivion. Much has changed in the forty years between the two inquiries but one constant impetus to revise the Constitution has been the historical recognition that Japan's constitution was initially drafted by the staff of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). What is less well known is that E. Herbert Norman, a historian of Japan and Canadian diplomat, waged a protracted battle to take the constitutional drafting process away from both SCAP and Japan's ruling oligarchy in order to put it into the hands of the Japanese people themselves. Norman was thwarted in this idealistic endeavor by none other than General MacArthur. Despite SCAP's imperious style in constitution crafting, Norman in the end supportedJapan's new constitution partially because no alternatives were available but also because it enshrined some of the values which he thought reflected the historical aspirations of the Japanese people.

Japan's ODA in the 21st century

In this article, Atsushi Kusano, Professor of Policy Management at Keio University, Tokyo, discusses the challenges facing the Japanese government as it continues its active promotion of official development assistance (ODA). The government is being exposed to competing pressures from the domestic and international communities. In response to these pressures, Professor Kusano argues that the Japanese government should improve the transparency of its ODA program, think strategically and set clear priorities for assistance, and incr ease public understanding and support. However, the future of Japan's ODA program, he says, depends not only on the efforts of the Japanese government, but also on the positive action by the people of Japan and by developing countries themselves.

International order and the future of world politics

Introduction John A. Hall and T. V. Paul Part I. Theories and Strategies: 1. A realist view: three images of the coming international order Michael Mastanduno 2. A liberal view: preserving and expanding the liberal pacific union Michael Doyle 3. Preconditions for prudence: a sociological synthesis of realism and liberalism John A. Hall and T. V. Paul 4. An institutionalist view: international institutions and state strategies Lisa Martin 5. Is the truth out there? Eight questions about international order Steve Smith Part II. Contenders: Major Powers and International Order: 6. Liberal hegemony and the future of American postwar order G. John Ikenberry 7. Russia: responses to relative decline Jack Snyder 8. The European Union: economic giant, political dwarf Juan Diez Medrano 9. Unsteady anticipation: reflections on the future of Japan's changing political economy T. J. Pempel 10. Chinese perspectives on world order Steve Chan 11. India as a limited challenger Baldev Raj Nayar Part III. Challenges: 12. Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state Michael Mann 13. Stateless nations and the emerging international order Hudson Meadwell 14. The coming chaos? Armed conflict at the world's periphery K. J. Holsti 15. Political religion in the twenty-first century Peter van der Veer 16. Environmental security in the coming century Karen T. Litfin 17. Demography, domestic conflict, and the international order Jack A. Goldstone 18. Great equalizers of agents of chaos? Weapons of mass destruction and the emerging world order T. V. Paul Part IV. Conclusions: 19. The state and the future of world politics John A. Hall and T. V. Paul.

Towards the Future of Japan

Towards the Future of Japan

Technological and information transfer: How do some nations learn what other nations know? Japan's experience

Abstract The returns to the rapid acceleration in the growth of gross global product per capita in the past century and a quarter have been very inequitably distributed across nations. Nations that were already relatively wealthy in 1870 have received most of the benefits of this increase in material well‐being. Japan is thus far the only major example of a country that has been able to fully traverse the vast gulf that separates poorer from wealthier nations. Lately other economies in East Asia have experienced such sustained high rates of growth in gross domestic product per capita as to suggest they too will join Japan as non‐Western examples of the world's wealthiest nations. Some doubt has been cast on these optimistic projections by findings that economies such as Taiwan and Korea have grown rapidly, seemingly Soviet‐bloc style, without the benefit of rapid growth in total factor productivity change. Characterizing growth without total factor productivity change as Stalinist, however, is ahistorical...

高密度実装技術 今後どうなるシリーズ 第７回 日本の実装技術はどうあるべきか

高密度実装技術 今後どうなるシリーズ 第７回 日本の実装技術はどうあるべきか

本邦都会住民における血清脂肪酸分画の現状について

Serum fatty acids analyses were performed on subjects in their thirties and fifties living in urban Japan. It is known that the Japanese traditionally consume relatively large amounts of omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids from fresh fish, and this may, in part, contribute to their low incidence of coronary heart disease (CHD).This study was performed to examine the differences of the composition of serum fatty acids (omega-3 and omega-6 ratio) between young and senior people. We surveyed plasma fatty acids in 176 people in their thirties and fifties living in Tokyo. The level of serum cholesterol was 198mg/dl in the first group and 222mg/dl in the second group. The percentage of omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids in the total serum fatty acids was 7.01±1.6% in the younger group and 9.67±1.8% in the elder group (p<0.01). The omega-3/omega-6 ratio was 0.19±0.05 and 0.29±0.09 (p<0.01), respectively.These findings suggest a significant difference in eating habits between young and elderly generations in Japan. A trend in the lower of omega-3 fatty acids from fish meat in the younger generation could be an important factor in the possible increase in occurrence of coronary heart disease in Japan's future.

East Asian Security

Part 1 East Asian security after the Cold War: ripe for rivalry - prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia wealth, power and instability - East Asia and the United States after the Cold War arms and affluence - military acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Part 2 The implications of the rise of China: hegemon on the horizon? China's threat to East Asian security China's illusory threat to the South China Sea East Asia and the constrainment of China China's new old thinking - the concept of limited deterrence Chinese perspectives on nuclear arms control. Part 3 The future of Japan's security role: Japan's national security - structures, norms and policies from sword to chrysanthemum - Japan's culture of anti-militarism the glorification of war in Japanese education.

The rise and fall of Japanese productiuity

AbstractLong considered a leader in productivity improvement and the techniques to spur competitive advantage, Japan of late has been suffering from the effects of a stagnant economy. In this insightful interview, Joli Arai, secretary general of the International Productivity Service in Washington, DC. details how Japan rose to economic prominence following World War II and the events that led to Japan's current economic woes. Despite his homeland's present‐day challenges, Arai believes in the viability of the Japanese productivity model, and he paints an optimistic picture of Japan's future in the burgeoning Asian market.

Utilizing CCRC Concept for Long-term Care Policy of Japan

Summary Japan's demographic profile is rapidly changing due to its low birth rate and its unsurpassed longevity. On the other hand, the family's caring capacity for the elderly is weakening because of a changing of household structure, a change of consciousness for supporting parents, and an increase of working women. In response to these problems, the Ministry of Health and Welfare is constructing a new nursing care system which focuses on promoting home health care through the New Gold Plan and the establishment of a public nursing care insurance system. In Northern Europe and the U. S., senior housing with home health care services is playing a significant role as an efficient and effective long-term care option for the elderly. In the U.S., CCRCs (Continuing Care Retirement Com)nunities) has been evaluated as a new senior housing program. In Japan, the preparation of senior housing has been far behind the need and more senior housing is needed in order to deliver quality of care and control health care costs. CCRCs should be a significant model in preparing senior housing programs which will be key for home health care for the elderly in the future ofJapan.

Who Rules Japan?: The Inner Circles of Economic and Political Power.

Preface The Iron Triangle: The Nature and Impact of Japanese Elites Japan: Some Key Aspects of Social Structure and Culture From Bakufu to Keiretsu: The Making of the Japanese Upper Class The Corporate Elite: A New Upper Class of Japan, Inc. The Bureaucratic Elite: The Guiding Hand and Training Ground for a New Upper Class The Political Elite: Junior Partner and Protectorate Uniting for Power: Intermarriage, Keibatsu, Business Groups, and Social Clubs The Todai Connection: Elite Recruitment and Reproduction Japan's Mass Society: People Control for Elite Power Elites and the Future of Japan: Some Final Thoughts Notes References

Reformers Fight to Draw More Students Into Science

TOKYO— On a hot and muggy evening this summer, a classroom at Shotoku Gakuen High School began to fill up with people carrying wires, tubes, and chunks of metal. They each took turns demonstrating simple experiments and discussing how to work them into classroom activities. One illustrated the

The Dialectics of Globalization: Whose Globalization Is It Anyway?

The term has recently become quite fashionable in international relations. Despite this attraction, however, the term lacks clarity. Against this backdrop, Takashi Inoguchi's Global Change represents an ambitious attempt to elucidate the dimensions of the globalization process (and the backlash to it) in systematic and comprehensive way. Inoguchi's argument, based implicitly on the Hegelian account of social change, develops conceptualization of the globalization process that he calls dialectics. This account draws uniquely convincing map of contemporary world affairs. Unfortunately, Inoguchi does not successfully avoid the defects inherent in what is basically structuralist theoretical approach. In previous article, Inoguchi (1989) outlined four possible scenarios for Japan's future: (1) resurgence of U.S. hegemony-Pax Americana (2) tight relationship between Japan and the United States that he called bigemony, (3) Pax Consortis in which no single state can dominate and control the rest, and (4) an emergence ofJapan as the dominant economic power-Pax Nipponica. Based on such as the neutralization of the nuclear arsenals, technological dynamism, and the historical debt of World War II, Inoguchi concluded that the first scenario (Pax Americana II) was the most likely in the short or middle term but that the third scenario (Pax Consortis) was the most probable in the long term. In Global Change, despite the significant changes that have occurred in the international system since 1989, Inoguchi argues that this conclusion remains valid (p. 41). Global Change, therefore, is complementary exposition intended to go beyond his earlier focus on Japan. In short, Inoguchi seeks to provide systematic explanation of current world affairs, including contemporary issues of national security, world economy, and state sovereignty. In particular, he seeks to analyze the so-called globalization process. Throughout the book, Inoguchi bases his analysis on what he calls account of world affairs, that is, an account that runs contrary to Newtonian linear dynamics. According to Inoguchi, dialectics means a viewpoint which brings light to the reciprocal relation of immanently conflictive factors (p. 36) in the globalization process. His dialectical approach pays exclusive attention to the immanent contradictions that social phenomena contain. Through this dialectic lens, many ongoing processes in the contemporary world that have been inappropriately named as ends (for example, the end of the Cold War, the end of geography, and the end of history) become transformed. These ends are no longer seen literally as end states. Instead, they are seen as states within ongoing, indeed endless,