Future Of Human Beings Research Articles

Existence value and intrinsic value

In this paper, the concept of existence value is related to the notion of intrinsic value current in environmental ethics, the methods employed to measure existence-value are discussed, and thus the question is investigated as to whether these methods are a satisfactory means of taking non-use value into account in practical decision-making. In particular I argue, against Jonathan Aldred, that not all bearers of intrinsic value satisfy his definition of existence value: plausible counter-examples include undiscovered and future bearers of such value (Section 2). I also raise difficulties for the two proposed measures of existence-value; willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept (Section 3). Finally, I conclude, in Section 4 that to base decision-making on the valuations of valuers in a free market fails to give value its due. A method is instead needed which, unlike those associated with existence value, more directly takes into account and weighs up the good or the interests of future human beings and of nonhuman entities.

Las fronteras del hombre y la investigación educacional

Partiendo de que nos encontramos en un momento de enorme plasticidad del mundo y de nuestra especie, el texto hace la invitación a considerar algunas reflexiones sobre lo que se pudiera llamar las fronteras de la especie, explorando tres dimensiones que no son circunstanciales: el pensamiento, la belleza y la responsabilidad ética. La triple apertura que converge en la capacidad humana inherente y necesaria de crear continuamente "visiones desiderativas" del mundo. La pregunta con la que el texto cierra y además de la que invita a hacer reflexión es la siguiente: ¿qué desmesura del deseo nos es hoy necesaria para proteger la libertad de los seres humanos futuros?

Ethics and economics of conservation

Nature can be valued in its own right or as an instrument for the benefit of humankind. The second valuation, although less fundamental from a philosophical point of view, is sufficient to substantiate conservation as a moral duty. The harm done to future human beings in burdening them with the prospect of life in an ecologically impoverished world cannot be justified by moral standards of a civilized society when we consider the fact that conservation costs are not excessive. Species and ecosystems can be thought of as economic resources possessing special properties: they can be irreversibly destroyed, their future usefulness is a matter of uncertainty, their services are difficult to replace and they exhibit properties of public goods. All aspects combined, prudence suggests that we must as far as possible prevent extinctions. Even from a purely anthropocentric point of view it is logically impossible to assess the full monetary value of an irreversibly destructible ecological asset because for this purpose we would need to know the valuations of all future human beings. It is meaningless, therefore, to ask how much money a species is ‘worth’. However, monetarization is possible within a limited scope. Many benefits obtained from species are amenable to evaluation in monetary terms. Independently, willingness-to-pay studies disclose the subjective value people place on species and biotopes. Despite numerous methodological problems, the costs of conservation can in most cases be assessed at least approximately. In principle, they amount to the maximum monetary benefit foregone if profitable but nature-adverse activities are displaced by conservation. Many empirical studies reveal low conservation costs by macroeconomic standards. In Germany, many conservation objectives in forests could be achieved virtually without any cost at all. A rather ambitious hypothetical conservation programme mainly for the agrarian countryside would bring about social costs of one thousand million DM per year. According to a first estimate, willingness-to-pay amounts to at least three thousand million DM per year.

Commentary: Maintaining the Somatic/Germ-Line Distinction: Some Ethical Drawbacks

Determinations of the ethical acceptability of genetic therapy have relied on several distinctions in attempts to separate ethically acceptable genetic therapy from those possible therapies that could lead to genetic modifications of future human beings. One distinction that has been proposed is that genetic modifications of human somatic cells is ethically acceptable but that germ-line genetics modifications would be ethically objectionable. This paper examines several serious difficulties which call into question the ethical relevance of a somatic/germ-line distinction.

Citizens and Consumers Look at Their State Mental Hospitals

number of articles written, lectures delivered, and symposia held on The future role of state mental is increasing at an exponential rate. reason is not hard to find. precipitous and continuing decline in the resident patient populations of these costly, generally isolated, and essentially custodial institutions compels a basic reassessment of the total mental health services delivery system within which the state hospitals have played so dominant a role. To some, the progressive dissolution of these massive facilities, each warehousing from two to nine thousand human beings, inspires hope for a better future for the oncoming waves of the mentally disordered. To others, the same phenomenon presages the death knell of the orderly, disciplined, authoritative, and serene lives they have for so long been accustomed to enjoy. I respectfully submit that the future we should be talking about is not the future of the state mental hospitals a timeand use -limited artifact of society but the present and future of human beings in distress. real question and the true starting point of any relevant discussion of the subject should

Shall we "reproduce"? I. The medical ethics of in vitro fertilization.

I must judge that in vitro fertilization constitutes unethical medical experimentation on possible future human beings, and therefore it is subject to absolute moral prohibition. I ask that my exact language be noted: I said, unethical experimentation onpossible future human beings. By this, I mean the childto-be, the successful experiments when they come. I mean to exclude three things that could be said additionally to make a showing of medical immorality and a notation of illicitness upon the trials that are currently being performed. Excluded are (1) the charge that before going to human experimentation physicians should not have omitted first proving their technique in species more closely related to man, on the primates, eg, monkeys. This is a question of the background needed in the experimental design which an amateur cannot judge. Still I do know enough about discussions among ethical physicians concerning the need to complete the

Shall We "Reproduce"?

I must judge that in vitro fertilization constitutes unethical medical experimentation on possible future human beings, and therefore it is subject to absolute moral prohibition. I ask that my exact language be noted: I said, unethical experimentation on<i>possible future human beings</i>. By this, I mean the childto-be, the "successful" experiments when they come. I mean to exclude three things that could be said additionally to make a showing of medical immorality and a notation of illicitness upon the trials that are currently being performed. Excluded are (1) the charge that before going to human experimentation physicians should not have omitted first proving their technique in species more closely related to man, on the primates, eg, monkeys. This is a question of the background needed in the experimental design which an amateur cannot judge. Still I do know enough about discussions among ethical physicians concerning the need to complete the