Future Of Britain Research Articles

The Anarchist and the Technocrat: Herbert Read, C. P. Snow, and the Future of Britain

Abstract A conceptual revision occurred at the heart of anarchist theory between the end of the nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries. As anarchist thinkers grappled with a state transformed beyond recognition by technological change, they reassessed their critique of state power and the rhetorical methods used to expose its inherent violence. Where nineteenth-century anarchists favored organic metaphors to emphasize the monstrosity of the state, twentieth-century anarchists tended to adopt a set of mechanical metaphors. This change focused attention on the idea of technocracy, and informed a more comprehensive assessment of the state's activities. This article analyses this innovation in anarchist political thought, before tracing it through to Herbert Read's critical appraisal of C. P. Snow's influential lecture “The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution,” and Snow's response to Read. Their debate, in which Read challenged Snow's argument that the pursuit of technological and political modernization was essential to maintain the nation's international role and address the social and economic challenges of the mid-century, was a contest for Britain's future. Drawing on his anarchism, Read saw such ideas as an existential threat, with the unthinking promotion of a technological “revolution” imperiling “the tender shoots of all that is human.” Contextualizing Read in his anarchist intellectual milieu, this article recovers a neglected voice in British intellectual and cultural history, the complexities of an overlooked political tradition, and a radical vision of Britain's future that questioned the dominant assumptions of the age.

‘A Menace to England’: The Egg Collector as Arch-Villain in Two 1940s Bird Novels

This paper examines the figure of the egg collector as an arch-villain in two novels about rare birds that were published in the 1940s: Adventure Lit Their Star by Kenneth Allsop, and The Awl Birds by J.K. Stanford. Drawing on insights from birdwatching literature published in the same period, I demonstrate that the extreme vilification of the egg collector in both texts represents a dramatic change in attitude towards a pastime that was previously considered beneficial for both adults and children. This about-face, I suggest, can be explained by reading the desperate rush to protect the birds’ eggs as an expression of deep contemporary anxieties over the future of Britain after the Second World War, and in particular a concern that the failures of the period after the First World War should not be repeated.

Penny Post Imperialists: Imagining and Experiencing Empire in Letters to the Colonial Office, 1903

ABSTRACT This article examines a collection of several hundred letters sent to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain in 1903. Written by British and colonial subjects from a wide range of different backgrounds and residing across the world, these letters addressed a variety of issues in the political, social, and imperial life of Edwardian British World. The collection offers a window into the minds and lives of a conscious and actively engaged sample of British and colonial subjects. The authors frequently wrote on the subject of British imperialism, sharing their ideas, feelings, and interactions with the empire with one of Britain’s most outspoken imperialists. The letters demonstrate a broad consensus of support for and pride in the empire. The particular ways in which individual authors conceptualised and defined theirs and Britain’s imperial relationships, however, show a variety of disagreements about the present and future of Britain’s place in the world. Nevertheless, these authors recognised their nation was inextricably connected with the rest of the world and could not exist in isolation, and understood and articulated this connection through the language of imperialism.

Changing tides of industrial democracy: Red Clydeside and the UCS work-in as political heritage

ABSTRACTDrawing on labour history, critical heritage studies and sociological literature on the entrepreneurial city, this article focuses on the cultural legacy of the famous 1971/72 Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) work-in apropos Glasgow’s historical reputation as ‘Red Clydeside’. In doing so, the article considers the dispute’s continuing importance as a political resource for present-day debates about workers’ rights, Glasgow’s post-industrial identity, the rise of populist demagoguery and the future of Britain’s industry more generally.

Brexit, CANZUK, and the legacy of empire

The Brexit referendum triggered a feverish debate over the future of Britain. Critics warn of a country stripped of its international influence, while advocates insist that it marks the beginning of a new phase in British engagement with the world. This article explores a notable development in the ideological debate. Some prominent Brexit supporters endorse the idea of CANZUK, a union of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We analyse CANZUK as an attempt to develop a fruitful post-Brexit imaginary and as a case of transnational elite advocacy. We begin by placing CANZUK in the context of debates over the ‘Anglosphere’. We then map the CANZUK advocacy network. Next, we examine past plans for uniting English-speaking polities, tracing the idea back to late 19th-century debates over settler colonialism. We end by sketching some reasons to be sceptical about the project.

‘The Injustice of the Woman's Vote’: opposition to female suffrage after World War I

Winning the vote in 1918 for British women over the age of thirty and, in 1928, on equal terms with men, did not mean that the controversy over the legitimacy and soundness of women's suffrage ceased to exist during the interwar period. In the context of the backlash against egalitarian feminism, many men and women remained opposed to women's suffrage. This article presents the views of three individual women, Arabella Kenealy, Charlotte Cowdroy and Charlotte Haldane, who, although they held diverging views on politics and feminism, agreed that female suffrage might have adverse consequences for the future of Britain. They shared the widely accepted views on the disappearance of sex differences and on the danger of ‘race degeneration’, which led them to advance critical views on female suffrage.

Learning the Strategic Lessons from Afghanistan

Decisions surrounding Britain's involvement in Afghanistan continue to be the subject of heated debate among policy-making and military circles. Far from apportioning blame, argues Mungo Melvin, a constructive assessment of the decisions made on Afghanistan will provide useful lessons for the future of Britain's strategy-making.

New Labour's foreign policy, and what should come next

A progressive UK foreign policy in the years ahead will need to advance the causes of justice, democracy and sustainability in a multi‐polar world, argue ippr researchers Andy Hull, Sarah Mulley and David Nash. Here they critically review the recent past and possible future of Britain's relationship with the world.

The British are “Taking to the Boat”: Australian Attempts to Forestall Britain's Military Disengagement from Southeast Asia, 1965–1966

This article examines the strategies pursued by the Australian Liberal-Country Party coalition governments of Robert Menzies and Harold Holt in their quest to secure a continuing British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore. It focuses on the first eighteen months of the Wilson premiership (October 1964–March 1966) when Labour's thinking on the future of Britain's defence role east of Suez was still fluid and had not yet crystallised into a firm decision to withdraw from “east of Suez.” In doing so, the article considers whether both Menzies and Holt did all they could to encourage London to remain politically and militarily engaged in Southeast Asia. In addressing this question, this study provides an interesting insight into the conduct of post-war Australian foreign policy and the management of Australia's relations with its major allies, the United States and Britain.

A Nuclear Legacy

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

A Nuclear Future

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Introduction

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Conclusions

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Deterrence

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Future Nuclear Capability

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

The future of Britain's electricity supply — vision or muddle?

The future of Britain's electricity supply — vision or muddle?

The future of Britain's nuclear deterrent

The British government has indicated that initial decisions about the long-term future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent capability are likely to be required within the life-time of the present Parliament, which could extend to 2010. It has not explained what aspects of the capability – warheads, missiles or submarines – may be the prime drivers of the decision timetable, nor what it regards as the prime considerations bearing on whether or how to renew the capability. A strategic case for continuance has to relate primarily to the very difficulty of prediction in a potentially dangerous word. For many observers, a crucial question will be how much a preferred renewal option would cost.

Broadcasts of Deliberative Polls: Aspirations and Effects

Every face-to-face Deliberative Poll (DP) to date has been the subject of a television broadcast. We consider these broadcasts a helpful adjunct to the design – a way of motivating both the random sample and the policy experts and policy makers to attend, of educating the broader public about the issues, and, perhaps, of nudging public opinion in the direction of the results. In ‘Rickety Bridges’, John Parkinson examines just one of these broadcasts, Channel 4's on the DP on the future of Britain's National Health Service (NHS) in 1998. Applying his coding of the contents to other DP broadcasts might or might not yield similar results, but we are happy to assume, for argument's sake, that it would. If DP broadcasts are generally doing what he describes the NHS DP broadcast as doing, they are doing pretty well, at least as far as the distribution of coverage is concerned. It is Parkinson's notion of what they should be doing that is mistaken. As a result, his critique is fundamentally misguided.THE AIMS OF DP BROADCASTSParkinson's critique rests on an inappropriate standard. His central claim is that Channel 4's broadcast of the NHS DP did not replicate the participants' experience. Of course it did not. No broadcast could ever give viewers the same experience they would have if they were actually part of the DP's on-site, weekend-long deliberations. The broadcast in that case would have to be weekend-long, and there would actually have to be multiple broadcasts – as many as there are participants – since every participant's experience is different.

New Europe in transition

Core themes - the impact of globalisation across Europe, Peter Anderson et al. Section 1 The problems and prospects of Europe's major institutions: the problem and the future of the EU, Philippa Sherrington enlargement - the EU and eastern Europe, Karen Henderson the legal dimension of the EU, Georg Wiessala the external relations of the EU, Georg Wiessala western and eastern Europe and the problems and future of Nato and the OSCE, Peter Anderson the UN in east/west Europe and its interactions with European and European-based institutions, David Travers. Section 2 The problems and prospects of the former Soviet Union and a representative selection of EU States: the problems and future of the former Soviet Union, Chris William's the problems and future of Germany, Joanna McKay the problems and future of France, Robert Harmsen the problems and future of Italy, Peter Anderson the problems and future of Britain, Peter Anderson the problems and future of Spain, Keith Jenkinson the problems and future of Denmark, Alastair, Thomas, Frands Pedersen the problems and future of Portugal, Jack Hampson. Section 3 Problems and prospects within key aspects of Europe's cultural, economic and social dimensions: the problems and possible future developments of the notion of a European identity within the EU, Geoffrey Edwards the problems and future of the western and eastern European economies, Pete Anderson th social dimensions of the EU and the former USSR, Jack Hampson, Chris William's. Conclusion: overall picture, Peter Anderson et al.