Fundamental Ontological Category Research Articles

Metaphysics as a First Science, Again: How a Textbook on Metaphysics Is Possible. Book Review: Lowe E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Clarendon Press, 1998

Jonathan Lowe believes that metaphysics should regain its central place in philosophy. It is an autonomous philosophical discipline, which task is to outline the realm of what is really possible by defining a system of fundamental ontological categories under which everything that exists falls, and relations of ontological dependence in which objects of various ontological categories are related to each other. Metaphysical categories are what gives meaning to our experience, however, unlike I. Kant, they are not the result of a priori constraints – on the contrary, they are subject to revision in the face of experience. The question of why there is something in the world rather than nothing, is solved with a non-Wittgensteinian understanding of what the world is (world is the sum of all existing objects because world as “the totality of facts” lacks determinate identity-conditions), as well as an understanding that universals must be actually instantiated in particulars. Far from being an easy textbook in the proper sense, this book is a brilliant example of the return of Aristotle to modern metaphysics.Reflections on the book: Lowe E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Clarendon Press, 1998.

Existential and Architectural Space in the Human World: Gender Aspect

Introduction. Space acts as a basic category for many phenomena of the human world. Therefore, a full understanding and analysis of space is possible only when we take into account the presence of a person in it. The purpose of the study is the need to trace the close interrelation of human existence and space, their mutual influence and interdependence. The relevance of the paper is connected with the need to enlarge the category of space in the gender aspect of being. The research novelty consists in the attempt to systematize the accumulated knowledge in the field of the study of the category of space and its gender characteristics.Methodology and sources. The methodological basis of the work are philosophical analysis and cultural analysis. The main approach in the work is interdisciplinary. We used as sources philosophical works related to the problem of space (M. Heidegger, M. Foucault, M. Merleau- Ponty, G. Marcel) and gender (G. Marcuse, M. Foucault, J. Derrida, J. Lacan, Ju. Kristeva), theoretical works on architecture (A. Ikonnikov, A. Nekrasov, K. Nornberg-Schultz, A. Gabrichevsky), as well as some sociological works (P. Bourdieu, M. Vilkovsky, S.O. Khan- Magomedov). Separate works on semiotics (U. Eco) and the issues of metaphorization in culture (O. Freudenberg, E.S. Kubryakova) provided tangible assistance in the preparation of this text.Results and discussion. Being a fundamental ontological category, space is explored in various aspects of humanitarian discourse. The history of culture shows us the mobility of the categories “masculinity” and “femininity”, therefore, a natural question arises about the regular revision of these concepts, that affect the spatial characteristics of being in a specific historical epoch. In the course of the study, the following results were obtained. Based on the analysis of works from the field of anthropology, the study of the body and gender, as well as by identifying the features of the formation of architectural space, we can say that there is a close relationship between space and person. Our research shows that the body is the background of cognition of the world and the individual oneself, therefore it acts as the basis for the formation of a gender metaphor. We have studied the works of architects, and it was concluded that it is impossible to “catch” a specifically feminine or masculine manner in the professional activity of an architect. The reason is that, first of all, the architect is faced with a specific order and certain technical tasks.Conclusion. As a basic characteristic of human existence, space appears in human existence also as a communicative sphere. The primary bodily experience of space, that a human being gets from birth, largely determines the background of cognition of the world. Moreover, the space can carry gender-marked or gender-neutral information, and that gives us a reason to talk about the problem of perception and influence on a person. This can be traced through the metaphor of the architectural language, the ways of space organizing, highlighting with color, shape and construction. Therefore, architecture is distinguished from other types of art by its great dependence on social reality that generates it, since it is a part of the human living environment.

Deep gunk and deep junk

All parts of mereologically ‘gunky’ entities have proper parts. All parts relevant to mereologically ‘junky’ entities *are* proper parts. This essay explores the application of gunk and junk beyond the standard category of material object. One such application yields what is here dubbed ‘deep’ gunk and junk: a material entity x all of whose intrinsic elements from any fundamental ontological category C either (a) have proper parts from C that also are intrinsic elements of x (deep gunk), or (b) are proper parts of entities from C that also are intrinsic elements of x (deep junk). In addition to being independently interesting, these mereological structures pose a challenge to the bare particular ontology of substance. For bare particulars standardly are assumed to be mereologically simple, yet a deep gunky or junky entity requires any associated bare particulars to be complex. The essay closes by examining the bare particular theorist’s prospects for answering this challenge.

Health beyond the carbon barrier

Silicon Valley donors have been investing heavily in a range of transhumanist longevity and immortality ventures. Theirs is a particular, culturally embedded endeavor, shaped by specific histories, ideologies, and futures that present new posthuman views of life, death, and survival. These projects aim for a future world in which the fundamental ontological categories of mind, life, and nonlife will have finally collapsed into one another thanks to the intercession of silicon-based digital or informatic technologies. The key term that denotes such a project is ‘convergence’ – used as much by transhumanists as by mainstream scientists and policymakers. Here I critically explore the ‘project of convergence’, tracing its history in the United States, and examining some of the projects and activities that have coalesced around it. These specifically include artificial intelligence, in which human persons are to be transferred from carbon-based to silicon-based substrates, and nanotechnology, in which work at the nano resolution aims at the reconstitution of the carbon-based or biochemical body. Although the concept of convergence emerges out of a transhumanist imaginary, the ideas and plans behind it have gained increasing traction in mainstream technoscientific projects. In contrast to some other health concepts that have been recently expanded to incorporate the organic nonhuman environment, these projects expand notions of health via robotic and computational formations in ways that, I argue, are moving health beyond the carbon barrier, pushing us toward an era in which intelligent existence deserving of care will not be understood as exclusive to carbon-based life forms.

Чотирикатегорiальна онтологiя Едварда Джонатана Лоу (огляд)

Британський аналiтичний фiлософ Едвард Джонатан Лоу створює чотирикатегорiальну онтологiю як основу для метафiзики як теорiї категорiй. Фундаментальними онтологiчними категорiями онтологiї Е.Дж. Лоу є: об’єкт як субстанцiальна партикулярiя, вид як субстанцiальна унiверсалiя, властивостi та вiдношення як несубстанцiальнi унiверсалiї, спосiб буття як несубстанцiальна партикулярiя. Об’єкт є конкретним прикладом виду, який водночас може бути втiлений властивостями та вiдношеннями i характеризуватися способами буття. Способи буття є конкретними прикладами властивостей i вiдношень. Види можуть бути охарактеризованi властивостями та вiдношеннями.

Between Factualism and Substantialism: Structuralism as a Third Way

ABSTRACTAccording to the substantialist, substances should be regarded as the fundamental ontological category. This has been subjected to criticism, recently and notably by Buonomo and Cumpa, drawing on aspects of modern physics. In this vein, I argue that reflection upon the Standard Model of elementary particle physics also undermines the substantialist position. However this does not necessarily clear the way for the factualist. Focusing on Dasgupta’s ‘generalism’ I suggest that although we are not compelled to adopt this stance, it does open the door to the structuralist position that might be viewed as a ‘third way’ between substantialism and factualism.

La información y el regalo de Peirce al mundo

The purpose of this paper is to show that the concept of information can be regarded as a fundamental ontological category. An attempt is made to show that many conceptual difficulties in ontological and epistemological discourse have their roots in a static ontology. In the second part an attempt is made to show how an alternative philosophy of 'event' as interpreted in the light of Peirce's New List of Categories might provide the key to a reconstruction of the world which withstands the lure of dualism.

Ontological Consequences of the Ethics of Technology

Development of new technologies is accompanied by a necessary ethical reflection of them. This ethical reflection, for the sake of the legitimization of its own discourse, defines the relations between the fundamental ontological categories such as human, culture, nature, technology and product. Ontological interpretation of these relations is bound to the specific model of rationality. This study compares two types of rationality for the interpretation of the relations between the concepts of man, nature, and the culture of technological developments and formulates the ontological consequences of both approaches. The first approach is the theory of Arne Naes, who in his theory departs from an anthropocentric starting point for understanding the relation between man and nature, preferring instead an understanding of the biosphere as a bearer of moral values [1]. The bearer of values is not in the human consciousness which makes the evaluation of objects and nature but the bearer is in the ecosystem and its autonomous existence. Bruno Latour, on the contrary, includes in the complexity of being not only human beings but also the products of technological processes, calling them hybrids or quasi-objects. The nature and quasi-object together constitute a sphere of transcendence. A comparison of the two approaches is focused on the definition of transcendence as a potential bearer of values, meanings and moral responsibility. We compare both approaches and evaluate the possibility of their use in the development of new concepts in ethics of technology.

Authority Delegation

In this paper, we introduce a new concept to the field of scientonomy, that of authority delegation. Authority delegation is, in essence, a type of relation between distinct scientific communities whereby one community both recognizes another as an expert on a particular topic and will accept the theories it is told by the expert community over the same topic. Importantly, authority delegation is not a new fundamental ontological category along with theory and method. We show that authority delegation is reducible to the more basic concepts of theory and method. Furthermore, we suggest that authority delegation comes in two forms: one-sided authority delegation and mutual authority delegation.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2016-0003]: Accept the notion of authority delegation:Authority Delegation ≡ community A is said to be delegating authority over topic x to community B iff (1) community A accepts that community B is an expert on topic x and (2) community A will accept a theory on topic x if community B says so.[Sciento-2016-0004]: Provided that the preceding modification [Sciento-2016-0003] is accepted, accept the following notions of mutual and one-sided authority delegation, as subtypes of authority delegation: Mutual authority delegation ≡ communities A and B are said to be in a relationship of mutual authority delegation iff community A delegates authority over topic x to community B, and community B delegates authority over topic y to community A.One-Sided authority delegation ≡ communities A and B are said to be in a relationship of one-sided authority delegation iff community A delegates authority over topic x to community B, but community B doesn’t delegate any authority to community A.

The No-Category Ontology

In this paper we argue that there are no categories of being⎯at least not in the robust metaphysical sense of something fundamental. Central arguments that metaphysicians provide in support of fundamental categories, such as indispensability and theoretical utility arguments, are not adequate to guarantee their existence. We illustrate this point by examining Jonathan Lowe’s [2006] four-category ontology, and indicating its shortcomings. In contrast, we offer an alternative, no-category ontology, which dispenses with any fundamental categories of being, and provides a deflationary understanding of any categorization in terms of concepts. Concepts, we insist, as opposed to fundamental ontological categories, can always be revised, refined, and recast. A distinctive deflationary, no-category ontology then emerges.

EDUCATIONAL E-ENVIRONMENT THROUGH ENGLISH VOCABULARY DEVELOPMENT

The study objective is the investigation of innovative linguophilosophic aspects of English vocabulary development in the sphere of cybertechnologies. Research methodology is based upon the supposition of the cyberspace-related word-stock terminological nature. The dual systematization character of terminology determined the analysis of both linguistic and external (ontological, anthropological, social) paradigmatic parameters of English cybervocabulary. Paradigmatic parameters of English computer terminology are featured from the following perspectives: perception of basic dimensions of cyber-reality (“space” and “time”) and anthropologic categorization of cyber-reality, thus both the anthropocentric and the sociocentric paradigmatics of English cyber vocabulary are reflected. The “artificial” digital environment is acquiring more independence as far as the “parent” reality is concerned and establishes the basis for being considered a separate metalingual entity. Hence, one of the prior ways fundamental ontological categories are exposed within cyberspace being through the language (precisely by means of contributing to the modern English vocabulary), we may assume the natural language itself to find its realization in ontological manner.

Physical Computation as Dynamics of Form that Glues Everything Together

The framework is proposed where matter can be seen as related to energy in a way structure relates to process and information relates to computation. In this scheme matter corresponds to a structure, which corresponds to information. Energy corresponds to the ability to carry out a process, which corresponds to computation. The relationship between each two complementary parts of each dichotomous pair (matter/energy, structure/process, information/computation) are analogous to the relationship between being and becoming, where being is the persistence of an existing structure while becoming is the emergence of a new structure through the process of interactions. This approach presents a unified view built on two fundamental ontological categories: Information and computation. Conceptualizing the physical world as an intricate tapestry of protoinformation networks evolving through processes of natural computation helps to make more coherent models of nature, connecting non-living and living worlds. It presents a suitable basis for incorporating current developments in understanding of biological/cognitive/social systems as generated by complexification of physicochemical processes through self-organization of molecules into dynamic adaptive complex systems by morphogenesis, adaptation and learning—all of which are understood as information processing.

Long-Term Care: The Family, Post-Modernity, and Conflicting Moral Life-Worlds

Long-term care is controversial because it involves foundational disputes. Some are moral-economic, bearing on whether the individual, the family, or the state is primarily responsible for long-term care, as well as on how one can establish a morally and financially sustainable long-term-care policy, given the moral hazard of people over-using entitlements once established, the political hazard of media democracies promising unfundable entitlements, the demographic hazard of relatively fewer workers to support those in need of long-term care, the moral hazard to responsibility of shifting accountability to third parties, and the bureaucratic hazard of moving from individual and family choice to bureaucratic oversight. These disputes are compounded by controversies regarding the nature of the family (Is it to be regarded primarily as a socio-biological category, a fundamental ontological category of social reality, or a construct resulting from the consent of the participants?), as well as its legal and moral autonomy and authority over its members. As the disputes show, there is no common understanding of respect and human dignity that will easily lead out of these disputes. The reflections on long-term care in this issue underscore the plurality of moralities defining bioethics.

The Self: the Incredulous Stare Articulated

AbstractThis paper is an examination of Galen Strawson’s theory of the human person as a succession of momentary selves (or SESMETs: Subjects of Experience that are Single MEntal Things). Insofar as there is a clear distinction between enduring objects and events or processes, SESMETs would seem to partake of the features of both, for they are at once short‐lived subjects of consciousness and brief episodes of consciousness. Strawson in fact rejects the object/ process distinction, and contends that there is no sense in which a SESMET is a process and a rock is not a process. Strawson’s rejection of the object/process distinction is essential to his attempt to meet the charge that the concept of a SESMET is an incoherent conflation of the concept ‘object’ and the concept ‘process.’ But many philosophers will find the rejection of the object/process distinction objectionable on general metaphysical grounds. I suggest that these philosophers (I am one of them) and Strawson will not be able usefully to discuss issues in the philosophy of mind (such as his theory of SESMETs) till they have reached agreement about what the most fundamental ontological categories are.

Some problems for Lowe's four-category ontology

Journal Article Some problems for Lowe's four-category ontology Get access Max Kistler Max Kistler Université Paris X-Nanterre, and Institut Jean Nicod1bis, av. Lowendal 75007 Paris, Francekistler@ehess.fr Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 64, Issue 2, April 2004, Pages 146–151, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.2.146 Published: 01 April 2004

Theoretical Paradox and Practical Dilemma

Emmanuel Levinas sets up alterity as a fundamental ontological category, irreducible to being and nothingess. There are two difficulties in understanding this ontological alterity. On the one hand, Levinas formulates it with negative terms – infinition, abstraction, ab‐solutenes, trace of a past that has never been present. On the other hand, Levinas invokes the notions of the superlative, the Good, and God. These notions are very difficult to separate from the notion of a redoubling of the positivity by which the things of the world are posited in their own subsistent being. The quasi‐concepts with which Levinas has thematized the alterity of the others who face us in an ontological sphere of infinition, absoluteness, and abstractness have determined negatively what he envisions as beyond negativity and positivity. They reduce the determinateness of the wants and needs of another, and reduce the otherness of one other from other others. In addition, the positivism with which Levinas eliminates the imperatives with which the elements summon us and the material imperatives with which the things put demands on us effaces the phenomenality of the other whose want and needs are inscribed on the susceptibility and vulnerability of his surfaces of skin.

Forms of Physical Determination

Four forms of physical determination are presently known in physics: classical or mechanical determination, related to classical mechanics; dynamical determination, related to the relativistic theories of electromagnetism and gravitation; classical statistical determination, related to classical statistical theories; and quantum statistical determination, related to modern microphysics. The concept of interaction is a fundamental ontological category, a moment of which is the causal relation; interaction is also local, taking place at finite velocities. Following the evolution of physical theories, it is possible to attest to the historicity of the concept of interaction and, accordingly, of the categories of interaction and determination. According to the Copenhagen School, causality and locality are incompatible with quantum mechanics. On the contrary, according to the point of view developed here, realism, causality and locality are simultaneously compatible in the domain of microphysics.