Abstract
ABSTRACTAccording to the substantialist, substances should be regarded as the fundamental ontological category. This has been subjected to criticism, recently and notably by Buonomo and Cumpa, drawing on aspects of modern physics. In this vein, I argue that reflection upon the Standard Model of elementary particle physics also undermines the substantialist position. However this does not necessarily clear the way for the factualist. Focusing on Dasgupta’s ‘generalism’ I suggest that although we are not compelled to adopt this stance, it does open the door to the structuralist position that might be viewed as a ‘third way’ between substantialism and factualism.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
