Fundamental Dualism Research Articles

Foregrounding the Feminine Principle in Pushpa Kumari’s Contemporary Mithila Painting

This paper explores artist Pushpa Kumari’s female-centered perspectives in Mithila Paintings that foreground the grace of Shakti, goddess Kali, in all females. Moreover, it examines the agency of women as a source of fertility and energy centralizing on how the bi-union of Prakriti and Purusha, the cosmicized versions of the earthly phenomenal male and female, reflects one integrated form, an indivisible whole. Basically, the paper is based on Kumari’s preference for tantrism, which accepts fundamental dualism, through which an individual encounters universal phenomena. Thus, this paper will provide a new insight on females’ subjectivity—how in tantric rituals every woman, a counterpart of feminine principle, as a microcosmic version of feminine power shakti becomes a reincarnation of cosmic energy symbolizing the ultimate essence of reality.

Citizenship Violence and the Afterlives of Dutch Colonialism

Through a close reading of Anton de Kom’s Wij slaven van Suriname (We Slaves of Suriname), this essay explores the complex legal, symbolic, social, and political lives of differentially positioned humans in the Dutch colonial and postindependent context. Firstly, De Kom’s 1934 book reveals the fundamental dualism between legal subjects and rightless bodies in the Dutch colonial context and how European law and the rights of citizens enabled the maximum exploitation of colonized and enslaved bodies. Contrary to universalist-inclusive and progressive notions of legal citizenship and the law, the concept of what the author terms “citizenship violence” seems appropriate to appreciate the dynamics revealed in Wij slaven. However, as De Kom demonstrates, the colonized were not passive subjects; they resisted citizenship violence in multiple ways. Secondly, in discussing the racialization of citizenship and belonging in contemporary Dutch society as part of broader European patterns, the essay highlights some ominous colonial afterlives.

A Relational Marxist Critique of Posthumanism in Archaeology

In archaeology, a Posthumanism has arisen from the ashes of post-modernism and declared that Marxism is dead in archaeology. Archaeological advocates of the posthumanist theory of Symmetrical Archaeology cherry-pick ideas to dismiss Marxism out of hand without considering the depth and nuances of different Marxist theories. They misrepresent the relational dialectic as oppositional thinking and ignore the fundamental dualism of their own polemic. They equate humans and things by arguing that they share a common ontology. A relational Marxism resolves the dualistic nature of their polemic and shows that things, animals and people may be studied relationally while still recognizing ontological differences. Marxism lives.

Мистическое переживание вечности как предел переживания времени

This article aims to clarify two traditions of understanding time, namely the rationalistic, which includes the scientific (in the West, going back to the ‘Physics’ of Aristotle) and philosophical (going back in the West to Augustine), and mystical (the most methodically sustained is the Yogic tradition of Classical India and Sufism). The article contains several sections: Introduction raises the problem of time and sets the subject boundaries. The main part is comprised of the following sections: 1. Time as found in objects: a brief summary of the rational scientific and quasi scientific trend of time interpretation from Aristotle’s Physics to Reichenbach’s “Philosophy of Time and Space”. The physical one-sidedness of the consideration of time is completely immersed in the object domain. 2. Time as associated with the ontological subject: essential points of purely philosophical understanding of time beginning with St. Augustine via Kant up to Heidegger. This philosophical approach is no less one-sided, and comprehends time almost exclusively as a subjective phenomenon (memory, contemplation, desire, one’s own nature etc.) Both trends lack any discrimination between the initial indication of the phenomenon of time (the answer to the question ‘what is time as a phenomenon?’) and the interpretation of the meaning of this phenomenon (the answer to the question ‘how to understand the phenomenon of time?’). 3. Interpretations of the time phenomenon are implicitly based on the everyday mode of awareness. The problem of time is one of the most difficult problems to comprehend. The main thesis of the article is that the pra-phenomenon of time is revealed to consciousness from the necessarily occurring switching and comparison between two processes: orientation in the external world and attention to cogitation, i.e., between the external and internal. This duality coincides with the duality that is realized in the elementary unit of rational thought - judgment, the subject of which is recognized as belonging to the external world, and the predicate – to the internal. Separately, it is planned to consider the understanding of time in the mystical tradition. We will focus on two ways of understanding time - the rationalistic (philosophical), represented by the teachings of Kant, and the mystical, represented by the Sufis and Yogis (with an indication of the fundamental difference between them). Note that these two methods are not opposed by us, although in a sense they exclude each other. 4. Lapse of time and the notion of a mode of awareness. The ordinary mode of awareness called vikṣipta ‘dispersed’ in Yoga philosophy is characterized by a fundamental dualism of inner and outer worlds’ events. Both are processes and the non predicative comparison of their pace constitutes the ordinary experience of the lapse of time. This mode is the most habitual one and the very mode within which it is possible to speak and compose texts, however it is not unique. There exist other possibilities. 5. One-pointed awareness mode and the atemporal process. Voluntarily achieved one-pointedness has no distinction between the outer and inner world and is therefore ‘out of’ or ‘above’ time. It is well known in mystical literature (exemplified by the text by eminent Sufi author, Niffari). In European rational philosophy this position was explained by Hegel, but not in his ‘Philosophy of Nature”, usually associated with the concept of time, it was in the ‘Science of Logic’ (in the timeless unfolding of absolute knowledge). The Conclusion presents a summary. The crucial point which enables a thinker to overcome the traditional scientific and philosophical one-sidedness of the conceptualization of time is the notion of a mode of awareness and comprehension of the fundamental duality of outer world processes and cogitations’ succession. A non-ordinary awareness mode is methodologically elaborated in Yoga philosophy, witnessed in mystical Sufi texts, and finally, grasped in Hegel’s concept of a speculative proposition.

Public sociology and southern European societies: a critical view

The aim of our paper is to analyze the role that a properly reformed public sociology can play in enhancing the perspective of southern European societies. The paper is organized in three parts. In the first part, we summarize the main aspects of Burawoy’s proposal, while in the second part we will focus on three dimensions (communication, ethical-political and epistemological dimensions), detecting the fundamental dualism that runs through them and which we will try to clarify. In the third part we emphasize the substantial analogy of the three forms of dualism that characterize Burawoy’s proposal and suggest hypotheses of the solutions that have been promoted in the international debate; we will introduce our work in progress hypothesis of solution in accordance with the solution proposed for the epistemological dimension.

A Odisseia do Conceito de Liberdade no Idealismo Alemão

This article analyses – in a necessarily summarized and incomplete way – the antithetical configurations of Fichte’s, Schelling’s and Hegel’s concepts of freedom, taking them as attempts to resolve the fundamental dualism of modern thought, namely: the opposition of spirit and nature.

К проблеме мифологической и научной интерпретации фундаментального геополитического дуализма (ФГД)

К проблеме мифологической и научной интерпретации фундаментального геополитического дуализма (ФГД)

Aesthetics of Hyperactivity: A Study of the Role of Expressive Movement in ADHD and Capoeira

In the established classification of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), the symptoms of inattention and hyperactivity are primarily interpreted as neurodevelopmental disorders connected to a set of behavioral symptoms or traits. In this construction, behaviors or actions are understood in terms of a fundamental dualism between the acting body and the regulating or executing mind, which expresses a representational model of the mind. As an effort to challenge the representational description, this article addresses the expressive aspects of movement and behavior in ADHD. Based on a qualitative study combining ethnographic and phenomenological methods, the article focuses on a relationship between aesthetic or expressive bodily movement and behavioral awareness in children diagnosed with ADHD, and draws on the experimental and expressive aesthetics of capoeira to propose a rethinking of the role of movement in ADHD behavior. Capoeira’s perpetual movement is shown to transform the general traits of hyperactivity into a medium for expression and experimentation. When practiced by diagnosed children, capoeira helped them to gain expressive release, rather than to feel imprisoned, victimized, or even categorized by the hyperactive events that happen to them. Capoeira thus seems to afford a therapeutic potential for change immanent to the hyperactive movements associated with ADHD.

Le dualisme de l’Esprit et de la Nature du Sāṃkhya

Sāṃkhya, which is one of the oldest systems (darśana) of Indian Philosophy, advocates an uncompromising dualism in its theoretical metaphysical teachings. There is a fundamental dualism or split at the very heart of reality, and this dualism or split is the fundamental fact of existence.According to Sāṃkhya, there are two co‑present and co‑eternal realities. The first one is the principle of pure Consciousness, the Puruṣa, which is inactive, indifferent, eternally free and Alone. Puruṣa is the soul, the self, the spirit, the subject, the knower. The other of the two co‑present and co‑eternal realities of Sāṃkhya is Nature or Prakṛti : it is the primordial and unconscious “stuff ” of the entire unmanifest and manifest world, whereas Puruṣa is the presupposition of individual consciousness. Nature or Prakṛti is the ultimate material principle and thus the substratum from which manifest, in the presence of the self (puruṣa), the gross and subtle bodies including the mental organs of all living beings. But Sāṃkhya is not a dualism of mind and body or even a dualism of subject and object.In classical Sāṃkhya the world is not derived from consciousness, nor is consciousness derived from the world. The classical Sāṃkhya refuses to understand the world simply as a product of consciousness. It refuses to see the world as an illusory projection of consciousness, and thus it rejects any idealistic monism. Similarly, it refuses to see consciousness simply as a product of the world, and thus it rejects any kind of materialism or naturalism. Thus, it steers an intermediate course or path between the Indian notion of a conscious, cosmic Self or its equivalent, which is the ground of all being, on the one hand, and the notion of a conscious self, which is only an empirical, relative construction, on the other. It maintains, rather, a fundamental dualism, the opposite poles of which function in a kind of dialectical interaction. The fact of consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreductible realities in constant interplay with one another. Though quite separate and unconnected, Spirit and Nature mutually interact to bring about the process of creation, self‑awareness and, finally, enlightenment. But Spirit or Puruṣa and Nature or Prakṛti are always only in proximity to one another, never in actual contact. This is a puzzling notion if one thinks of Puruṣa and Prakṛti as two things. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are two realities of a completely different order.Right knowledge is the knowledge of the separation of the Puruṣa from the Prakṛti. The individual soul (jīva) has to realize itself as the pure Puruṣa through discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.From a rational point of view, classical Sāṃkhya can be regarded as a bundle of contradictions. Some problems regarding its interpretation are the problem of the nature of the Sāṃkhya dualism and the problem of the connection or relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Sāṃkhya system clings to spiritualistic pluralism and dualistic realism, but its very logic indeed impels it to embrace idealistic monism or absolutism.

Bloom's Lament for American Higher Education: A Deweyan Critique

Engaging issue of higher education's role in a democracy is a Gordian Knot that many insightful thinkers and profound authors have attempted to untangle. The purpose of this essay is to explicate distinct metaphysical postulates underlying thinking of two influential philosophers: Allan David Bloom (1930-1992) and John Dewey (1859-1952). Of course, these two men were quite clear as to ontological postulates underlying their arguments. It is due to that clarity that examination of their respective metaphysics contributes to our own contemporary understanding as we carry on discussion. One would be hard pressed to find a thinker more influential in twentieth century than John Dewey. This is true across wide spectrum of schools of thought and fields of inquiry, not least of which are philosophy of education and theory of democracy. His work remains actively studied and productively applied to this day. Allan Bloom's influence as a teacher of classical literature and political theory was sustained over many years, but his impact as an author was enhanced by his bestselling book The Closing of American Mind, published in 1987. Perhaps most often purchased and least read book of decade, it became a symbol in curriculum wars of period. Its popularity was in some ways unfortunate, for like most symbols, depth of its insight was too often lost in heat of debate. The more difficult chapters of book are well worth careful review. Faith in one's democratic fellow has always been and yet remains core matter of contention; one need not venture far into folly of human foible and frailty to question prudence of self-government. Certainly, from beginning of American Experiment, education has been promoted as best response to such misgivings. It is impossible to converse about democratic character, citizenship, or leadership without subject of education emerging, two are so entwined. Oftentimes, an impasse seems to be encountered and one feels compelled to choose from two less than satisfactory alternatives. It is at such moments that our unexamined assumptions are ripe for examination. This essay attempts to explicate some of those underlying assumptions about how is; that is to say, our ontology. Allan Bloom (1987) is insightful when he points out that fundamental crisis facing us today is incoherence and incompatibility among first principles with which we interpret world (p. 346). However, his solution to this predicament falls woefully short; indeed, it may serve to make matters worse. The philosophy of John Dewey provides a fruitful perspective from which to examine shortcomings of Bloom's thinking. Dewey also supplies an alternative to what Bloom views as underlying impasse. The essay below is divided into three sections. The first will summarize Allan Bloom's position as it is found in his influential book, The Closing of American Mind. The paraphrase found here will be tightly focused upon those postulates underlying a more extensive argument. The second section will offer a critical examination of these underpinnings found in Bloom's analysis of crisis in American higher education from perspective of John Dewey's thought. The final section will furnish a brief account of Dewey's alternative ontology as it relates to fundamental dualism underpinning Bloom's critique of American higher education. If reader returns to Dewey's original text, author will be delighted indeed. I. Openness and Demise of American College Student Allan Bloom addresses the state of our souls in a report from the front. The front of which he speaks is current scene of higher education as he found it in best universities. The students he encountered there are united in their claim that truth is relative. The belief that truth is relative is necessary to virtue which they hold most dear: openness. …

‘Rights and Obligations’ in WTO Law

The phrase “rights and obligations” recurs frequently in WTO law and suggests a fundamental dualism about WTO legal relations. Each WTO obligation is thought to be matched by a single, corresponding right. However, a close look at WTO law reveals that the phrase is, at best, a portmanteau term for a diversity of legal relations involving both rights and obligations, but also privileges and “no rights”, powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities. This working paper seeks to illuminate the rich array of legal relationships under WTO law and to identify some issues arising from their recognition in WTO decision-making.

Pedagogy as Self-Reference in External-Reference - Conceptual-Historical Theory Figures in the Discourse of Modernity (Pädagogik als Selbstbezug im Fremdbezug - Ideengeschichtliche Theoriefiguren im Diskurs der Moderne)

The designation of pedagogy as self-reference within the frame of external-reference points to a fundamental dualism within which, generally, human history is anchored: the position of man between his attachment to and liberation from nature, between attachment to and liberation from culture. Reading the history of mankind as a struggle against natural and cultural ties does not follow any ideologically-progressive scheme of reading, but rather searches for formal criteria of description. It is plausible that this varies, depending on perspective or the kind of question one raises. For pedagogy, as practical science of education and formation, this fundamental dualism of the history of mankind has to be specified as follows: Structurally, the term of education is about the relationship between what has been effected and effecting, which means it deals with forms of instruction being directed towards becoming socially-independent. In this context, the pedagogical question incorporates the problem of coercion and freedom, taking into perspective social and cultural aspects represented in the educator-pupil relation. In the educational act, the pedagogical problem will be formulated as to how self-realization can be produced on condition of functional access of institutional and social power. In contrast, the formation term operates on the correlation of being-formed and self-formation. Within this frame, this relationship structurally deals with processes which focus on individuality. In this context, the pedagogical problem is the question of how, in educational processes and in processes of arguing about the Thing and the Other, a self-relationship can be established. The formal description of education and formation as correlative as self-reference in the external-reference, implies, in view of the formation of an educational theory, that tension terms, within which the concepts of education and formation constituted, have to be determined. Furthermore, it also implies to work out how the underlying dualism can be transformed into a theoretical approach in regard to education and formation. As for modernity, I will confine myself to deal with the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Enrique Dussel. Focusing on those authors, it can be illustrated that the pedagogical questions of self-realization and self-formation are founded on very different figures of duality and, therefore, will result in different and sometimes divergent conceptions of the pedagogical theory.

A Logic of Ethical Information

The work of Luciano Floridi lies at the interface of philosophy, information science and technology, and ethics, an intersection whose existence and significance he was one of the first to establish. His closely related concepts of a philosophy of information (PI), informational structural realism, information logic (IL), and information ethics (IE) provide a new ontological perspective from which moral concerns can be addressed, especially but not limited to those arising in connection with the new information and communication technologies. In this paper, I relate Floridi's approach to another novel perspective, namely, that of an extension of logic to complex real processes, including those of information production and transfer. This non-propositional, non-truth-functional logic (logic in reality (LIR)) is grounded in the fundamental dualism (dynamic opposition) inherent in energy and accordingly present at all levels of reality. The LIR description of the dynamics of processes and their evolution is relevant to what Floridi refers to as the possible non-linguistic aspects of information. It suggests answers to some of Floridi's “outstanding problems” in PI related to the ontological status of information and how it is used in cognition. Floridi's IL retains the formal structure of the doxastic and epistemic logics from which he correctly distinguishes it and is the basis for his conceptual PI. However, LIR fulfills Floridi's implied requirement that logic be regarded as a natural phenomenon dealing with other natural phenomena, recovering its original philosophical function. LIR provides a logical foundation for discussion of ethical questions based on kinds of information that complements IL. Both are reconsiderations of logic that, as Marijuan suggests, may be necessary for the advancement of information technology in an ethical direction (cf. also Brenner). IE focuses on entities as constituted by information in an overall strategy that generalizes the concept of moral agents. LIR and its related ontology naturalize critical aspects of Floridi's theses, especially, the moral value of being as such and a non-separable joint responsibility of individuals and groups. I compare IE to other current approaches to ethics and information technology (e.g., phenomenological and social constructivist). Ethical information is defined “ecologically” in process terms as reality in a physical space (cf. Floridi), with an intentional “valence,” positive and negative, in the morally valued interaction between producer and receiver. LIR is neither topic-neutral nor context independent and can support an ethics involving apparently contradictory perspectives (e.g., internalist and externalist). Ethics involves practical reasoning, and unlike standard logics, LIR supports Magnani's approach to abductive reasoning in rational moral decision making. The basis of moral responsibility and the consequent behavior of individuals involved in information and communications technologies is the same logical–metaphysical principle of dynamic opposition instantiated at other levels of reality. The way moral responsibilities are actively accepted (or not) by individuals supervenes on their primitive psychological structure, which in turn reflects an evolutionary development grounded in the fundamental dualism of the physical world. The paper concludes with some suggestions of areas of philosophical research, such as causality, identity, and the ontological turn, where convergence of the Floridi and LIR approaches might be envisaged. Their overall motivation is the same, namely, the development of strategies for reinforcing and increasing ethical sensitivity wherever possible. The ethical information concept outlined in the paper supports the function of IE, assigned to it by Floridi, of potentially determining what is right and what is wrong.

“THE STORM DIDN'T DISCRIMINATE”: Katrina and the Politics of Color Blindness

Hurricane Katrina exposed the politics of race, poverty, and inequality to broad public view for the first time in a generation. But the storm and its aftermath also constituted a metaphor for the deep tension between color-blind and race-conscious models of politics that has long been one of the central and defining themes of U.S. politics. In this essay, I explore Hurricane Katrina as a window onto this fundamental dualism in U.S. political culture, its ambivalent embrace of both color blindness and race consciousness. In the storm's immediate aftermath, President George W. Bush became the unlikely mouthpiece of this dualism, and I examine his contradictory statements about race in the storm's wake and place them in historical context. I connect these presidential statements to the broader political context that shapes race policymaking in order to ask whether Katrina and the political response it provoked might generate a policy response that takes seriously the problem of racial inequality exposed by the storm. A brief account of a parallel historical example of race-conscious policy emerging from political conditions apparently dominated by color blindness, the emergence of affirmative action in employment in the 1960s and 1970s, emphasizes the mixture of ideological and strategic, political factors that shape U.S. race politics and policy, and suggests a set of ideological and institutional conditions that may be necessary to generate such a dramatic change in policy direction. I conclude by drawing some lessons from this history for post-Katrina race politics.

Truth Is What Works : Francisco J. Varela on Cognitive Science, Buddhism, the Inseparability of Subject and Object, and the Exaggerations of Constructivism--A Conversation

Francisco J. Varela (1946-2001) studied biology in Santiago de Chile, obtained his doctorate 1970 at Harvard University with a dissertation on the insect eye, and worked there for some time in the laboratory of Torsten Wiesel, the later Nobel Laureate for medicine. From his scientific beginnings as a researcher in biology, he not only studied and practiced biology but, resisting the dominating mainstream, pursued a research program that ignored and broke down traditional disciplinary boundaries. This research program is best characterized as experimental epistemology, a concept introduced by the neuropsychiatrist and cybernetician Warren S. McCulloch. Francisco J. Varela's great aspiration was to examine and answer the philosophical ur-question of cognition with scientific precision and with the help of the best possible theoretical framework. [End Page 35] Having obtained his doctorate, he went back to Chile to work as a professor of biology together with Humberto R. Maturana. He contributed to the writing of the theory of autopoiesis, which was to cause a furor in the world of science as a universally applicable explanatory model. After the overthrow of Allende and the installation of the dictatorship by the putsch general Pinochet, Francisco J. Varela first escaped to Costa Rica, then became a professor at the American University of Colorado and University of New York, and finally returned in 1980 to the University of Chile in Santiago for five years. Temporary positions as guest professor for neurobiology, philosophy, and cognitive science in Germany, Switzerland, and France led him to Paris in the end, where he worked as research director of the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique until his death on May 28, 2001. In his research work embracing cognitive science, evolutionary theory, and immunology, Francisco J. Varela, constantly inspired by his fundamental interest in the key questions of epistemology, gave the epistemological debate a new orientation. In his thinking he refuses to accept the strict separation of subject and object, of knower and known, which as a rule unites realists and constructivists alike. Francisco J. Varela rejects the fundamental dualism dividing mind and world, which had shaped Western philosophy from its earliest beginnings. He does not subscribe to the idea that human individuals can invent their own realities—blindly and arbitrarily, and without experiencing any resistance from the external world and all other things given. He equally distances himself, however, from the diametrically opposite position that overstates the eigenpower of the world of objects. The external world and all other things given cannot determine what happens in an organism. Varela's claim is that individual and world create each other. The Computational Model of the Mind Poerksen: The ancient key questions of philosophy are at the center of modern cognitive science. What is the essence of the mind? Do our conceptions represent a given world, which is independent from our minds? What is the formative power of external objects over our perceptions? How does cognition function? The search for an adequate answer and an improved understanding of the human mind has led many cognitive scientists to entertain the assumption that the brain is actually a kind of computer. Memory is taken to be a store. Thinking and perceiving are understood as data processing in the sense that an independent external world is computationally transformed into symbols and represented in the organism in this manner. You are very critical of this view. Why? Varela: If the brain is considered as a kind of computer, then cognitive research is limited to discovering certain self-sufficient shapes—the symbols—together with the rules [End Page 36] governing them—the programs. But this search for symbols and programs will never be profitable because it...

Creative Industries and the Limits of Critique from

Creative Industries and the Limits of Critique from

Beyond Dualism, Splits, and Schisms: Social Justice for a Renewal of Vocational–Academic Education

To fulfill the democratic dream for American schooling, educators and policymakers need to work together for the same common cause: reforming the academic-vocational dichotomy of schooling that has persisted over the past century. Academic subjects continue to be separated from vocational schooling with the effect of diluting each domain's effectiveness. The Deweyian vision of social justice provides a solution for healing this fundamental dualism that characterizes schooling. Even where integration has been attempted using academic-vocational models, tracking continues in public schools without commitment to whole-school reform design. This article discusses these issues in the context of the history of vocational education and Dewey's perspective of integrated education through the occupations. The authors also illustrate the concepts presented through promising whole-school reform designs for democratizing the public education system. Policy implications are addressed for moving toward a socially just system of schooling.

A Handbook of Integrative Psychotherapies for Children and Adolescents

A Handbook of Integrative Psychotherapies for Children and Adolescents

Tiempo del espacio y espacio del tiempo en los Andes

Time of space and space of time in the Andes. Using concrete examples of rituals, mythology, toponymies and astronomy, the author illustrates that the categories of space and time can be represented as homologous structures. The comparison of the ethnographic material with data from the chronicles shows that time, mythical space, indigenous geography and the society itself are organized in terns of a classical scheme of oppositions between Nature and Culture, with a particular emphasis on the intermediate category. The data in pathology (etiology, symptomatology, designations of the curers and curing) are likewise analized in terms of this fundamental dualism of the Andean culture. Together all these traits form a series of dual oppositions which are incased ones in the others : from the concepts of space and cosmic time to the space occuped by the village and even to the body of the sick.

The Changing Boundary between the State and Higher Education

The relationship between the university and the state is one of crucial importance and abiding interest, not least to those in universities. It is, of course, by no means a new preoccupation. As early as 1798, the philosopher Kant sought to provide a suitable model to balance, on the one hand, the necessary independence from bureaucratic intervention that constitutes the sine qua non of scholarship, and on the other, the requirement that the state have some measure of control over those professions that an American political scientist, David Easton, has termed the value-allocating bodies in society-in effect, law, theology and medicine [1]. These three professions, Kant argued, were the legitimate area for state regulation, since they affected its well-being and influenced the thinking of its citizens. Philosophy, by contrast, did not fall into this category. Concerned with the pursuit of scholarship and truth, not only was it free to judge the teaching of other faculties, but because Man is by nature free and thus not under any constraint but the one of that pursuit, state regulation in such an area was inappropriate [2]. In short, the Kantian model was one in which the relationship between the state and the university was based on a fundamental dualism, expressed not so much in the field of teaching and learning as in the distinction between those areas where the state might intervene and those where it might not. The counterpoint to this model was provided by the Humboltian concept of the university. In theory, it did not distinguish between areas of state intervention, but rather sought to develop a totality of non-intervention expressed in the form of freedom for teaching and research. As many writers have pointed out, this ideal did not easily adjust to the growing requirements for the professional training of business and administration that emerged in the course of the 19th century. The establishment of research organisations, generally under state supervision in 19th century Prussia, organisations usually outside or on the periphery of the university [3], in fact, gave rise to a situation nearer to the one suggested by Kant than that incorporated in the early days of the University of Berlin. In short, the development of professional schools and research institutes in 19th century Germany, and the growth of similar bodies in the form of the Grandes Ecoles in France, underlined the fact that the notional independence of the university was possible only at the price of setting up either a parallel sector, legally distinct from the university, or a series of affiliated organisations attached to it, in regard to which state intervention was seen as reasonable.