Functional Contextualism Research Articles

A Functional Contextual Account of Background Knowledge in Categorization: Implications for Artificial General Intelligence and Cognitive Accounts of General Knowledge.

Psychology has benefited from an enormous wealth of knowledge about processes of cognition in relation to how the brain organizes information. Within the categorization literature, this behavior is often explained through theories of memory construction called exemplar theory and prototype theory which are typically based on similarity or rule functions as explanations of how categories emerge. Although these theories work well at modeling highly controlled stimuli in laboratory settings, they often perform less well outside of these settings, such as explaining the emergence of background knowledge processes. In order to explain background knowledge, we present a non-similarity-based post-Skinnerian theory of human language called Relational Frame Theory (RFT) which is rooted in a philosophical world view called functional contextualism (FC). This theory offers a very different interpretation of how categories emerge through the functions of behavior and through contextual cues, which may be of some benefit to existing categorization theories. Specifically, RFT may be able to offer a novel explanation of how background knowledge arises, and we provide some mathematical considerations in order to identify a formal model. Finally, we discuss much of this work within the broader context of general semantic knowledge and artificial intelligence research.

Contextualism, psychological science, and the question of ontology

There has recently been a renewed interest in philosophy among some psychologists, particularly those working within the modern behavior analytic framework known as contextual behavioral science. Functional contextualism (FC) has emerged as an alternative to the dominant mechanistic view – generally associated with epistemological realism—within psychology. The most controversial feature of FC has been its so-called “a-ontological” stance, in which it is argued that any statements about even the mere existence of a reality independent of human sensation are meaningless. We argue that FC in fact requires the assumption of the existence of such a “reality,” which we term an “independent, textured substratum,” if it is to serve as an orienting function for psychological science. Moreover, wholesale rejection of any reference to any ontological dimension is itself incommensurate with the analytic goals of FC in that it unnecessarily alienates scientists who might otherwise find value in the sensitivities of FC.

Functional Contextualism in Learning and Instruction: Pragmatic Science or Objectivism Revisited?

0 Eric Fox presents an interesting case for applying functional contextualism (FC) constructs and principles to learning and instruction. He draws on several well-debated issues related to the instructional design and technology (IDT) field's shifting philosophical-epistemological roots and pedagogical practices. His is not the first attempt to question the foundations of the field or propose pragmatic alternatives to reconciling constructivist-inspired practices with time-tested, traditional instructional design methods (see, for example, Lebow, 1993; Rieber, 1993); it will not be the last. However, Fox raises several issues that require clarification. This is perhaps the nature of straw-man arguments: To strengthen the face validity of a particular perspective, the legitimacy of competing perspectives must first be undermined. In this case, Fox provides a selective and somewhat limited analysis of constructivist-inspired approaches to bolster the case for and significance of FC advocacy. While I will not revisit the largely unproductive objectivist-constructivist debates of the past decade, I question several of Fox's assertions and argue that while FC has value for the IDT field, it is consistent with and an extension of objectivist-inspired instructional engineering rather than an alternative to constructivist-inspired approaches.