Function Of Punishment Research Articles

Response speed following failure in a two-choice game as a function of reward, punishment, and response pattern.

Response speed following failure in a two-choice game as a function of reward, punishment, and response pattern.

The Expressive Function of Punishment

The Expressive Function of Punishment

Children's discrimination learning as a function of reward and punishment.

Children's discrimination learning as a function of reward and punishment.

Perceptual differentiation as a function of nondifferential reward and punishment.

Perceptual differentiation as a function of nondifferential reward and punishment.

The Social Function of Punishment

TheoriaVolume 13, Issue 1 p. 1-46 The Social Function of Punishment Âke Petzäll., Âke Petzäll.Search for more papers by this author Âke Petzäll., Âke Petzäll.Search for more papers by this author First published: January 1947 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1947.tb00512.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume13, Issue1January 1947Pages 1-46 RelatedInformation

The Function of Punishment in Learning

* Accepted for publication by K. S. Lashley of the Editorial Board, and received in the Editorial Office on July 28, 1937.

Motivation in learning. IV. The function of punishment as determined by its temporal relation to the act of choice in the visual discrimination habit.

Motivation in learning. IV. The function of punishment as determined by its temporal relation to the act of choice in the visual discrimination habit.

The Punishment of Crime

Inspired by a suggestive article2 on the function of punishment by a member of the Florida bar, the assertion is made that the power to sentence should not be entrusted to, or exercised by, the trial judge. Governor Manning, a layman, in an address before the National Conference of Charities and Corrections at Pittsburgh, on June 13th, 1917, said: work of the criminal courts should be judicial merely, and not both judicial and administrative as now.3 As the punishment of crime has been regarded in this state from earliest times as a semi-legislative and semi-judicial act, the suggestion of the governor invites a review of this subject. Mr. Garrett, whose article inspired the governor's opinion, speaking of the judiciary, says: Its appropriate duty (in relation to crime) is to perform one function, the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. An act has been declared unlawful. Has the defendant done that act? That is all that appertains to the province of the courts of law. Consequently, the trial should end with the verdict. Sentence is not merely superfluous (aside from its mere formal aspect as approval of the verdict), it is extra judicial. That the power of sentence does not belong to the nisi prius judge may appear an unjustifiable didactic conclusion. It is, however, rested upon sound argument. The object of a criminal trial is to adjudicate guilt or innocence of one act. On the other hand, the object of sentence is according to notions now becoming current, to reform the person convicted of having done that act. ... The legislature acts only on the mass, and as the courts, without another trial of each prisoner convicted, are not sufficiently informed to give sentence, the function of punishment lies outside the purview of the legislature and the judiciary. As a consequence, if all government is 'divided into three parts,' the administrative department is the proper organ to perform the function. Administrative are here treated as executive acts. There may be a difference between them.

The Function of Punishment

In England and in the United States, since time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, the punishment of crime has been a semi-legislative, semi-judicial act. Yet, in principle, it belongs to the administrative arm of polity. So long as the scheme of government under which England operated remained an apparently hapzard amalgam of political expedients and historical developments the anomaly was imperceptible. When, however, Montesquieu reduced the conglomeration to theory and principle, and separated the functions of government, as exercised in that country, into the co-ordinated departments denominated executive, legislative and judical, a vague conception of the difficulty became possible. Yet the practice of Government in England so imperfectly distinguished and demarcated the three divisional parts thereof that the misplacement of the power of punishment was not concretely and clearly observable. The framers of the United States Constitution, however, hardy theorists that they were, deliberately delimited the bounds of the several functions of their new sovereignty, and divided the one from the other as, of old, the waters were divided from the dry land. And now the faults caused by imperfect divisions of the components of the system became obvious. And the function of punishment stood, like an island of administration, in the midst of the conflicting currents of the legislature and the judiciary, a forlorn outpost beset by the combers of the seas. Nevertheless, as the explanation of the identity of things geological has often followed long after the recognition of similarity, the fact that this little island belonged to the neighboring continent has not been consciously recognized until today. Many years have now passed since movements in prison reform began, and progress has been remarkable. We have improved the surroundings of the prisoner, and the influences that play upon him from within the penal institutions. We have added to his economic value. We have braced his self-respect. We are assuming a respon-